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Abstract 
 
          The first essay considers a model in which an entrepreneur develops a 
technology and seeks to sell a stake of her asset for diversification purposes. In our 
model, output depends on both the quality of the asset and the non-contractible effort 
made by investors. In this case, signalling the asset type and motivating the investors 
are two conflicting objects. Our model shows that by applying a mechanism with 
endogenous commitment, entrepreneurs can achieve the second best allocation. 
Moreover, when the proportion of high type entrepreneurs is high, our model predicts 
that low-quality entrepreneurs will sell all of their shares above the fair price 
(overpricing) whereas the high-quality entrepreneurs may retain a fraction of their 
shares and sell their share below the fair price (underpricing).   
 
          The second essay illustrates a model in which an entrepreneur intends to 
securitize her risky asset to invest in a new project. In contrast to the settings of 
pecking order theory, outside investors are able to acquire the type information of the 
asset by making an effort. This new assumption allows the entrepreneurs to signal their 
types by motivating the investors’ information searching behaviour. Moreover, our 
model also endogenizes the existence of intermediaries in the issuing process. We 
conclude that if intermediaries are allowed to offer a menu of contracts to the 
entrepreneurs, a second best allocation can be sustained as an equilibrium.   
  
           The third essay considers a general model in which agents with different 
production technologies insure each other by entering a futures contract. However, 
unobservable risk exposure and strategic default of counterparty may prevent agents 
from fully hedging their risk. In this paper, we compare the market efficiency using 
two different trading mechanisms—OTC market and centralised clearinghouse. Our 
model shows that without any aggregate uncertainty, both mechanisms can achieve 
the second best allocation. Nevertheless, when aggregate uncertainty is introduced into 
the market, a centralised clearinghouse may dominate the OTC market by including 
more market participants and diversifying the risk more widely. Additionally, our 
model predicts that when aggregate uncertainty is extremely high, the central 
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clearinghouse may have the incentive to provide extra liquidity to certain types of 
market participants for risk control purposes. 
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Chapter I: 
  
Overview 
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      This thesis consists of three theoretical essays focusing on the optimal mechanism 
design for liquidity provision. Briefly speaking, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 consider 
models with active investors. The key difference is that the investors are active in 
different respects. In Chapter 2, investors are active in the production process, which 
means that they can affect the final output by privately choosing their effort level. In 
Chapter 3, investors are active in information acquisition. In another word, investors 
endow with access to the quality information of the project in which they invest. 
Chapter 4 illustrates a model in which investors with different liquidity demand insure 
each other with futures contracts. In this model, contracts are unobservable to third 
parties, and counterparties of the contract can strategically default. Across the whole 
thesis, we attempt to answer the following two questions: How should we modify our 
trading mechanism to adapt to these new characteristics of investors? What roles do 
the centralised intermediaries plays in this new market? 
 
        The answer to the first question results from the research on liquidity provision 
under asymmetric information (for example, Leland and Pyle (1977) and Myers and 
Majluf (1984)). In these papers, investors are usually assumed to be homogeneous and 
passive. However, the speed of financial innovation (such as online trading platforms 
and derivative exchanges) has far exceeded the expectation of previous researchers. 
The effect brought by innovation has strongly modified investors’ behaviour in recent 
years. For example, Kaplan and Stromberg (2000) and Hellmann and Manju (2000) 
noted that institutional investors such as venture capitalists might play an active role 
in a firm’s operation. They provide professional services such as management group 
formation, network building, and product design. Moreover, Fulghieri and Lukin 
(2001) suggest that previous research on optimal securities design ignore the 
information production abilities of outside investors. If investors are allowed to 
identify the quality of assets by exerting effort, high-quality entrepreneurs may choose 
to issue risky securities to motivate investors’ monitoring activities. 
  
        To cover the new characteristics of investors, in Chapter 2, we consider models 
in which privately informed entrepreneurs issue securities to investors with advising 
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capacity. In this Chapter, we find that the conventional methods of signalling (such as 
equity retention and issuing information-insensitive securities), may not guarantee 
separation unless we introduce a mechanism with the endogeneity of commitment 
(Koufopoulos 2010). The main advantage of this mechanism is that it allows cross-
subsidies to be introduced, which can solve the new conflicts associated with active 
investors. In Chapter 2, when the advising services offered by investors become 
valuable, the unilateral dilemma about equity retention can be extended into a bilateral 
one.  On one hand, entrepreneurs may face a more serious choice in the issuing process 
compared to the model described by Leland and Pyle, because equity retention for 
signalling may not only prevent entrepreneurs from diversifying their portfolio but 
also undermine the incentive for investors to contribute effort to their firm. On the 
other hand, investors must identify the high-quality projects that are worthy of their 
contribution. Therefore, for separation purposes, equity retention becomes a necessary 
method to signal entrepreneurs’ type about their projects. However, higher equity 
retention may also mean less value to be shared by investors, which makes them 
reluctant to exert effort. As mentioned above, a mechanism with “endogeneity of 
commitment” must be introduced to make the second best allocation sustainable. 
Under this mechanism, the investors can offer contracts with or without commitment. 
It converts a normal signalling game into a screening game and effectively restricts 
the existence of deviating contracts offered by rivals. As a result, the separating menu 
can be sustained as an equilibrium in a wider parameter range and the social efficiency 
can be improved. 
 
With regard to Chapter 3, we consider another securities issuing model with 
entrepreneurs and speculative investors. In this model, we define speculative investors 
as those who can acquire signals correlating to the quality of the project. In that case, 
high type entrepreneurs may issue information-sensitive securities (such as equity) to 
motivate investors’ information acquisition behaviour to separate themselves from the 
low types. However, as the cost of doing so, high-quality entrepreneurs could suffer 
from the adverse selection procedure when investors’ signals are imperfect. To cope 
with the dilemma above, in this model we endogenize the existence of the 
intermediaries. We show that speculative ability of the investors may force the 
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intermediaries to offer a separating menu, which in return improve the social 
efficiency. 
  
            Chapter 4 illustrates a model in which investors attempt to offer liquidity to 
each other through a forward contract. Departing from the other two chapters, 
contracts offered by agents are not backed by any tangible asset, and the number of 
contracts taken by individuals is unobservable. Therefore, strategic default is possible 
in our model. Investors who participate in the forward contracts must face counterparty 
risk. In this case, our model shows that both a voluntary report system (Leitner 2012) 
and a central clearinghouse system can achieve the second best allocation in an 
economy without aggregate uncertainty. When aggregate uncertainty is introduced, 
the central clearinghouse may become dominant in risk control and liquidity provision.  
 
         As mentioned at the beginning of this part, our essay also attempts to illuminate 
the role of central financial intermediaries—institutional investors and central 
clearinghouses. First, for institutional investors, previous research has shown that 
firms backed by institutional investors with venture capital and private equity are more 
innovative (Kortum and Lerner 2000) and profitable (Gompers and Lerner 1999a,b, 
2001). However, most previous research attributed this effect to the superior 
information acquisition ability and monitoring skill of institutional investors (Winton 
2001, DeMarzo 2005). None of them attempted to explain the impact of the 
mechanism itself. Hence, in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, we explain this efficiency gain 
with the mechanism design instead of the ability of institutional investors. By 
introducing the intermediaries, the separating menu with cross-subsidies can be 
sustained as an equilibrium. In the circumstance we discuss, this separation improve 
the social efficiency by revealing the necessary information for securities buyers to 
react optimally in the following steps.   
 
 
        Secondly, with regard to the central clearinghouse, Bernanke (1990) empirically 
analysed the role played by the clearinghouses in the futures market. He concluded 
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that by substituting itself as a seller to every buyer and a buyer to every seller, a 
clearinghouse becomes an official ‘party to every trade’. This party substitution 
function effectively reduces the counterparty risk and improves market efficiency. 
Nevertheless, Duffie and Zhu (2011) suggested that adding a central clearing platform 
(CCP) to each certain deviated market may reduce netting efficiency. This in turn leads 
to an increase in average exposure to counterparty risk. In Chapter 4, we find that the 
superiority of a central clearinghouse may stand out when aggregate uncertainty is 
introduced into the system, because the optimal allocation may not necessarily be 
collusion-proof. Conversely, participants of the futures market may always have the 
incentive to exclude other participants with the same liquidity demand to increase their 
position. However, this incentive may lead to overexposure of systemic risk and higher 
ex-post defaulting rate. Additionally, people who are excluded from the futures market 
may have to insure themselves with their savings. This limits the systematic risk to be 
efficiently shared among the whole society. Our model illustrates that social welfare 
can be improved by including all agents in the market. However, for this contract to 
be implemented the clearinghouse must have the power to standardise all tradable 
contracts. In addition, the clearinghouse should be authorised to charge agents with 
high-risk exposure and subsidise other agents with an anti-business circle cash flow. 
All of these functions rely on the bargaining power of the clearinghouse, so we 
conclude that a market with a central clearinghouse may have a higher resistance to 
aggregate uncertainty. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In most theoretical models of financial contracting under asymmetric information, 
financiers are assumed to be passive and risk neutral, whereas entrepreneurs are either 
risk neutral or risk averse. In models with risk-neutral entrepreneurs, different types 
of entrepreneurs issue different securities (or combinations of securities) to convey 
information about their types1. If entrepreneurs are assumed to be risk averse, high-
quality entrepreneurs (firms) can signal their type by retaining a sufficiently high 
fraction of their firm’s equity. The retention of shares conveys a credible signal 
because it implies a utility cost from under-diversification. This utility cost is even 
higher for entrepreneurs with low-quality firms. When the retention becomes 
sufficiently high, a separating equilibrium arises (Leland and Pyle, 1997). 
 
Recently, several empirical studies have illustrated that venture capital plays an 
active role in a firm’s operation and influences the firm’s financing choices 2. In 
response, theoretical models have incorporated the role of financiers as advisors who 
improve the operational efficiency of the company they finance. In this paper, we 
construct a model in which the financier (venture capitalist) also works as an advisor. 
The model is similar to that of Baldenius and Meng (2010). Entrepreneurs are assumed 
to be risk averse and financiers to be risk neutral. Financiers can improve the firm’s 
value by exerting effort (advising). However, the key difference between our model 
and theirs is that we use the three-stage screening game suggested by Koufopoulos 
(2010) 3  instead of the two-stage signaling game. The main characteristic of this 
screening game is that the financiers optimally decide whether they commit or not to 
                                                          
1For example, Brennan and Kraus (1987), Constantinides and Grundy (1989), and Stein (1992). 
2For example, Kaplan and Stromberg (2000), and Hellmann and Puri (2000). 
3More specifically, we consider a three-stage game where at stage 1, financiers offer menus of contracts 
and specify which of them they are committed to and which not; at stage 2, entrepreneurs apply for (at 
most) one menu from one financier; and at stage 3, the financiers decide which of the menu offered at 
stage 1 without commitment will be withdrawn and which not. Of course, after stage 3, provided the 
financier has not withdrawn the menu and the menu is signed by both parties, the financier becomes 
committed to it. 
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the contracts they offer. They can also offer menus of contracts which allows for cross-
subsidization across types (contracts).  
 
In this context, the equilibrium always exists, it is (second-best) efficient and 
unique. More specifically, the possibility of cross-subsidization across contracts is, in 
general, necessary for the achievement of efficient allocations. Also, the ability of the 
financier (uninformed) to commit to a menu of contracts makes the decision of the 
entrepreneurs of whether to take it independent of their beliefs about who else takes it. 
As a result, starting from any inefficient allocation, it is always possible for a financier 
to offer a menu with commitment (off-the-equilibrium path) that profitably attracts 
both types. That is, the combination of cross-subsidization across types and the ability 
of a financier to commit to a menu (off-the-equilibrium path) eliminates any inefficient 
allocation as an equilibrium. Also, efficient allocations other than the one which 
maximizes the expected utility of the good type cannot be supported as equilibria. A 
deviant firm can offer with commitment a menu which makes the good type better off 
and profitably attract either only the good type or both types. Finally, the ability of a 
financier to offer a menu without commitment (on-the-equilibrium path) acts a threat 
for a potential entrant and supports this allocation as an equilibrium.  
 
Finally, our model has some interesting empirical implications. First, if the 
operating risk and the proportion of high-quality firm are high, then the equity of high-
quality firms is underpriced and that of the low-quality overpriced. Second, there is a 
negative correlation between equity retention and operating risk and proportion of 
high-quality firm.  
 
2 Literature review 
 
Our model is related to many strands of the literature. First, on theoretical grounds, 
our paper is related to Wilson (1977). Wilson proposes a non-Nash-type equilibrium 
concept (Anticipatory Equilibrium) under which an equilibrium always exists. If 
some feasible (no loss-making) pooling allocations Pareto-dominate the Rothschild-
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Stiglitz separating allocation, the zero-profit pooling allocation which maximizes the 
expected utility of the low risk is the unique “Wilson equilibrium.” The key in 
Wilson’s solution is that a firm may withdraw a contract if the introduction of a new 
contract by another firm makes the original contract loss-making. Anticipating this 
reaction, the new entrant will introduce his contract only if the potential withdrawal 
of the original contract does not render his contract loss-making. The threat of 
withdrawal supports as an equilibrium the pooling allocation which maximizes the 
expected utility of the good type (provided this pooling allocation Pareto-dominates 
the Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) separating allocation). Hellwig (1987) proposed a three-
stage game which provides game-theoretic foundations to Wilson pooling equilibrium. 
However, because insurers cannot commit to the contracts they offer at Stage 1, the 
choice of a contract by an insuree depends on his beliefs about the other insurees’ 
choices. This leads to a coordination failure and so to multiple equilibria (which, in 
general, are inefficient). 
 
Miyazaki (1977) employs the Wilson equilibrium concept and allows for the offer 
of menus of contracts. He shows that the equilibrium allocation is separating, it is 
always (second-best) efficient and, in general, involves cross-subsidization across 
types. The Miyazaki equilibrium allocation maximizes the expected utility of the good 
type given incentive compatibility and feasibility. In this sense, our equilibrium 
allocation is similar to Miyazaki. Furthermore, our three-stage game provides game-
theoretic foundations to Miyazaki equilibrium by extending Hellwig’s game in two 
ways: First, we allow for the offer of menus of contracts. Second, we allow the firm 
to optimally decide whether they commit or not to the menu they offer in the first stage 
of the game (endogenous commitment).  
 
The paper is also closely related to Baldenius and Meng (2010). The key difference 
between our paper and theirs stems from the usage of the three-stage screening game 
instead of the two-stage signaling game. In the former game, owing to the endogeneity 
of commitment, a particular efficient allocation involving cross-subsidies can be 
sustained as an equilibrium. This equilibrium is unique and interim incentive efficient 
(second best), and it does not rely on refinements to restrict beliefs off the equilibrium 
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path. In contrast, the two-stage signaling game may end up with multiple equilibria if 
no refinement is used to restrict beliefs off the equilibrium path. Alternatively, the 
application of the “intuitive criterion” leads to a unique equilibrium that, in general, is 
inefficient4.  
 
Inderst (2001) also considers a model similar to that of Baldenius and Meng but 
with universal risk neutrality and a continuous effort level. He also uses the standard 
signaling game and applies the “intuitive criterion” to reduce the set of equilibrium. 
He suggests that there exists a unique separating equilibrium if the proportion of high 
type is low whereas there exists a pooling equilibrium if the proportion is high. 
Nevertheless, our model shows that a separating menu with cross-subsidy can 
dominate his pooling contract and make a Pareto improvement to his allocation. In 
another related paper, Martimort and Sand-Zantman (2006) construct a model in 
which a principal with private information intends to delegate an agent who can 
contribute unobservable effort to improve the output. Their findings show that projects 
with higher quality may end up with a contract with a higher share of operating risk 
retained by the principle. In their model, the effects of adverse selection and moral 
hazard are separated. Parameter values are restricted to obtain a unique separating 
equilibrium. To generalize their findings, we introduce the interaction between 
adverse selection and moral hazard by setting up a dependence relationship between 
the type of project and the productivity of effort. We also extend our discussion to all 
parameter conditions to reach a comprehensive conclusion 
 
Additionally, there is another strand of literature that analyses venture capitalist 
financing in a double moral hazard framework. For example, Casamatta (2003) and 
Schmidt (2003) considered models in which both the entrepreneurs and the financiers 
are risk neutral, and the firm’s payoff depends bilaterally on the unobservable (non-
contractible) effort level chosen by both parties. Their results show that without fund 
provision, the outside financier can be excluded from the project when the effort from 
                                                          
4In adverse selection environments, efficiency generally requires cross-subsidization across types. 
However, allocations involving cross-subsidies cannot be supported as equilibria in signaling games 
when the “intuitive criterion” is applied.  
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entrepreneurs is more efficient. They further suggested that convertible securities may 
be the optimal financial contract under this environment.  
 
We organize the paper as follows. Section 3 describes the basic assumptions of 
the model. Section 4 discusses the essential lemmas about the separating equilibrium. 
In Section 5, we will drive the separating equilibrium of the game and discuss the 
existence of pooling equilibrium. More specifically, we will derive the conditions 
under which different equilibria arise and provide the underlying intuition. Section 6 
provides the empirical implication of our model. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
 
3. The model 
 
Our model illustrates the case in which the entrepreneur has developed a 
technology and seeks to bring it to the market. To do so, he plans to sell a stake of his 
firm to the active financiers. The underlying two motivations are as follows: First, the 
entrepreneurs in our model are assumed to be risk averse and expect to diversify the 
specific risk of their portfolios. Second, some professional service (such as advising 
and management group formation) or special resource (such as network and marketing 
channels) provided by the financiers may be required by the entrepreneurs for the 
firm’s operation. More specifically, entrepreneurs may sell a stake of their firm to the 
venture capitalists (VC) not only to share their specific risk but also to obtain advising 
and monitoring service from qualified financiers. In comparison to Baldenius and 
Meng’s model, our model allows the commitment to contracts to be determined 
endogenously. As a result, investors can offer a menu of contracts with or without 
commitment, and entrepreneurs can maximize their utility by choosing the optimal 
contract in the market. In response to the contracts offered by their rival, financiers 
could withdraw their uncommitted contracts that are expected to incur losses, and 
entrepreneurs will deviate to other contracts remaining in the market. 
 
     Technologies in our setting can be classified into two types: low (L) or high (H) 
quality, which will be referred as the type of entrepreneurs in the following discussion. 
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The technology of entrepreneurs can affect the output of the firm in two ways: fixed 
earnings  θi (i = L, H) and marginal productivity of financiers’ effort  ϕi (i = L, H). 
The entrepreneur privately knows the type information of each firm, whereas both 
financiers and entrepreneurs commonly know the prior proportion of each type. 
Furthermore, no costless communication channel is available to transfer information 
from entrepreneurs to financiers in our model.  
 
As mentioned above, the value-adding activities taken by the financier generate 
earnings for the firm, which we define as “investor effort.” We use k to denote the cost 
incurred by these activities and let k ∈ {0, K}, where K represents the potential of 
investor effort. Therefore, the firm’s liquidation value will be 
 
xi = θi + ϕik + ε, 
 
where ε ~ N(0, σ2) denotes the operating risk of the project. Additionally, we assume 
that θH > θL and ϕH > 1 > ϕL > 0. It means that compared to the low-quality firm, 
the high-quality firm can generate higher fixed earnings and higher marginal 
productivity of investors’ effort. In addition, the second inequality also illustrates that 
only the high-quality firm can generate positive net value from investor effort ( ϕH >
1). We further define Δθ ≡ θH − θL and Δϕ ≡ ϕH − ϕL as the differential of fixed 
earnings and marginal productivities, respectively. Taking p as the proportion of high 
type in the whole population, we define Θ ≡ pθH + (1 − p)θL and Φ ≡ pϕH + (1 −
p)ϕL as the expectation of  θ and  ϕ in the pooling contract. We first discuss the case 
in which Φ < 1 and extend our discussion to the opposite case in Section 6.5 
 
For the financiers, the effort level k they offer depends on both the type of the firm 
and the fraction of equity 1 − a they acquire from the contract. We define the market 
                                                          
5If Φ > 1 there may exist a pooling equilibrium if the potential of financiers’ effort is sufficiently high. 
And actually, this assumption works as a restriction of proportion of high type which ensures we will 
always have separating equilibrium. 
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price of the whole firms to be P. Departing from Baldenius and Meng’s model, we 
allow the financiers to offer a menu of contracts instead of a single contract to both 
types of entrepreneurs. Under this setting, the competition between financiers may 
lead to zero economic profit for the whole menu. However, it is not necessary that 
each contract included in the menu earns zero profit. In other words, financiers may 
offer a loss-making contract to a certain type of entrepreneur to make a profit from the 
other type. These profits and losses are defined as “cross-subsidies” in our model 
because they altogether work as a kind of subsidy between different types, which we 
denote as S. 
 
Hence, for any single contract offered by the risk-neutral financiers, we have 
 
(1-a)(xe − P) − k = S, 
 
where xe represents the expectation of x, and xe = θ + ϕk. 
 
We suppose that the entrepreneurs have constant risk aversion. Their preferences 
are described by the utility function  (− exp{−ρW}) , where ρ  stands for the risk 
aversion coefficient and W stands for the wealth held by the entrepreneur, which can 
be expressed as W = (1 − a)P + a(θ + ϕk + ε). Therefore, the expected utility of 
entrepreneurs will be: 
 
U = (1 − a)P + a(θ + ϕk) − R(a) 
 
In the equation above,  R(a) ≡
ρ
2
a2σ2, where σ2 is by definition the variance of ε and 
can be viewed as a measure of the operating risk of the firm. R(a) denotes the disutility 
due to equity retention. All above settings are similar to those in Baldenius and Meng’s 
model. However, the key differences are: (1) We adopt a screening game instead of a 
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signaling game. (2) We endogenize the commitment of contracts in our model. As a 
result, the game structure of our model becomes: 
 
1. The competitive financiers offer a menu of contracts to the entrepreneurs with or 
without commitment.  
2. The entrepreneurs signal their types by choosing the contract that maximizes their 
utility. 
3. Observing rival’s contracts, the financiers withdraw their uncommitted contracts 
that are expected to be loss-making. 
4. Entrepreneurs take the optimal contract remaining on the market. 
5. Financiers choose the effort level k. 
6. Finally, the firm generates output, and the payoff to financiers and entrepreneurs 
is realized. 
 
4. Equilibrium  
 
In the following discussion, we will consider only the pure-strategy Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium. We assume free entry and exit of the financial market. Therefore, 
for any menu or contract to be sustained as equilibrium, the two following basic 
conditions must be satisfied: 
 
1. No menu of contracts offered by financiers in the equilibrium will be loss-making. 
2. Any deviation from the equilibrium menu will not increase the financiers’ 
expected payoff. 
 
The first condition underlines the participation constraint of the financiers. If the 
whole menu generates negative incomes, financiers can leave the market, and we end 
up with a non-trading equilibrium. A natural result of the conditions above is that the 
trading surplus between entrepreneurs and financiers is nonnegative (R(a) ≥ 0), at 
least for the low type. Thus, the allocation without trading cannot be an equilibrium. 
The second condition sources from the definition of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. If 
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there exists any deviation that can make the financiers better off, they will deviate, 
resulting in the collapse of the original allocation.    
 
Suppose that a menu containing contracts CH and CL is offered in the market and 
that these two contracts are taken by high type and low type, respectively. With the 
formula listed in section 3, the price of the firm (P) can be expressed as a function of 
the entrepreneur’s retaining equity 𝑎 and cross-subsidies S: 
 
Pi = θi + [ϕi −
1
1 − ai
] ki −
Si
1 − ai
     (i = H or L)                             (1) 
 
Under the assumption of full competition between financiers, the economic profit 
of financiers has to be zero in the equilibrium. Otherwise, competitors can easily 
attract both types of entrepreneurs by cutting down the profit level. Thus, this context 
requires: 
 
SHp + (1 − p)SL = 0 → SL = −
p
1−p
SH. 
 
If Si = 0 (i = H or L), formula (1) becomes the zero-profit condition, when both 
types of equity are fairly priced: 
 
Pi = θi + [ϕi −
1
1 − ai
] ki   (i = H or L)                               (2) 
 
    With the two basic conditions, we can derive some general results, which will be 
useful for establishing and characterizing the separating equilibria of our model. 
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Lemma 1: In the separating equilibrium, bad type entrepreneurs will seek 
to sell the whole firm, and no effort will be contributed to their firm by the 
financiers. 
 
Proof: In any separating equilibrium, the financiers can infer the type information 
by observing the contract taken by entrepreneurs. Based on the contract they take, the 
utility function of low type entrepreneur can be expressed as: 
 
UL = (1 − aL)PL + aL(θL + ϕLkL) − R(aL) 
 
The first part represents the fund received by the entrepreneur in the sales of 
equity. It also equals the fraction of equity sold to financiers (1 − aL) multiplied by 
the price of the whole firm. The second part represents the true value of the equity 
retained by the entrepreneurs. The third part represents the disutility of insufficient 
diversification as we defined in the last section. By substituting the price equation (1), 
we can simplify the utility function as:  
 
PL = θL + [ϕL −
1
1 − aL
] kL −
SL
1 − aL
 
→ UL = θL + (ϕL − 1)kL +
p
1 − p
SH − R(aL) 
 
From the expression above, we can infer that the sum of the first and second parts 
of the utility function is independent of aL. Thus, the equity retention can affect only 
the level of disutility by R(a) ≡
ρ
2
a2σ2 . To maximize her utility, the low type 
entrepreneur will choose the contracts of aL = 0 if her type has been revealed. On the 
other hand, because ϕL < 1 , it can be inferred that  kL = 0 . Because the value 
generated by the effort can never cover the corresponding cost, the financiers will not 
waste their effort on a bad firm once its type is identified.  
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Given the discussion above, the utility of the low type entrepreneur is UL = θL +
P
1−P
SH if a low type entrepreneur truly reveals her type. For a separating menu to be 
sustainable, contracts in the menu must be designed to guarantee that the low type 
cannot be better off by choosing the contract for the high type. Therefore, the 
following incentive comparison condition of the low type must be satisfied: 
 
(1 − aH)θH + [ϕH(1 − aH) − 1]kH − SH + aH(θL + ϕLkH) − R(aH)
≤ θL +
p
1 − p
SH 
 
The inequity above can be rewritten as: 
 
(1− aH)(θH − θL)+[ϕH(1− aH)+ϕLaH − 1]K−
1
1− p
SH − R(aH)≤0 
 
In the following section, we will show that this condition is always binding in our 
separating equilibrium. Because both equity retention and cross-subsidy cause 
disutility to higher type entrepreneurs, they would never prefer a contract with an 
unnecessary provision of them. Because contracts with extra equity retention or cross-
subsidy do not provide further useful information for financiers to make their decision. 
 
Lemma 2: In any separating equilibrium involving cross-subsidies, high types 
cross-subsidize low types. 
 
    Proof: From the incentive comparison condition above, we can see that the high 
type entrepreneurs can provide cross-subsidies to prevent the low types from 
mimicking. Because mispricing from pooling is harmful only to the high types, they 
are the only type with an incentive to offer cross-subsides. Otherwise, suppose that 
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there exists a separating equilibrium in which the low type offers a subsidy to the high 
type. In other words, in this equilibrium, financiers are offering a loss-making contract 
to high types and a profit-making contract to low types (SH < 0, and SL > 0). A new 
competitor then enters the market and offers a more attractive contract CL
∗  to the low 
type entrepreneurs by cutting down the profit she makes from them. Doubtlessly, the 
price of equity that low type entrepreneurs get from the new contract will be higher, 
and they will thus deviate to the new contract. If the original menu of contracts is 
offered with commitment, the incumbent financier must fulfill her commitment to the 
high types and holds only the loss-making contracts in her hand. If it is offered without 
commitment, the incumbent financier will withdraw the contract in stage 3, and both 
types will take the new contract. Given θH > θL, this means that the new entrant can 
purchase the high-quality equity at a low price and make an even higher profit6. In 
conclusion, the deviation from the original menu can increase financiers’ expected 
payoff. This conclusion contradicts the definition of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, so 
the original menu cannot be an equilibrium. 
 
In a separating equilibrium, financiers can infer the true value of θ  and ϕ 
depending on the contract chosen by entrepreneurs. The price offered depends on the 
type of the entrepreneurs. From formula (1), we have: 
 
PH = θH + [ϕH −
1
1 − aH
] kH −
SH
1 − aH
                          (𝑖) 
 
and  
 
PL = θL + [ϕL −
1
1 − aL
] kL −
SL
1 − aL
= θL +
p
1 − p
SH     ( aL = 0 )        (𝑖𝑖) 
 
                                                          
6Conversely, in the case of a separating equilibrium in which the high type subsidizes the low type, a 
contract that makes the high type better off if taken by both types will result in losses. 
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Notice that for the high type, the share retained by the entrepreneurs, aH , is 
negatively correlated with the price of equity. This may be caused by two effects: First, 
from the second part of (i), it can be seen that if the entrepreneurs retain a higher 
fraction of equity, then less benefit comes to the financiers from their value-adding 
activity. Secondly, from the third part of (i), we can infer that keeping the total value 
of cross-subsidies unchanged, financiers will require a higher underpricing for each 
share if fewer shares are sold to them. On the other hand, by comparing the price 
functions of different types, we can show the effect of cross-subsidies on the incentive 
comparison constraint: It decreases the equity price of high types and increases that of 
low types, which encourages the low type entrepreneurs to reveal their type truly. In 
another word, the price adjustment of both types’ equity work as “subsidization” from 
high type to low type. Although the high type entrepreneurs do not directly pay the 
low type entrepreneurs, the whole system leads to a similar result. 
 
Lemma 3: Among all feasible zero-profit menus, only the one that maximizes 
the utility of high type can be sustained as an equilibrium. 
 
Proof: Suppose that a menu of contracts CH  and CL  becomes the equilibrium 
menu of the market. As the result of perfect competition, this menu must satisfy the 
zero-profit condition, SHp + (1 − p)SL = 0. Otherwise, any rival can simply attract 
both types of entrepreneurs by offering a more competitive menu. Consider that a new 
entrant attempts to offer a profit-making menu containing CH
+ and CL
+, which satisfies 
the incentive comparison constraint (UL(CL
+) > UL(CH
+)) and makes the high type 
better off (UH(CH
+) > UH(CH)). In this case, the high type entrepreneurs deviate to the 
new menu. If the original menu involves a cross-subsidy, it becomes loss-making 
when it attracts only the low type. Thus, if the incumbent financiers offer their menu 
with commitment, they will incur a loss. If the incumbent financiers offer their menu 
without commitment, they will withdraw the menu in step 3, and then the low type 
entrepreneurs will have to take CL
+. However, the new entrant can still end up with 
positive profit from the whole menu. Otherwise, if the original menu does not involve 
cross-subsidies, the incumbent financiers will not withdraw their menu, so the new 
entrant attracts only the high type and makes a positive profit. Because a deviation can 
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increase the expect payoff to the financiers, the original menu CH and CL could not be 
an equilibrium. 
 
 
5. Equilibrium with non-contractible investor effort 
 
5.1 Investors’ effort and Separating equilibrium 
One of the most interesting parts of our model is that investors can contribute to 
the firm value by exerting costly effort. Practically, investors’ effort is contractible 
only when it is tangible and can be valued accurately. However, services such as 
advising and monitoring can hardly satisfy these two conditions. To avoid the moral 
hazard problem, the entrepreneurs would prefer to choose a contract that offers 
sufficient motivation for financiers to exert effort. Under our assumptions, any unit of 
effort taken to a firm has a constant marginal cost 1 and can generate a marginal benefit 
of (1 − ai)ϕi to the financiers. Hence, we can infer that the effort taking condition 
is (1 − ai)ϕi ≥ 1 or (ai ≤
ϕi−1
ϕi
). As mentioned above, because ϕL < 1, no effort will 
be distributed to the low type firms if their type is revealed truly. For the high types, 
the trade-off is more complicated. First of all, to motivate financiers to exert effort, 
high-quality entrepreneurs must signal their type effectively. As we have discussed 
above, share retention is a credible signal of entrepreneurs’ confidence in their project 
quality. However, retaining too much equity (aH >
ϕH−1
ϕH
) can confound investors’ 
incentive to exert effort. Therefore, in extreme cases, conserving investors’ incentive 
to exert effort and signaling high type entrepreneurs become two contradictive 
objectives in our model. To solve this problem, we introduce “cross-subsidies” as an 
extra method for signaling. By providing cross-subsidies, high type entrepreneurs can 
guarantee the satisfaction of both incentive constraints.  
 
As the cost of doing so, entrepreneurs of high type may have to undertake the 
price cut. In other words, high type entrepreneurs make a trade-off between the value 
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created by financiers and the price of their securities. If the price cut caused by cross-
subsidies exceeds the whole value of the financiers’ service, high type entrepreneurs 
may prefer to retain a sufficiently large share of equity for signaling and make the 
financiers passive. 
 
As a result, the optimization program can be decomposed into two subprograms 
(with or without investors’ effort), and only the allocation that provides higher utility 
to the high type entrepreneurs can be sustained as an equilibrium: 
 
Subprogram I: (kH = K) 
max
{SH,aH}
θH + (ϕH − 1)K − SH − R(aH) 
Subject to: 
 
(1 − aH)(𝜃𝐻 − 𝜃𝐿) + [𝜙𝐻(1 − aH) + 𝜙𝐿aH − 1]K −
1
1 − p
SH − 𝑅(aH) ≤ 0 
aH ≥ 0 
aH ≤
ϕH − 1
ϕH
 
SH ≥ 0 
 
Subprogram II: (kH = 0) 
max
{SH,aH}
θH − SH − R(aH) 
Subject to: 
 
(1 − aH)(𝜃𝐻 − 𝜃𝐿) −
1
1 − p
SH − 𝑅(aH) ≤ 0 
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aH >
ϕH − 1
ϕH
 
SH ≥ 0 
 
Subprogram I illustrates the case in which high type entrepreneurs conserve investors’ 
incentive, so the effort contributed to the high type firm is equal to its maximum K. 
Subprogram II describes the case in which entrepreneurs abandon investors’ effort 
( kH = 0 ). We define the optimal contract in subprogram I as CK  and that in 
subprogram II as C0 . Thus, the separating equilibrium will be CK  when UH(CK) ≥
UH(C0) or C0 when UH(CK) < UH(C0). 
 
Proposition 1a 
When investors’ effort is non-contractible and cross-subsidies are involved in the 
menu (𝐒𝐇 > 𝟎 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝛔?̃? < 𝛔𝟐̅̅ ̅): 
1. For 𝛔𝟐 > 𝛔?̂?, there exists a unique separating equilibrium in which 𝐚𝐇 = 𝐚
∗, 
𝐒𝐇 = 𝐒𝐇
∗  and investors’ effort is efficiently distributed (𝐤𝐇=K). 
2. For 𝛔𝟐̅̅ ̅ < 𝛔𝟐 < 𝛔?̂?, there exists a unique separating equilibrium in which 𝐚𝐇 =
𝛟𝐇−𝟏
𝛟𝐇
, 𝐒𝐇 > 𝐒𝐇
∗  and investors’ effort is efficiently distributed (𝐤𝐇=K). 
3. For 𝛔?̃? < 𝛔𝟐 < 𝛔𝟐̅̅ ̅, there exists a unique separating equilibrium in which 𝐚𝐇 >
𝛟𝐇−𝟏
𝛟𝐇
, 𝐒𝐇 > 𝟎 and no effort is distributed to the high type (𝐤𝐇=0). 
 
Proof: See Appendix A1 for the proof. 
 
Firstly, to check the sustainability of the equilibrium above, we need to check that 
given the incumbent separating menu, whether a competitive investor can introduce 
other profit-making separating menu that attracts both types of entrepreneurs. As we 
have defined in the maximization problem above, our menu maximizes the utility of 
  32 
 
high type entrepreneur under the break-even condition and the incentive constraints. 
Therefore, it is impossible for the new entrant to offer another separating menu which 
effectively attracts the high type entrepreneurs and still makes a positive profit. 
Moreover, since our separating menu with cross-subsidy makes a loss to the low type 
entrepreneurs, any other separating menu that attracts only the low types will make a 
loss. As a result, we can conclude that there does not exist any other separating menu 
that can break our equilibrium.  
 
     Secondly, we are going to check whether the competitor can offer a single contract 
that breaks the separating equilibrium.  As we have just mentioned, in this separating 
menu the high type entrepreneurs subsidize the low type ones. Therefore, the securities 
of low type are overpriced in the menu. In that case, any single contract that only 
attracts the low type will be loss-making since it must offer an even higher price to 
attract the low type entrepreneurs. Besides, if the competitors attempt to offer a 
“cream-skimming” contract which only attracts the high type, it can be inferred that 
the incumbent investors will withdraw their menu after observing this new contract.  
As a result, entrepreneurs of both types may take the new contracts at the same time. 
If the new contract does not satisfy the break-even condition of pooling, the new 
entrant may end up with loss-making. Finally, our last question is whether the new 
entrant can benefit by offering a pooling contract which attracts both types of 
entrepreneurs. One intuitive way to answer this question is to analysis the whole break-
even pooling contract set and check whether there exists any pooling contract that can 
attract the high type entrepreneurs. However, based on our finding in Section 5.2 and 
the maximization problem above, the answer is negative. In section 5.2, we have 
proved that when Φ<1 for any break-even pooling contract (𝐶𝑃), there always exists 
a separating menu (𝐶𝑠) that breaks-even and makes the high type entrepreneurs better-
off (𝑈𝐻(𝐶𝑠) ≥ 𝑈𝐻(𝐶𝑃) ). In order word, when the separating menu  𝐶𝑠 is offered in 
the market, the new pooling contract 𝐶𝑃 will not be able to attract the high type 
entrepreneurs.  Furthermore, as we have mentioned at the beginning of the previous 
paragraph, among all the break-even separating menu, our optimal menu ( 𝐶𝑆
∗) 
maximizes the utility of high type entrepreneurs. Therefore we can have  𝑈𝐻(𝐶𝑆
∗) ≥
𝑈𝐻(𝐶𝑠). Simply, it can be inferred that 𝑈𝐻(𝐶𝑆
∗) ≥ 𝑈𝐻(𝐶𝑠) ≥ 𝑈𝐻(𝐶𝑃), so when the 
optimal separating menu is offered, there is no break-even pooling contract that can 
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effectively attract the high type entrepreneurs. In conclusion, the optimal separating 
menu can be sustained as an equilibrium.   
 
As for the intuition of the equilibrium, the first case illustrates the situation in which 
the operating risk is relatively high. In that case, a small fraction of equity retained can 
credibly convey entrepreneurs’ type information. Therefore, the incentive for 
financiers to exert effort is not undermined by equity retention. On the other hand, 
owing to the high operating risk, the disutility associated with equity retention is 
relatively high, and cross-subsidization becomes a more efficient way of signalling. 
From the proposition above, the necessary condition for the cross-subsidy to be 
introduced in the equilibrium menu is σ2 >  σ2̃, where  σ2̃ is negatively correlated 
with the proportion of high type p.  Given no change in the whole population, an 
increase in high type proportion means more providers and fewer receivers of the 
cross-subsidies. Therefore, the cross-subsidies undertaken by each high type 
entrepreneur will decrease. As a result, high type entrepreneurs may prefer a 
separating menu with higher cross-subsidies rather than higher equity retention under 
this environment. 
 
As the operating risk decreases, the signal from equity retention becomes less 
informative. In other words, keeping the level of cross-subsidy unchanged, 
entrepreneurs may have to retain a higher fraction of equity for separation. However, 
retaining a fraction of equity higher than 
ϕH−1
ϕH
 can destroy investors’ incentive to exert 
effort. Conversely, entrepreneurs can choose to hold a fraction no more than 
ϕH−1
ϕH
 to 
motivate the investors. However, this significantly weakens the power of their signal. 
To compensate for the lost power, high type entrepreneurs may have to offer extra 
cross-subsidies to prevent low types from mimicking. This dilemma between 
preserving financiers’ effort and paying extra cross-subsidy is well described by sub-
cases 2 and 3 of Proposition 1a. The fundamental factors of this trade-off are the 
operating risk 𝛔𝟐 (related to the cost) and the potential of investors K (related to the 
benefit). When the operating risk is relatively moderate, high type entrepreneurs may 
trend to reserve financiers’ incentive to exert effort because the amount of extra cross-
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subsidies remains acceptable to them. Otherwise, when the operating risk is extremely 
low, the cost of offering extra cross-subsidy will be sufficiently high, which exceeds 
the value that can be created by the financier. In that case, high-quality entrepreneurs 
choose to retain a fraction of equity larger than 
ϕH−1
ϕH
 and cause the financiers to be 
passive. In addition, the operating risk should be higher than 𝛔?̃? (which is defined in 
the proof of Proposition) for the introduction of cross-subsidy. If this condition is not 
satisfied, our model will lead to a similar result as Baldenius and Meng’s low effort 
equilibrium, which will also be discussed in the proposition below. 
 
Proposition 1b 
When the investor effort is non-contractible, and cross-subsidies are not involved 
in the menu: (𝐒𝐇 = 𝟎, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝛔?̃? > 𝛔𝟐̅̅ ̅) 
1. For 𝛔?̃? > 𝛔𝟐 ≥ 𝛔𝟐
𝟐̅̅ ̅, there exists a unique separating equilibrium in which 𝐚𝐇 ≤
𝛟𝐇−𝟏
𝛟𝐇
, and the investor effort is efficiently distributed (𝐤𝐇=K). 
2. For 𝛔𝟐 < 𝛔𝟐
𝟐̅̅ ̅, there exists a unique separating equilibrium in which 𝐚𝐇 >
𝛟𝐇−𝟏
𝛟𝐇
,  
and no effort is distributed to the high type (𝐤𝐇=0). 
 
Proof: All proofs will be shown in Appendix A1. 
 
       Similarly, we need to check the sustainability of this equilibrium. With similar 
argument as in Proposition 1a, we can simply prove that there is not another deviating 
menu which can dominate our optimal separating menu. Given the maximization 
problem and the break-even constraints, the new menu may either fail to attract the 
high type entrepreneurs or fail to generate a positive profit. Besides, it is also 
impossible for the rival to offer a profit-making contract which attracts a certain type 
of entrepreneurs. Different from the previous discussion, the cross-subsidies are not 
introduced into the separating menu in this sub-case. In other word, contracts offered 
to different types satisfy their own break-even condition separately. Since in this 
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separating menu, the low type entrepreneurs have fully securitized their asset at a fair 
price, the new entrant can never offer a deviating contract which makes the low types 
better-off without making a loss. On the other hand, as we can see in the proof, the 
non-mimic condition of low type entrepreneurs is binding in our separating menu. 
Hence, if the new entrant intends to attract the high type entrepreneurs by decreasing 
their equity retention or increasing their securities price, the new contract will 
inevitably attract the low type entrepreneurs as well. Finally, based on our discussion 
in last proposition, it can also be inferred that any polling contract that makes the high 
type entrepreneurs better-off will become loss-making. Therefore, the separating 
menu in Proposition 1b can also be sustained as an equilibrium.  
 
Different from the case in Proposition 1a, Proposition 1b illustrates a case where 
the proportion of high type is sufficiently low.  Hence, equity retention becomes a 
preferable way of signaling, and high type entrepreneurs may abandon the usage of 
cross-subsidies when σ2 < σ2̃ or p < p̃.  
 
σ2 < σ2̃ =
(1 − p2)(Δθ + ΔϕK)2
2ρp2[Δθ + (ϕH − 1)kH]
 ⟺ 
p < p̃ =
(Δθ + ΔϕK)
√(Δθ + ΔϕkH)2 + 2ρσ2[Δθ + (ϕH − 1)kH]
 
  
In this case, the trade-off becomes more straightforward. By comparing the cost 
of retaining equity and the cost of mispricing from pooling with low type entrepreneurs, 
high type entrepreneurs decided whether to hold a fraction higher than 
ϕH−1
ϕH
. However, 
regardless of entrepreneurs’ choice, the financiers will not exert effort to their firm 
(Φ < 1). In other words, investors’ effort plays no role in entrepreneurs’ decision 
process in this extreme case.  
 
     In summary, we find that high type entrepreneurs make a two-dimensional trade-
off in the securities issuing process when investors’ effort is non-contractible. On one 
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hand, by comparing σ2 to σ2̃, which is related to the proportion of high type p, high 
type entrepreneurs decide whether to introduce cross-subsidies as a way of signaling. 
On the other hand, by comparing σ2 to σ2̅̅ ̅, which is related to the potential value of 
investor effort K, high type entrepreneurs decide whether they should introduce 
investors’ effort. However, one of the most interesting findings is that even if high 
type entrepreneurs do not intend to introduce investors’ effort, they would still prefer 
to separate from the low type. In the following section, we prove that the pooling 
allocation cannot be sustained as an equilibrium when Φ < 1. 
 
5.2 Pooling Equilibrium 
 
5.2.1 Characteristics of possible pooling equilibrium 
 
In our model, we assume that the expected marginal productivity of effort is 
below its cost. Thus, financiers exert no effort to any firm if their type is not identified. 
Under this assumption, we find that the pooling equilibrium cannot be sustained in our 
model. To be more precise, with Φ < 1, our model always ends up with a unique 
separating equilibrium. To disprove the existence of a pooling equilibrium, we start 
by analyzing the characteristics of the potential pooling contracts and then discuss 
whether any of these contracts can be sustained as an equilibrium. 
  
First, in any pooling equilibrium, investors’ break-even constraint must be 
binding because financiers cannot be suffering a loss in the equilibrium (free 
participation) and the perfect competition forces financiers to lower their profit to zero. 
Thus: 
Ppol = Θ + [Φ −
1
1 − apol
] kpol 
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Similar to our previous definition,  Ppol , apol  and kpol  represent the price of 
equity, equity retention and investors’ effort in the pooling contract, respectively. As 
we mentioned above, we assume that Φ < 1. Therefore, financiers will be passive if 
the type information is not revealed. In other words, kpol = 0 and  
 
Ppol = Θ = pθH + (1 − p)θL 
 
The expected utility functions of the two types of entrepreneurs will then 
become: 
 
UHp = (1 − apol)Ppol + apolθH − R(apol) 
ULp = (1 − apol)Ppol + apolθL − R(apol) 
 
In the equations above, UHp and ULp represent the expected utility of high type 
and low type, respectively, under the pooling contract. Because θL < 𝛩 < θH , by 
retaining a fraction of share, entrepreneurs can prevent more of their underpriced 
securities from being sold. In other words, even if we ignore the effect of signaling, 
equity retention is still an optional way to alleviate the loss due to adverse selection.  
 
Similar to Lemma 3, we can easily prove that among all the zero-profit pooling 
contracts, only the one that maximizes the utility of high type can be sustained as an 
equilibrium. The proof is as follows: Suppose that a pooling contract  Cpol is sustained 
as an equilibrium and a new entrant attempts to offer another pooling contract Cpol
∗ , 
where UHp(Cpol
∗ ) > UHp( Cpol). Cpol
∗  can be designed to ensure that the financier can 
still make a strictly positive profit if both types take it. (The existence of such a 
contract can be guaranteed if there exists another point Cpol
′′∗  that satisfies 
UHp(C′′pol
∗ ) > UHp( Cpol) along the zero-profit line of the financier.) Identical to the 
previous discussion, high type entrepreneurs deviate to the new contract, and this 
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deviation can cause the incumbent financiers to incur losses if the original contract is 
offered with commitment. Otherwise, if the original contract is offered without 
commitment, both types will finally take Cpol
∗  and the new entrant ends up with 
positive profit. In that case, the original pooling contract   Cpol  cannot be an 
equilibrium. 
 
In conclusion, to find a potential pooling contract, we must solve the following 
optimization program: 
 
max
apol
UHp = (1 − apol)Ppol + apolθH − R(apol) 
Subject to: 
Ppol = pθH + (1 − p)θL 
 
We solve this program by calculating the first-order condition: 
→
∂UHp
∂apol
= −pθH − (1 − p)θL + θH − ρapolσ
2 = 0 
→ apol =
(1 − p)(θH − θL)
ρσ2
 
 
And UHp = [pθH + (1 − p)θL] +
(1−p)2Δθ2
2ρσ2
 
 
5.2.2 Nonexistence of pooling equilibrium when Φ < 1 
 
With the discussion above, we pin down a potential pooling contract. For a pooling 
contract to be sustainable as an equilibrium, it must be able to dominate any separating 
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menu. In other words, there should not exist any separating menu 
CH(aH, SH) and CL(aL, SL) that satisfies the following conditions: 
 
(1− aH)(θH − θL)+[ϕH(1− aH)+ϕLaH − 1]K−
1
1 − p
SH − R(aH) ≤ 0       (1) 
(Incentive comparison condition) 
 
(ϕ
H
− 1)K+θH − SH − R(aH) ≥ [pθH+(1− p)θL]+
(1 − p)2Δθ2
2ρσ2
                     (2) 
(The menu of separating contracts can make good firm better off than the pooling 
contract) 
 
0 ≤ aH ≤ 1                                                                                                (3)      
(Good firm will retain a nonnegative fraction of equity) 
 
SH ≥ 0                                                                                                       (4) 
(High types subsidize the low types) 
 
aL = 0                                                                                                       (5)      
(In separating equilibrium, the low type will sell the whole firm) 
 
pSH + (1 − p)SL = 0                                                                             (6) 
(Zero-profit still holds when including the cross-subsidies) 
 
However, we find that regardless of the parameter value, there always exists at 
least one menu of separating contracts satisfying all the conditions above. For example: 
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aH = apol =
(1 − p)(θH − θL)
ρσ2
 
 
𝑆𝐻 = (1 − 𝑝)(1 − aH)(𝜃𝐻 − 𝜃𝐿) − (1 − 𝑝)𝑅(aH) + {𝜔(𝜙𝐻 − 1)𝐾 + (1 −
𝜔)(1 − 𝑝)[𝜙𝐻(1 − aH) + 𝜙𝐿aH − 1]𝐾}       (ω ∈ [0,1]) 
 
aL = 0 
 
SL = −
p
1 − p
SH 
 
Proof: See Appendix A2 for the proof. 
 
Our proof shows that this argument can hold regardless of investors’ potential K, 
because even in the extreme case where aH >
ϕH−1
ϕH
 and K=0, the above menu still 
satisfies all the necessary conditions. Therefore, the optimal pooling allocation could 
not be sustained as an equilibrium. In other words, there is no pooling equilibrium in 
our model when Φ < 1. 
 
 
5.2.3 Existence of pooling equilibrium when Φ > 1 
 
     Pooling equilibrium can be sustainable only when Φ > 1 . In this case, type 
revealing is no longer the necessary condition for investors’ effort to be contributed. 
This result weakens the incentive for high type entrepreneurs to signal themselves. 
More specifically, this pooling equilibrium can only arise when operating risk is 
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extremely low. In that case, the equity retention requirement for signaling will be 
relatively high, and this high retention could undermine the incentive for financiers to 
make an effort, as we have discussed. Moreover, because investors’ effort can be 
attained even when pooling with the low type, high type entrepreneurs may have no 
incentive to offer extra cross-subsidies for signaling. Therefore, both methods of 
signaling can be abandoned by the high type entrepreneurs, and the pooling 
equilibrium can be sustained.  
 
Proof: See Appendix A4 for the proof 
 
6. Empirical implications 
 
In section 5, we showed that there can exist a separating equilibrium in which the 
equity issued by the high-quality entrepreneurs are underpriced whereas those of the 
low-quality entrepreneurs are overpriced. We also show that this equilibrium is more 
likely to arise when both the proportion of high-quality firms and the operating risk 
are high. Empirically, a proxy for the proportion of the high type could be the 
economy-wide conditions. More specifically, we expect that the proportion of the 
high-quality firms would be higher when the economy is in a boom. With regard to 
the operating risk of a firm or industry, it can be measured by the variance of its cash 
flow. Therefore, our model gives the prediction that there should be a positive 
correlation between the equity mispricing and the two factors above.  
 
Moreover, we showed that the operating risk affects the fraction of equity 
retained by the high-quality firms. As we proved in the model, the fraction of the 
equity required for signaling is negatively correlated with the operating risk. The more 
equity is retained by the entrepreneurs, the less remains for the investors. As a result, 
financiers may have no incentive to exert effort when the operating risk is extremely 
low. In other words, our model predicts that in mature industries with low operating 
risk, financiers may behave passively. Correspondingly, active investors such as 
venture capitalists may tend to invest in firms with growth opportunity and high 
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operating risk. This prediction is consistent with the empirical finding of Sapienza et 
al. (1996). They found that project and environment uncertainty does play a role in 
financiers’ value-add activity, and they also observed that venture capital fund 
managers become more involved in the early stages of projects with higher risk 
assessment. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we considered a model in which the firm performance depends on 
both the firm’s (project’s) inherent quality and the effort exerted by the venture 
capitalist. We show that the market equilibrium is closely linked with two factors: i) 
the proportion of high-quality entrepreneurs and ii) the operating risk of the firms. 
When both are sufficiently high, there exists a separating equilibrium that includes 
cross-subsidies. In this equilibrium, the low-quality entrepreneurs sell all of their 
shares above the fair price (overpricing) whereas the high-quality entrepreneurs retain 
a fraction of their shares and sell their equity below the fair price (underpricing). If 
both the proportion of high-quality firms and the operating risk is sufficiently low, the 
high-quality entrepreneurs will separate themselves from the low-quality ones by 
retaining a sufficiently high fraction of shares, and the shares sold by both types of 
entrepreneurs are fairly priced. 
 
We also found that the operating risk affects the fraction of shares retained by the 
high-quality firms. As the operating risk decreases, the cost of equity retention 
decreases as well. Therefore, high-type entrepreneurs may have to retain a higher 
fraction of equity to separate themselves from the low-type firms. However, this also 
implies that the financiers will receive a lower fraction of equity and have less 
incentive to exert effort.  
 
     Finally, we discuss the necessary condition for a pooling equilibrium to arise. We 
show that the existence highly depends on the general quality of the whole industry Φ. 
In this paper, we have proved that when the marginal productivity of the whole 
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industry is less than the marginal cost of financiers’ effort (Φ < 1), the separating 
equilibrium is always dominant. Otherwise, when Φ > 1, which means that, when the 
financier exerts effort even without type information, a pooling allocation could be 
sustained as an equilibrium.  
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Appendix 
 
A.1 Separating equilibrium with non-contractible effort 
 
      As illustrated in the main text of the paper, when the fraction of equity retained by 
entrepreneur aH exceeds 
𝜙ℎ−1
𝜙𝐻
, the incentive for investors to contribute effort will be 
destroyed. Therefore, to simplify our analysis, we use aH =
𝜙ℎ−1
𝜙𝐻
 as the cut-off point 
to decompose our program into two subprograms. In subprogram I, when aH ≤
𝜙ℎ−1
𝜙𝐻
, 
investors continue to increase their effort level until it reaches its maximum k=K. In 
subprogram II, when aH >
𝜙ℎ−1
𝜙𝐻
, investors refuse to exert any effort and k=0. All 
subcases can be summarized as in the table below: 
 
 Subprogram I: (k=K) Subprogram II: (k=0) 
aH <
𝜙ℎ − 1
𝜙𝐻
 aH =
𝜙ℎ − 1
𝜙𝐻
 aH >
𝜙ℎ − 1
𝜙𝐻
 
SH > 0 Case 1 Case 2 Case 5 
SH = 0 Case 3 Case 4 Case 6 
 
 
Subprogram I: (k=K) 
 
max
{aH,SH}
θH + (ϕH − 1)K − SH − R(aH) 
Subject to: 
(1 − aH)(𝜃𝐻 − 𝜃𝐿) + [𝜙𝐻(1 − aH) + 𝜙𝐿aH − 1]K −
1
1 − p
SH − 𝑅(aH) ≤ 0 
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aH ≥ 0 
aH ≤
ϕH − 1
ϕH
 
SH ≥ 0 
 
Similarly, we solve the program with the Lagrangian method: 
 
𝐿 = 𝜃𝐻 + (𝜙𝐻 − 1)𝐾 − 𝑆𝐻 − 𝑅(aH)
− 𝜆 {(1 − aH)(𝜃𝐻 − 𝜃𝐿) + [𝜙𝐻(1 − aH) + 𝜙𝐿aH − 1]𝐾 −
1
1 − 𝑝
𝑆𝐻
− 𝑅(a)} + 𝜇aH + 𝜂 (
𝜙𝐻 − 1
𝜙𝐻
− aH) + 𝜑𝑆𝐻 
 
∂L
∂aH
= −(1 − λ)ρaHσ
2 + λ(θH − θL) + λ(ϕH − ϕL)K + μ − η = 0                      (1) 
 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑆𝐻
= −1 +
𝜆
1 − 𝑝
+ 𝜑 = 0                                                                                               (2) 
 
𝜆 {(1 − aH)(𝜃𝐻−𝜃𝐿) + [𝜙𝐻(1 − aH)+𝜙𝐿aH − 1]𝐾 −
1
1 − 𝑝
𝑆𝐻 − 𝑅(aH)} = 0    (3) 
 
λ ≥ 0 
 
(1 − aH)(𝜃𝐻−𝜃𝐿) + [𝜙𝐻(1 − aH)+𝜙𝐿aH − 1]𝐾 −
1
1 − 𝑝
𝑆𝐻 − 𝑅(aH) ≤ 0 
 
aHμ = 0                                                                                                                  (4) 
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 aH ≥ 0    μ ≥ 0 
 
φSH = 0                                                                                                                       (5) 
 
φ ≥ 0      SH ≥ 0 
 
𝜂 (
𝜙𝐻 − 1
𝜙𝐻
− aH) = 0                                                                                                   (6) 
 
𝜂 ≥ 0       aH ≤
𝜙𝐻 − 1
𝜙𝐻
 
 
Case 1 
 
If φ = 0, SH ≥ 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝜂 = 0,  aH≤
ϕh-1
ϕH
 
From (2): λ = 1 − p → 0 < 𝜆 < 1 
 
So  
(1 − aH)(𝜃𝐻−𝜃𝐿) + [𝜙𝐻(1 − aH)+𝜙𝐿aH − 1]𝐾 −
1
1 − 𝑝
𝑆𝐻 − 𝑅(aH) = 0 
 
Then if aH = 0, μ > 0 
From (1): λ(θH − θL) + λ(ϕH − ϕL) + μ > 0 (fail to hold) 
So aH > 0, 𝜇 = 0 
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Then from (1): 
 
aH = a
∗ =
(1 − p)[(θH − θL) + (ϕH − ϕL)K]
pρσ2
 
 
SH = SH
∗ = (1 − p){(1 − aH)[θH − θL − (ϕH − ϕL)K] + (ϕL − 1)K − R(aH) 
 
Define Δθ = θH − θL and Δϕ = ϕH − ϕL 
From aH ≤
ϕh−1
ϕH
, we have 
p ≥
ϕH(Δθ + ΔϕK)
(ϕH − 1)ρσ2 + ϕH(Δθ + ΔϕK)
 
Or 
σ2 ≥ σ2̂ =
(1 − p)(Δθ + ΔϕK)ϕH
ρp(ϕH − 1)
 
And from SH ≥ 0, we have 
p ≥
(Δθ + ΔϕK)
√(Δθ + ΔϕkH)2 + 2ρσ2[Δθ + (ϕH − 1)K]
 
Or 
σ2 ≥ σ2̃ =
(1 − p2)(Δθ + ΔϕK)2
2ρp2[Δθ + (ϕH − 1)K]
 
 
In conclusion, this case exists when 
 
p> max
(
 
ϕ
H
(Δθ+ΔϕK)
(ϕ
H
-1)ρσ2+ϕ
H
(Δθ+ΔϕK)
, 
(Δθ+ΔϕK)
√(Δθ + ΔϕkH)2+2ρσ2[Δθ+(ϕH-1)K])
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Or 
σ2 > 𝑚𝑎𝑥 (
(1 − p)(Δθ + ΔϕK)ϕH
ρp(ϕH − 1)
,
(1 − p2)(Δθ + ΔϕK)2
2ρp2[Δθ + (ϕH − 1)K]
) 
 
 
Case 2 
 
If φ = 0, SH ≥ 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝜂 > 0, aH=
ϕh-1
ϕH
 
Since aH=
ϕh-1
ϕH
> 0, μ = 0 
From (2): λ = 1 − p → 0 < 𝜆 < 1 
(1 − aH)(𝜃𝐻−𝜃𝐿) + [𝜙𝐻(1 − aH)+𝜙𝐿aH − 1]𝐾 −
1
1 − 𝑝
𝑆𝐻 − 𝑅(aH) = 0 
 
SH = (1 − p){(1 −
ϕH − 1
ϕH
) [θH − θL − (ϕH − ϕL)K] + (ϕL − 1)K − R(
ϕH − 1
ϕH
) 
 
η = (1 − p)(Δθ + Δϕ) − pρσ2
ϕH − 1
ϕH
 
 
From 𝜂 > 0 we have, 
p <
ϕH(Δθ + ΔϕK)
(ϕH − 1)ρσ2 + ϕH(Δθ + ΔϕK)
 
Or 
σ2 < σ2̂ =
(1 − p)(Δθ + ΔϕK)ϕH
ρp(ϕH − 1)
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And from SH ≥ 0, we have 
σ2 ≤ σ2̅̅ ̅ =
2ϕH(Δθ + ΔϕK) + 2(ϕL − 1)KϕH
2
ρ(ϕH − 1)2
 
 
Case 3 
 
If 𝜑 > 0, 𝑆𝐻 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝜂 = 0, aH<
ϕh-1
ϕH
 
From (2): λ = (1 − p)(1 − φ) 
If aH = 0,μ > 0 
 
Substitute it into 
(1 − aH)(θH − θL) + [ϕH(1 − aH) + ϕLaH − 1]K −
1
1 − p
SH − R(aH) ≤ 0 
→ (θH − θL) + (ϕH − 1)K ≤0 (fail to hold) 
So 
aH > 0, μ = 0 
 
Substituting this conclusion into (1), we have  
−(1 − λ)ρaHσ
2 + λ(Δθ + ΔϕK) = 0 
 
If λ = 0 → −ρaHσ
2 = 0 (fail to hold)  
So λ > 0  
And  
(1 − aH)(𝜃𝐻−𝜃𝐿) + [𝜙𝐻(1 − aH)+𝜙𝐿aH − 1]𝐾 − 𝑅(aH) = 0 
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→ ρσ2aH
2 + 2(Δθ + ΔϕK)aH − 2[Δθ + (ϕH − 1)K] = 0 
 
→ aH =
−(Δθ + ΔϕK) + √(Δθ + ΔϕK)2 + 2ρσ2[Δθ + (ϕH − 1)K]
ρσ2
 
SH = 0 
From aH<
ϕh-1
ϕH
 we have  
σ2 > σ2̅̅ ̅ =
2ϕH(Δθ + ΔϕK) + 2(ϕL − 1)KϕH
2
ρ(ϕH − 1)2
 
And from φ > 0 we have 
p <
(Δθ + ΔϕK)
√(Δθ + ΔϕkH)2 + 2ρσ2[Δθ + (ϕH − 1)K]
 
Or 
σ2 < σ2̃ =
(1 − p2)(Δθ + ΔϕK)2
2ρp2[Δθ + (ϕH − 1)K]
 
 
Case 4 
 
φ > 0, SH = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜂 > 0, aH =
ϕh − 1
ϕH
 
From (2): λ = (1 − P)(1 − φ) 
Since aH =
ϕh−1
ϕH
> 0, μ = 0 
 
If λ = 0, substitute it into (1), 
→ −ρσ2
ϕh − 1
ϕH
− η = 0 (fail to hold) 
So λ > 0 and  
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(1 − aH)(𝜃𝐻−𝜃𝐿) + [𝜙𝐻(1 − aH)+𝜙𝐿aH − 1]𝐾 − 𝑅(aH) = 0 
 
→ aH =
−(Δθ + ΔϕK) + √(Δθ + ΔϕK)2 + 2ρσ2[Δθ + (ϕH − 1)K]
ρσ2
 
 
We also have aH=
ϕh-1
ϕH
 
Thus, case 4 is actually a special case of case 3, when 
ϕh-1
ϕH
 becomes a sufficiently 
large fraction of signaling. 
 
 
Subprogram II: (k=0) 
 
max
{aH,SH}
θH − SH − R(aH) 
Subject to: 
(1 − aH)(𝜃𝐻 − 𝜃𝐿) −
1
1 − p
SH − 𝑅(aH) 
 
aH >
ϕH − 1
ϕH
 
 
SH ≥ 0 
 
𝐿 = 𝜃𝐻 − 𝑆𝐻 − 𝑅(aH) − 𝜆 {(1 − aH)(𝜃𝐻 − 𝜃𝐿) −
1
1 − 𝑝
𝑆𝐻 − 𝑅(aH)}
+ 𝜂 (aH −
𝜙𝐻 − 1
𝜙𝐻
) + 𝜑𝑆𝐻 
  56 
 
 
∂L
∂aH
= −(1 − λ)ρaHσ
2 + λ(θH − θL) + η                                                                      (7) 
 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑆𝐻
= −1 +
𝜆
1 − 𝑝
+ 𝜑 = 0                                                                                               (8) 
 
𝜆 {(1 − aH)(𝜃𝐻−𝜃𝐿) −
1
1 − 𝑝
𝑆𝐻 − 𝑅(aH)} = 0                                                             (9) 
 
λ ≥ 0 
 
(1 − aH)(𝜃𝐻−𝜃𝐿) −
1
1 − 𝑝
𝑆𝐻 − 𝑅(aH) ≤ 0 
 
φSH = 0                                                                                                                                 (10) 
 
 φ ≥ 0        SH ≥ 0 
 
 
Since 𝜂 (aH −
𝜙𝐻−1
𝜙𝐻
)=0 and aH >
ϕH−1
ϕH
, we have η = 0 
 
 
Case 5 
 
If φ = 0, SH ≥ 0 
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From (8): λ = 1 − p → 0 < 𝜆 < 1 
From (7): −(1 − λ)ρaHσ
2 + λ(θH − θL) = 0 → aH =
(1−P)(θH−θL)
pρσ2
 
 
And since 𝜆 > 0 
→ (1 − aH)(𝜃𝐻−𝜃𝐿) −
1
1 − 𝑃
𝑆𝐻 − 𝑅(aH) = 0 
 
→ SH = (1 − p)[(1 − aH)(𝜃𝐻−𝜃𝐿) − R(aH)] 
 
From aH >
ϕH−1
ϕH
 we have 
p <
ΔθϕH
ρσ2(ϕH − 1) + ΔθϕH
 
Or 
σ2 <
(1 − p)ΔθϕH
ρp(ϕH − 1)
 
And from SH ≥ 0 we also have 
p ≥
Δθ
√Δθ2 + 2Δθρσ2
 
Or 
σ2 ≥ (
1
2ρp2
−
1
2ρ
)Δθ 
This case also requires that  
 
(
1
2p2
−
1
2
)Δθ < 𝜌σ2 <
(1 − p)ΔθϕH
p(ϕH − 1)
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→ (
1
2p2
−
1
2
)Δθ <
(1 − p)ΔθϕH
p(ϕH − 1)
 
 
→ p >
ϕH − 1
ϕH + 1
 
To determine the parameter condition under which the menus with investors’ effort 
may dominate menus without effort, we compare the results of case 2 to those of case 
5. Define the optimal contract in case 2 as CK and that in case 5 as C0. If UH(CK) >
UH(C0) → 
 
θH + (ϕH − 1)K − (1 − p) [(1 −
ϕH − 1
ϕH
) (Δθ − ΔϕK) + (ϕL − 1)K]
− pR (
ϕH − 1
ϕH
) 
> θH − (1 − p) [1 −
(1 − p)(θH − θL)
pρσ2
] Δθ − pR(
(1 − p)(θH − θL)
pρσ2
) 
 
From this inequality, we can deduce that it will be satisfied when: 
 
K > K̅ or σ2 > σ2̅̅ ̅ 
 
Since we also have 
(1−p)(θH−θL)
pρσ2
>
ϕH−1
ϕH
 
→ σ2 < σ2̂ 
 
Case 6 
 
If φ > 0, SH = 0 
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From (8): λ = (1 − p)(1 − φ) 
If λ = 0 substitute it into (7), 
→ −ρaHσ
2 = 0 , and aH >
ϕH − 1
ϕH
> 0(fail to hold) 
So λ > 0 and  
 
(1 − aH)(𝜃𝐻−𝜃𝐿) − 𝑅(aH) = 0 
 
→ aH =
√Δθ2 + 2Δθρσ2 − Δθ
ρσ2
 
And from (7) 
λ =
ρaHσ
2
Δθ + ρaHσ2
 
→ φ = 1 −
ρaHσ
2
(1 − p)(Δθ + ρaHσ2)
 
From aH >
ϕH−1
ϕH
, we have 
σ2 <
2ϕHΔθ
ρ(ϕH − 1)2
 
And from φ > 0 we also have 
p <
Δθ
√Δθ2 + 2Δθρσ2
 
Or 
σ2 < (
1
2ρp2
−
1
2ρ
)Δθ 
 
Similarly, to identify the parameter conditions for introducing investors’ effort, we 
compared the results of case 4 to those of case 6. Define the optimal contract in case 
4 as C′K and that in case 6 as C′0. If UH(CK) > UH(C0) → 
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θH + (ϕH − 1)K − R(
𝜙𝐻 − 1
𝜙𝐻
) > θH − R(
√Δθ2 + 2Δθρσ2 − Δθ
ρσ2
) 
 
It will be satisfied only if K > K̅2 and σ
2 > σ2
2̅̅ ̅ 
 
A2. Discussion about the pooling when Φ < 1 
 
In our model, the financier offers a menu of contracts to the entrepreneurs, after 
which the entrepreneurs choose the contracts that maximize their utility. In the pooling 
case, identical contracts will be offered to both types of entrepreneurs. It can be 
inferred that this contract must be the one that maximizes the utility of the high type. 
Suppose that if a contract of this kind is offered by one of the financiers; other 
competitors can infer that any deviating contracts will be accepted by no type or low 
type only. As a result, to pin down the sustainable pooling contracts, the objective 
function of our program should remain sourced from the utility function of high type 
entrepreneurs. 
 
With regard to the effort contributed by the investors, because we assume that the 
proportion of high type and low type satisfied pϕH + (1 − p)ϕL < 1, the marginal 
productivity of the effort would not be able to cover the corresponding cost. Thus, no 
effort will be contributed to any firm if a pooling equilibrium is sustained. The price 
of equity offered to the entrepreneurs will then become: 
 
Ppol = pθH + (1 − p)θL 
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Additionally, with a pooling contract, no cross-subsidy can be implemented (𝑆𝐻 =
𝑆𝐿 = 0). Summarizing all the results above, the utility function of the high type 
entrepreneurs taking the pooling contract will be: 
 
UHp = (1 − a)Ppol + aθH − R(a) 
 
Using this as the objective function, we derive the first order condition and 
calculate the optimal equity retention: 
 
∂UHp
∂a
= −pθH − (1 − p)θL + θH − ρaσ
2 = 0 
 
→ apol =
(1 − p)(θH − θL)
ρσ2
 
 
And UHp = [pθH + (1 − p)θL] +
(1−p)2Δθ2
2ρσ2
 
 
For a pooling contract to be sustainable as an equilibrium, the pooling contract 
must be able to dominate any separating menu. In other word, there should not exist 
any separating menu (aH, SH) and (aL, SL) that satisfies the following conditions: 
 
 
(1− aH)(θH − θL)+[ϕH(1− aH)+ϕLaH − 1]K−
1
1− p
SH − R(aH)≤0                 (1) 
(Incentive comparison condition) 
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(ϕ
H
− 1)K+θH − SH − R(aH)≥[pθH+(1− p)θL]+
(1 − p)2Δθ2
2ρσ2
                           (2) 
(The menu of contracts can make the good firms better off than the pooling contract) 
 
0 ≤ aH ≤ 1                                                                                                                           (3) 
(A good firm retains a nonnegative fraction of equity) 
 
SH ≥ 0                                                                                                                                     (4) 
(Cross-subsidies can just be from good type to bad type) 
 
aL = 0                                                                                                                                    (5) 
(In separating equilibrium, the bad type sells the whole firm) 
 
pSH + (1 − p)SL = 0                                                                                                           (6) 
(Zero-profit condition of the whole menu when including the cross-subsidies) 
 
Otherwise, if we can prove the existence of such a separating menu, the pooling 
equilibrium would collapse. Because aL = 0 and SL = −
P
1−P
SH, the key point is 
whether there exists a nonnegative aH and SH to satisfy inequalities (1) and (2). 
 
From (1) 
 
[ϕH(1 − aH) + ϕLaH − 1]K + (1 − aH)(θH − θL) − R(aH) ≤
1
1 − p
SH 
→ (1− p)[ϕ
H
(1− aH)+ϕLaH − 1]K+(1− p)(1− aH)(θH − θL) − (1 − p)R(aH)≤SH 
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From (2) 
(ϕH − 1)𝐾 + (1 − 𝑝)(𝜃𝐻 − 𝜃𝐿) −
(1 − 𝑝)2Δ𝜃2
2𝜌𝜎2
− 𝑅(aH) ≥ SH 
 
So it is required that  
 
(1− p)[ϕ
H
(1− aH)+ϕLaH − 1]K+(1− p)(1− aH)(θH − θL) − (1− p)R(aH)
≤  (ϕ
H
− 1)K+(1− p)(θH − θL) −
(1− p)2Δθ2
2ρσ2
− R(aH) 
 (ϕ
H
− 1)K − (1− p)[ϕ
H
(1− aH)+ϕLaH − 1]K+ {[(1− p)(θH − θL) −
(1− p)2Δθ2
2ρσ2
− R(aH)]− [(1− p)(1− aH)(θH − θL) − (1− p)R(aH)]} ≥ 0 
 
This inequality can be decomposed into two sufficient conditions: 
 
 (ϕ
H
-1)K − (1− p)[ϕ
H
(1− aH)+ϕLaH − 1]K ≥ 0                                                      (7) 
And  
(1− p)(θH − θL) −
(1− p)2Δθ2
2ρσ2
− R(aH) − (1− p)(1− aH)(θH − θL)+(1
− p)R(aH) ≥ 0                                                                                        (8) 
 
In (7), since ϕH > ϕL , for any aH ∈ [0,1] the first inequality always holds. 
 
In (8), let us set aH = apol =
(1−p)(θH−θL)
ρσ2
 
The inequality becomes 
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aH(1− p)(θH − θL) −
(1− p)2Δθ2
2ρσ2
− 𝑝𝑅(aH) ≥ 0 
→
(1− p)2Δθ2
ρσ2
−
(1− p)2Δθ2
2ρσ2
−
p(1− p)2Δθ2
2ρσ2
≥ 0 
→
(1− p)3Δθ2
2ρσ2
≥ 0 
 
Which will hold when p ≤ 1. 
So by setting aH = apol =
(1−p)(θH−θL)
ρσ2
, there exists a SH to satisfy (1) and (2).  
 
The next step is to prove the existence of a nonnegative SH (SH ≥ 0) that satisfies all 
the conditions above. 
 
To do so, another inequality must be introduced into the proof: 
 
UHp = [pθH + (1 − p)θL] +
(1−p)2Δθ2
2ρσ2
< θh + (ϕh − 1)K (for any K) 
 
This inequality means that high type entrepreneurs cannot be better off in the 
pooling than in complete information. The left-hand side is the utility of the high type 
entrepreneur in optimal pooling equilibrium under asymmetric information, whereas 
the right-hand side is the utility of high type entrepreneurs under complete information. 
Because the information rent is always nonnegative to the high type entrepreneurs, 
this inequality will hold economically. For any nonnegative K, the inequality must 
strictly hold. Extremely, when K=0, we have: 
 
[pθH + (1 − p)θL] +
(1 − p)2Δθ2
2ρσ2
< θh 
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Clearly, even when the financiers are passive, the high type will be better off to 
separate from the low type than pooling. This inequality is also plausible in our model 
because in the pooling equilibrium, no effort will be made by the financiers toward 
any kind of firm. 
 
[pθH + (1 − p)θL] +
(1 − p)2Δθ2
2ρσ2
< θH 
→
(1− p)Δθ
2ρσ2
< 1 
→ (1− p)Δθ< 2ρσ2 
 
With the inequality above, we can show that (1− p)(1− aH)(θH − θL) − (1 −
p)R(aH) > 0, when aH = apol =
(1−P)(θH−θL)
ρσ2
 
 
Thus, we can set  
SH = 𝑆?̃? = (1 − p)(1 − aH)(θH − θL) − (1 − p)R(aH) + {ω(ϕH − 1)K + (1
− ω)(1 − p)[ϕH(1 − aH) + ϕLaH − 1]K} 
 
Since (ϕH − 1)K > 0 , there always exist a “ω” that causes the following equation 
to be positive:  
ω(ϕH − 1)K + (1 − ω)(1 − p)[ϕH(1 − aH) + ϕLaH − 1]K} 
 
And (1− p)(1− aH)(θH − θL) − (1 − p)R(aH) > 0, so 𝑆?̃? ≥ 0. 
 
It can also be proved that 𝑆?̃? satisfies the two conditions (1) and (2) above. 
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In conclusion, by setting: 
aH = apol =
(1 − p)(θH − θL)
ρσ2
 
 
SH = (1 − p)(1 − aH)(θH − θL) − (1 − p)R(aH) + {ω(ϕH − 1)K + (1
− ω)(1 − p)[ϕH(1 − aH) + ϕLaH − 1]K} 
 
aL = 0 
 
SL = −
p
1 − p
SH 
 
The separating menu can always dominate the optimal pooling contract. In other 
words, a beneficial deviation always exists, and the pooling contract can never be 
sustained as an equilibrium when Φ ≤ 1.  
 
A3. Discussion about the pooling when Φ > 1 
In the following part, we come to the discussion about the existence of pooling 
equilibrium where Φ > 1: 
Since we have: 
Φ = pϕH + (1 − p)ϕL > 1 and Θ = pθH + (1 − p)θL 
 
The financiers will make effort if and only if the retaining fraction αp satisfies the 
following condition: 
(1 − αp)Φ ≥ 1 ⇒ αp ≤
Φ− 1
Φ
= αp
c  
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In that case, the participation constraint of investors becomes: 
 
(1 − αp)(xp − Pp) − kp ≥ 0 
 
This constraint will be binding under full competition among investors, and the equity 
price offered to entrepreneurs can be driven as: 
 
(1 − αp)(Θ + Φkp − Pp) − kp = 0 ⇒ Pp = Θ+ [Φ −
1
1 − ap
]kp 
 
Substituting the price equation, the payoff to the high type entrepreneurs can be 
rewritten as: 
 
(1 − αp)Pp + αp(θH + ϕHkp) − R(αp) 
= (1 − αp)Θ + [(1 − ap)Φ − 1]kp + αp(θH + ϕHkp) − R(αp) 
= (1 − αp)pθH + (1 − ap)(1 − p)θL
+ [(1 − αp)pϕH + (1 − αp)(1 − p)ϕL − 1]kp + αp(θH + ϕHkp)
− R(αp) 
 
As illustrated above, only the pooling equilibrium that maximizes the payoff to the 
high type can be sustained. We solve the optimal pooling contract by deriving the first-
order condition: 
 
∂uH
∂αp
= −pθH − (1 − p)θL − pϕHkp − (1 − p)ϕLkp + (θH + ϕHkp) − αpρσ
2 = 0 
⇒ (1 − p)θH − (1 − p)θL + (1 − p)ϕHkp − (1 − p)ϕLkp = αpρσ
2 
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⟹ αp =
(1 − p)Δθ + (1 − p)Δϕkp
ρσ2
kp ∈ [0, K] 
 
In the following discussion, we focus only on the case where αp ≤
Φ−1
Φ
, which means 
that the financiers will make effort when the pooling contract is chosen, because when 
αp >
Φ−1
Φ
, all the analysis is similar to the case where Φ < 1. 
 
 
Subcase I 
 
When αp
∗ =
(1−p)Δθ+(1−p)Δϕkp
ρσ2
≤
Φ−1
Φ
 
Then αp
∗  will be the optimal contract conditional on ρσ2 ≥
[(1−p)Δθ+(1−p)ΔϕK]Φ
Φ−1
 
In this case, the utility of the high type will be: 
 
UHp = (1 − αp)Θ + [(1 − αp)Φ − 1]K + αp(θH + ϕHK) − R(αp) 
= [1 −
(1 − p)(Δθ + ΔϕK)
ρσ2
] Θ + {[1 −
(1 − p)(Δθ + ΔϕK)
ρσ2
]Φ − 1}K
+
(1 − p)(Δθ + ΔϕK)
ρσ2
×(θH + ϕHK) −
(1 − p)2(Δθ + ΔϕK)2
2ρσ2
 
=Θ + (1 − p)αpΔθ + [Φ − 1 + α(1 − p)Δϕ]K −
(1−p)2(Δθ+ΔϕK)2
2ρσ2
 
=[Θ + (Φ − 1)K] + (1 − p)αp(Δθ + ΔϕK) −
(1−p)2(Δθ+ΔϕK)2
2ρσ2
 
=[Θ + (Φ − 1)K] +
(1−p)2(Δθ+ΔϕK)2
2ρσ2
 
 
Subcase II 
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When 
(1−p)(Δθ+ΔϕK)
ρσ2
≥
Φ−1
Φ
 and 
(1−p)Δθ
ρσ2
≤
Φ−1
Φ
, 
 
The results of this subcase will be similar to the part where investors’ effort is 
introduced in subcase III. Thus, we combine the discussion in the following part. 
 
Subcase III 
 
When 
(1−p)Δθ
ρσ2
>
Φ−1
Φ
 
 
The entrepreneurs face a dilemma about whether to introduce the effort from investors. 
On one hand, a high type entrepreneur can reduce the loss from security mispricing by 
retaining a higher fraction of equity. On the other hand, he can introduce investors’ 
effort and lower the disutility from insufficient diversification by retaining less equity. 
 
If the optimal pooling contract is designed to introduce investors’ effort, then the 
incentive constraint αp ≤
Φ−1
Φ
 must be satisfied. Since  
(1−p)(Δθ+ΔϕK)
ρσ2
≥
(1−p)Δθ
ρσ2
>
Φ−1
Φ
, the high type entrepreneur will choose αp = αc =
Φ−1
Φ
. 
 
In this case, the utility of high type will be 
U′Hp = (1 − αp)Pp + αp(θH + ϕHkp) − R(αp) 
=
Θ
Φ
+ [
1
Φ
×Φ − 1]K +
Φ − 1
Φ
(θH + ϕHK) −
1
2
ρσ2
(Φ − 1)2
Φ2
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Otherwise, if the pooling contract is designed to exclude investors’ effort  αp ≥
Φ−1
Φ
, 
the optimal fraction retained will be αp =
(1−p)Δθ
ρσ2
. 
 
U"Hp = Θ+
(1 − p)2(Δθ + ΔϕK)2
2ρσ2
= Θ +
(1 − p)2Δθ2
2ρσ2
 
 
To analyse the sufficient conditions for investors’ effort to be introduced, we derive 
from the inequality U"H > U′H. 
 
Θ +
(1 − p)2Δθ2
2ρσ2
>
Θ
Φ
+ [
1
Φ
×Φ − 1]K +
Φ − 1
Φ
(θH +ϕHK) −
1
2
ρσ2
(Φ − 1)2
Φ2
 
K <
ρσ2(Φ − 1)
2ϕHΦ
+
(1 − p)2ΔθΦ
2ρσ2(Φ − 1)
−
(1 − p)Δθ
ϕH
 
 
Summary 
 
Summarising the results of all three cases listed above, we end up with the following 
conclusion: 
 
1. When K ≤
(Φ−1)ρσ2
ΦΔϕ(1−p)
−
Δθ
Δϕ
 or ρσ2 ≥
[(1−p)(Δθ+ΔϕK)]Φ
Φ−1
 
 
⇒
(1 − p)Δθ + (1 − p)Δϕkp
ρσ2
≤
Φ− 1
Φ
 
 
The optimal pooling contract will be 
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αp
∗ =
(1 − p)Δθ + (1 − p)Δϕkp
ρσ2
 
 
And the utility of the high type will become 
 
UHp =[Θ + (Φ − 1)K] +
(1−p)2(Δθ+ΔϕK)2
2ρσ2
 
 
2. When K ≥
(Φ−1)ρσ2
ΦΔϕ(1−p)
−
Δθ
Δϕ
 or
(1−p)ΔθΦ
Φ−1
≤ ρσ2 ≤
[(1−p)(Δθ+ΔϕK)]Φ
Φ−1
 
The optimal pooling contract will be 
 
αp
′ =
Φ− 1
Φ
 
 
And the utility of the high type will become 
 
U′Hp =
Θ
Φ
+
Φ− 1
Φ
(θH + ϕHK) −
1
2
ρσ2
(Φ − 1)2
Φ2
 
 
3. When ρσ2 ≤
(1−p)ΔθΦ
Φ−1
, two subcases will be possible. 
1) If the optimal pooling contract is designed to introduce investors’ effort: 
The optimal contract will be 
 
αp
′ =
Φ−1
Φ
 and UHp = U′Hp =
Θ
Φ
+
Φ−1
Φ
(θH + ϕHK) −
1
2
ρσ2
(Φ−1)2
Φ2
 
 
2) If the pooling contract is designed to exclude investors’ effort:  
The optimal contract will be 
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αp
∗ =
(1−p)Δθ
ρσ2
 and UHp = U"H = Θ +
(1−p)2Δθ2
2ρσ2
 
 
The first pooling contract will be dominant when U"H < U′H 
Θ +
(1 − p)2Δθ2
2ρσ2
<
Θ
Φ
+
Φ− 1
Φ
(θH + ϕHK) −
1
2
ρσ2
(Φ − 1)2
Φ2
 
⇒ K >
ρσ2(Φ − 1)
2ϕHΦ
+
(1 − p)2ΔθΦ
2ρσ2(Φ − 1)
−
(1 − p)Δθ
ϕH
 
 
The second pooling contract will be dominant when U"H > U′H 
K <
ρσ2(Φ − 1)
2ϕHΦ
+
(1 − p)2ΔθΦ
2ρσ2(Φ − 1)
−
(1 − p)Δθ
ϕH
 
⇒
(Φ− 1)ρσ2
ΦΔϕ(1 − p)
−
Δθ
Δϕ
< 𝐾 <
ρσ2(Φ − 1)
2ϕHΦ
+
(1 − p)2ΔθΦ
2ρσ2(Φ − 1)
−
(1 − p)Δθ
ϕH
 
 
As illustrated in previous section, the pooling equilibrium will be sustainable only 
when it strictly dominates all possible separating equilibria. In other words, proving 
the existence of a pooling equilibrium is equivalent to proving that no other separating 
menu can dominate the optimal pooling contracts. The method to prove this will be 
similar to what we have shown in Appendix A3. Because we have three different 
subcases, we will discuss them one by one in the following.  
 
 
Subcase I : (the optimal pooling contract can introduce investors’ effort) 
 
αp
∗ =
(1 − p)Δθ + (1 − p)Δϕkp
ρσ2
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UHp =[Θ + (Φ − 1)K] +
(1−p)2(Δθ+ΔϕK)2
2ρσ2
 
And K ≤
(Φ−1)ρσ2
ΦΔϕ(1−p)
−
Δθ
Δϕ
 
 
The object is to prove that there does not exist any separating menu that satisfies the 
inequities below. 
 
[ϕH(1 − αH) + ϕLαH − 1]kt + (1 − αH)θH − SH + αHθL − R(αH)
≤ θL +
p
1 − p
SH                                                                                       (1) 
 
(Incentive comparison constraint of the separating menu) 
 
(ϕH − 1)kt + θH − SH − R(RH) ≥ [Θ + (Φ − 1)K] +
(1 − p)2(Δθ + ΔϕK)2
2ρσ2
     (2) 
 
(Condition for the separating menu to dominate the pooling contract) 
 
0 ≤ αH ≤ 1                                                                                                                             (3) 
 
(Short-selling constraint of entrepreneurs)  
 
SH ≥ 0                                                                                                                                      (4) 
 
(Cross-subsidy constraint) 
And if αH ≥
ϕH−1
ϕH
⇒ kt = 0 
  74 
 
If αH ≤
ϕH−1
ϕH
⇒ kt = K 
(Incentive constraints of investors’ effort) 
 
Inequality (1) can be rewritten as 
Δθ + (ϕH − 1)kt − αH(Δθ + Δϕkt) −
1
2
ρσ2αH
2 ≤
1
1 − p
SH 
 
Whereas inequality (2) can be rewritten as  
(ϕH − 1)kt − (Φ − 1)K + (1 − p)Δθ −
1
2
ρσ2αH
2 −
(1 − p)2(Δθ + ΔϕK)2
2ρσ2
≥ SH 
 
0 ≤ αH ≤ 1 
SH ≥ 0 
 
Based on the incentive constraints of investors’ effort, the whole program can be 
decomposed into two sub-programs—with and without investors’ effort. 
 
① 
Δθ + (ϕH − 1)K − αH(Δθ + ΔϕK) −
1
2
ρσ2αH
2 ≤
1
1 − p
SH                             (𝑎1) 
(1 − p)(Δθ + ΔϕK) −
1
2
ρσ2αH
2 −
(1 − p)2(Δθ + ΔϕK)2
2ρσ2
≥ SH                     (𝑎2) 
0 ≤ αH ≤
Φ− 1
Φ
                                                                                                          (𝑎3) 
SH ≥ 0                                                                                                                             (a4) 
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② 
Δθ − αHΔθ −
1
2
ρσ2αH
2 −
(1 − p)2(Δθ + ΔϕK)2
2ρσ2
≤
1
1 − p
SH                            (𝑏1) 
(1 − p)Δθ − (Φ − 1)K −
1
2
ρσ2αH
2 −
(1 − p)2(Δθ + ΔϕK)2
2ρσ2
≥ SH                 (𝑏2) 
Φ− 1
Φ
≤ αH ≤ 1                                                                                                            (b3) 
SH ≥ 0                                                                                                                              (b4) 
 
 
Case ① 
 
From ① condition (a1) and (a2) 
(1 − p)Δθ + (1 − p)(ϕH − 1)kt − (1 − p)αH(Δθ + Δϕkt) −
1
2
(1 − p)ρσ2αH
2
≤ (1 − p)(Δθ + ΔϕK) −
1
2
ρσ2αH
2 −
(1 − p)2(Δθ + ΔϕK)2
2ρσ2
 
 
(1 − p)(ϕL − 1)K ≤ (1 − p)αH(Δθ + ΔϕK) −
1
2
pρσ2αH
2 −
(1 − p)2(Δθ + ΔϕK)2
2ρσ2
 
 
Set αH = αp =
(1−p)(Δθ+Δϕ)
ρσ2
≤
Φ−1
Φ
≤
ϕH−1
ϕH
 
 
(1 − p)(ϕL − 1)K
≤
(1 − p)2(Δθ + ΔϕK)2
ρσ2
−
p(1 − p)2(Δθ + ΔϕK)2
2ρσ2
−
(1 − p)2(Δθ + ΔϕK)2
2ρσ2
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(1 − p)(ϕL − 1)K ≤
(1 − p)
2
×
(1 − p)2(Δθ + ΔϕK)2
ρσ2
 
 
Because the left-hand side of the inequality (1 − p)(ϕL − 1)K ≤ 0 and the right-
hand side 
(1−p)
2
×
(1−p)2(Δθ+ΔϕK)2
ρσ2
≥ 0. Thus, there exists a nonempty set 𝜔1 of SH 
that satisfies both (a1) and (a2). 
 
To satisfy both conditions (a2) and (a4), it is required that 
 
(1 − p)(Δθ + ΔϕK) −
1
2
ρσ2αH
2 −
(1−p)2(Δθ+ΔϕK)2
2ρσ2
> 0. 
 
When αH =
(1−p)(Δθ+Δϕ)
ρσ2
, it becomes 
(1 − p)(Δθ + ΔϕK) −
(1 − p)2(Δθ + ΔϕK)2
2ρσ2
−
(1 − p)2(Δθ + ΔϕK)2
2ρσ2
 
= (1 − p)(Δθ + ΔϕK) −
(1 − p)2(Δθ + ΔϕK)2
ρσ2
 
= (1 − p)(Δθ + ΔϕK)×(1 −
(1 − p)(Δθ + ΔϕK)
ρσ2
) 
= (1 − p)(Δθ + ΔϕK)×(1 − αH) > 0 
 
Thus, there also exists a nonempty set 𝜔2 of SH that satisfies both (a2) and (a4). 
 
By combining both inequalities above, we have: 
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(1 − p)(Δθ + ΔϕK) −
1
2
ρσ2αH
2 −
(1 − p)2(Δθ + ΔϕK)2
2ρσ2
> max {(1 − p)Δθ + (1 − p)(ϕH − 1)kt − (1 − p)αH(Δθ + Δϕkt)
−
1
2
(1 − p)ρσ2αH
2 , 0} 
Define 
 (1 − p)Δθ + (1 − p)(ϕH − 1)kt − (1 − p)αH(Δθ + Δϕkt) −
1
2
(1 − p)ρσ2αH
2 = Υ  
 
Then Υ > 0 or Υ < 0 or Υ = 0 
⇒ 𝜔1 ∋ 𝜔2 or 𝜔1 ∋ 𝜔2 or 𝜔1 = 𝜔2 
And since 𝜔1, 𝜔2 ≠ ∅ 
⇒ ω = 𝜔1 ∩ 𝜔2 ≠ ∅ 
 
In other words, there exists a nonempty set  ω  of SH  that satisfies the all three 
restrictions (a1), (a2) and (a4), and when αH = αp =
(1−p)(Δθ+Δϕ)
ρσ2
, (a3) is satisfied as 
well.  
 
Because all four conditions can be satisfied at the same time, there exists a separating 
equilibrium menu dominating the pooling contract. Based on lemma 3, the pooling 
equilibrium collapses. In summary, when the separating menu and the pooling contract 
can both introduce investors’ effort, the pooling contract cannot be sustained as an 
equilibrium. 
 
Case ②  discusses the separating menu where the entrepreneurs choose not to 
introduce investors’ effort. However, it implies that the separating menu without effort 
would dominate that with investors’ effort. Because, in the discussion above, we have 
proved that separating the menu with investors’ effort can dominate the pooling 
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contract, there is no need to check case ② under this parameter condition when αp =
(1−p)(Δθ+Δϕ)
ρσ2
. 
 
Subcase II : (the optimal pooling contract excludes investors’ effort) 
 
Let us move to the case where αp =
Φ−1
Φ
and UHp = U′Hp =
Θ
Φ
+
Φ−1
Φ
(θH + ϕHK) −
1
2
ρσ2
(Φ−1)2
Φ2
. 
 
For the pooling contract above to become optimal, it requires:  K >
ρσ2(Φ−1)
2ϕHΦ
+
(1−p)2ΔθΦ
2ρσ2(Φ−1)
−
(1−p)Δθ
ϕH
 
 
By similar argument, the discussion is decomposed into two based on whether the 
optimal separating menu introduces investors’ effort: 
 
① 
(1 − p)Δθ + (1 − p)(ϕH − 1)K − (1 − p)αH(Δθ + ΔϕK) −
1
2
(1 − p)ρσ2αH
2
≤ SH                                                                                                           (𝑎1) 
θH
Φ
−
Θ
Φ
+
ϕH
Φ
K − K +
1
2
ρσ2
(Φ − 1)2
Φ2
−
1
2
ρσ2αH
2 ≥ SH                                        (𝑎2) 
0 ≤ αH ≤
Φ− 1
Φ
                                                                                                                (𝑎3) 
SH ≥ 0                                                                                                                                   (a4) 
 
② 
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∆θ − αHΔθ −
1
2
ρσ2αH
2 ≤
1
1 − p
SH                                                                                 (𝑏1) 
θH
Φ
−
Θ
Φ
+
ϕH
Φ
K − K +
1
2
ρσ2
(Φ − 1)2
Φ2
−
1
2
ρσ2αH
2 ≥ SH                                          (𝑏2) 
Φ− 1
Φ
≤ αH ≤ 1                                                                                                                  (b3) 
SH ≥ 0                                                                                                                                     (b4) 
 
One can easily show that it is impossible to eliminate the pooling equilibrium by 
following the method above. Thus, we suspect that a pooling equilibrium does exist 
under this case. To prove this, we first assume that there is no pooling equilibrium 
under all the parameter conditions. In other word, we can always find a separating 
menu that strictly dominates the optimal pooling contract. 
Then, let us start with case ① 
 
(1 − p)Δθ + (1 − p)(ϕH − 1)K − (1 − p)αH(Δθ + ΔϕK) −
1
2
(1 − p)ρσ2αH
2
≤
θH
Φ
−
Θ
Φ
+
ϕH
Φ
K − K +
1
2
ρσ2
(Φ − 1)2
Φ2
−
1
2
ρσ2αH
2  
 
αH
2 −
2(1 − p)(Δθ + ΔϕK)
pρσ2
αH +
2(1 − p)(1 −
1
Φ)Δθ
pρσ2
+
2(1 −
1
Φ)ϕHK
pρσ2
−
2(ϕH − 1)K
ρσ2
−
(Φ − 1)2
pΦ2
≤ 0 
 
pρσ2αH
2 − 2(1 − p)(Δθ + ΔϕK)αH + 2(1 − p) (1 −
1
Φ
)Δθ + 2 (1 −
1
Φ
)ϕHK
− 2p(ϕH − 1)K − ρσ
2
(Φ − 1)2
Φ2
≤ 0 
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We definea = pρσ2, b = 2(1 − p)(Δθ + ΔϕK), and c = 2(1 − p) (1 −
1
Φ
)Δθ +
2 (1 −
1
Φ
)ϕHK − 2p(ϕH − 1)K − ρσ
2 (Φ−1)
2
Φ2
. 
 
It can be seen from the inequality above that the left-hand side of the inequality is a 
quadratic form of αH . For there to be an αH  that satisfies the inequality above, it 
requires that b2 − 4ac ≥ 0.  Otherwise, if b2 − 4ac < 0 , the inequality cannot be 
satisfied, and the pooling equilibrium becomes sustainable. Thus, from b2 − 4ac < 0, 
we have: 
 
(1 − p)2(∆θ + ΔϕK)2
− pρσ2 [2(1 − p) (1 −
1
Φ
)Δθ + 2 (1 −
1
Φ
)ϕHK − 2p(ϕH − 1)K
− ρσ2
(Φ − 1)2
Φ2
] < 0 
 
(Φ − 1)2
Φ2
(ρσ2)2
− ρσ2 [2p(1 − p) (1 −
1
Φ
)Δθ + 2p (1 −
1
Φ
)ϕHK − 2p
2(ϕH − 1)K]
+ (1 − p)2(∆θ + ΔϕK)2 > 0 
 
This inequality is sufficient for the existence of pooling equilibrium. Given the 
quadratic form of ρσ2, this condition can be satisfied only if: 
 
[2p(1 − p) (1 −
1
Φ
)Δθ + 2p (1 −
1
Φ
)ϕHK − 2p
2(ϕH − 1)K]
2
− 4
(Φ − 1)2
Φ2
p(1 − p)2(∆θ + ΔϕK)2 > 0 
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[p(1 − p)Δθ + pϕHK −
P2(ϕH − 1)
Φ − 1
ΦK]2 − p(1 − p)2(∆θ + ΔϕK)2 > 0 
 
p2(1 − p)2Δθ2 + p2ϕH
2K2 + p4
(ϕH − 1)
2
(Φ − 1)2
Φ2K2 + 2p2(1 − p)ΔθϕHK
− 2p3(1 − p)Δθ
ϕH − 1
Φ − 1
ΦK − 2p3
ϕH − 1
Φ − 1
ϕHΦK
2
> p2(1 − p)2(Δθ2 + 2ΔθΔϕK) + Δϕ2K2 
 
{p2ϕH
2 + p4
(ϕH − 1)
2
(Φ − 1)2
Φ− 2p3
ϕH − 1
Φ − 1
ϕHΦ− p(1 − p)
2Δϕ2}K2
> 𝑝(1 − p)3Δθ2 + [2p2(1 − p)ΔθϕH − 2p
3(1 − p)Δθ
ϕH − 1
Φ − 1
Φ
+ 2p(1 − p)2ΔθΔϕ]K 
 
The left-hand side of the inequality above is a quadratic form of K, whereas the right-
hand side is a constant. Therefore, when the coefficient of the quadratic term is 
positive, the inequality will be satisfied when K is sufficiently large. 
 
p2ϕH
2 + p4
(ϕH − 1)
2
(Φ − 1)2
Φ− 2p3
ϕH − 1
Φ − 1
ϕHΦ− p(1 − p)
2Δϕ2
= {p2 (ϕH −
p(ϕH − 1)
Φ − 1
Φ)
2
− p(1 − p)2Δϕ} 
 
When Δϕ → 0 or p → 1, K is relatively large and the operating risk ρσ2 is under a 
certain area, the pooling equilibrium exists. 
Using a similar method, the same argument can be proved in case ② as well. 
 
 
 
  82 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter III: 
 
 Optimal Mechanism Design of Liquidity 
Provision under Asymmetric Information 
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1. Introduction 
 
The impact of asymmetric information on securities trading has long been discussed 
by theoretical research. Similar to the “lemon” market discussed by Akerlof (1970), 
private information depraves the trading process and reduces liquidity provision. With 
asymmetric information, high-quality asset owners will tend to retain their asset as the 
result of the mispricing in the market. To minimise the negative impact, previous 
researchers have written many articles to discuss the optimal mechanism design under 
asymmetric information. 
 
In recent years, more and more articles focus on the essential role played by 
intermediaries in asymmetric information environment (for example Winton (2001) 
and DeMarzo (2005)). However, these articles assume intermediaries have either a 
better ability or a stronger incentive to monitor entrepreneurs. To distinguish our study 
from these previous works, we show that by allowing intermediaries to offer a menu 
of contracts, the social efficiency and liquidity provision can be improved even 
without outstanding monitoring ability. In our model, when the separating menu is 
sustained as an equilibrium, the type information can be obtained by observing the 
contract chosen by the entrepreneurs. Therefore, by introducing a screening 
mechanism and designing the menu optimally, the intermediary can fill this 
information gap without paying any extra cost of effort. This advantage can finally 
benefit both the investors and the entrepreneurs. On the investors’ side, this “free” 
signal saves their time and cost for information collecting and analysing. On the other 
hand, it also prevents the entrepreneurs from being misidentified by any inaccurate or 
misleading information.  
 
In addition, this paper also discusses the optimal securities design, under a different 
market environment. Previous research related to pecking order theory (Myer and 
Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984) suggests that a high-quality asset owner should issue 
securities with low information sensitivity to alleviate the mispricing. However, 
Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) point out that their results ignore the information 
production ability of outside investors. If investors are allowed to identify the quality 
of an asset by exerting effort, the high-quality owner may choose to issue risky 
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securities to motivate the investors’ monitoring behaviours. Incorporating this idea, 
we also assume that investors are equipped with access to identifying the private 
information by exerting costly effort. However, our model shows that it is not always 
on the entrepreneurs’ benefit to motivate investors’ speculation behave. Firstly, in 
order to motivate the investors, the selling price of the securities may be cut to 
compensate for investors’ cost of effort. Secondly, information acquired by the 
investors is imperfect. Therefore, it is associated with a risk of misidentification. Due 
to this two effects, we are going to show that without complete information, this 
speculation power can decrease the attractiveness of the directly issuing process and 
leave more motivation for entrepreneurs to issue through intermediaries.  
 
Additionally, to make our model general, we also endogenize the existence of 
intermediaries by allowing entrepreneurs to choose to issue securities through 
intermediaries or directly to investors. As a result, we find that intermediaries are more 
likely to be introduced in a market where the cost of information is relative high. More 
importantly, when intermediaries are introduced, and the proportion of High type is 
sufficiently high, intermediaries can implement “cross-subsidy” to improve social 
efficiency. Our model also predicts that when the economic environment is good, we 
are more likely to observe the issuing of risky securities and there will be a price 
adjustment in the reselling process. Otherwise, when the economic environment is less 
favourable, we may observe that only the riskless securities will be issued.  
 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the important results 
from the previous literature. We will describe the basic setting and assumptions in our 
model in Section 3. Then, in Section 4, we will firstly discuss the equilibrium with 
intermediaries, while the equilibrium without intermediaries will be discussed in 
Section 5. Finally, we will come to the conclusion and empirical implications in 
Section 6. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
One of the most important papers discussing the securities issuing process with 
asymmetric information is Leland and Pyle (1977). With the risk aversion assumption 
of the entrepreneurs, they show that the seller of high-value securities can signal their 
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type by partly retaining their risky asset. Although in our model we also have the case 
where entrepreneurs of High type partly retain their risk asset, the incentive of doing 
so is different. In our model, entrepreneurs are assumed to be risk neutral and endowed 
with a short-term investment opportunity. Since the short-term programme has 
positive NPV, entrepreneurs have an incentive to sell their risky asset to finance this 
programme. Moreover, the decision to retain an asset is based on the trade-off of 
underinvestment and mispricing of the asset. 
 
Later, Diamond (1984) creates an intermediation model with ex-post asymmetric 
information where the cash flow of the firm is unobservable. To cope with the moral 
hazard problem and ensure the repayment, investors are allowed to monitor the firm 
at a cost. In the case of multiple investors, he/she finds it becomes efficient to delegate 
the monitoring to an intermediary. Different from their standpoint, our model mainly 
discusses the effect of ex-ante asymmetric information. Besides, in our model, we also 
find there is an efficiency gain by introducing the intermediaries. However, our 
efficiency gain is mainly sourced from implementing a more efficient separating menu 
instead of coping with the dilemma of the public good. 
 
By introducing a market making setting, Gorton and Pennachi (1990) build up another 
model of intermediation with two different kinds of investors, informed and 
uninformed. In their model, uninformed investors will be exploited by the informed 
ones at the time when they are in need of liquidity. As a result, an intermediary should 
be set up by the uninformed investors to split cash flows into riskless debt and equity. 
In that case, uninformed investors will only trade the riskless securities to satisfy their 
liquidity demand. With similar ideas but different arguments, Chemla and Hennessy 
(2011) design a model with uninformed investors and speculators. They point out that 
there will be an equilibrium where only riskless debt is issued. In addition, they also 
suggest that when the demand for liquidity is high, an issuer may pool at the structure 
optimal to the High type so as to introduce the effort from speculators. To distinguish 
our study from their model, in this article investors are homogeneously endowed with 
access to the type information, but the information they get is not perfect.  Therefore, 
in our model, the introduction of investor’s effort is not always helpful in decreasing 
the information rent, rather imperfect information may lead to a risk of 
misidentification. Our model also shows that this risk may even offer a higher 
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incentive for entrepreneurs to issue their securities through intermediaries. 
 
Additionally, Winton (2001) considers a model where intermediaries have incentives 
to acquire the quality information about the underlying asset so as to minimise the 
agency cost. With the existence of liquidity shock, intermediaries may be forced to 
issue securities backed by their holding. Similarly, DeMarzo (2005) suggests another 
model in which financial intermediaries have superior ability in valuing assets. 
Therefore, they can benefit from purchasing the underpriced securities and holding 
them to maturity. On the other hand, to make the most of their leverage capacity, they 
may have an incentive to partly resell their asset and reinvest the proceeds. However, 
due to their superior information, they may face an adverse selection problem in the 
reselling process. As a result, they suggest that it may become optimal for an 
intermediary to construct an asset pool and issue securities based on the income of the 
whole pool. Similar to their model, intermediaries in our mechanism are required to 
purchase the risk asset from entrepreneurs and resell the securities to investors. 
However, the ability to acquire information is granted to investors instead of to 
intermediaries. We are going to show that by offering an efficient separating menu, 
intermediaries can acquire the type information even without the special ability. 
Moreover, by introducing intermediaries, the cost of information acquisition can be 
saved, and we can end up with a higher social efficiency. 
 
On the other hand, our model also discusses the question about optimal security design. 
As illustrated in pecking order theory (Myer and Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984), under a 
trading environment with asymmetric information, high-quality firms may issue less 
information-sensitive securities to alleviate the mispricing. Later, DeMarzo and Duffie 
(1999) also examine the problem faced by a firm involved in fundraising under 
asymmetric information. Their paper shows that when the firm issues securities, the 
private information will lead to a liquidity loss that has to be traded off against the cost 
of retention. Similarly, Narayanan (1988) also supports the implication of pecking 
order theory. He suggests that firms of high quality should minimise the dilution cost 
by issuing low information sensitive securities. However, all these papers rely on the 
assumption that the information gap between entrepreneurs and investors is fixed. In 
other words, they do not consider the effect of information acquisition by investors. 
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Modifying this assumption, Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) suggest that if outside 
investors are allowed to produce information, high-quality firms may have an 
incentive to issue information-sensitive securities to motivate the information 
acquisition. Moreover, their paper shows that securities of low information sensitivity 
do not always dominate ones of high information sensitivity. Whether entrepreneurs 
prefer debt or equity depends on the cost of information acquisition and the precision 
of the information. Consistent with their argument, in our model we also allow outside 
investors to detect the quality of the firm by exerting costly effort. However, our model 
gives entrepreneurs the option to issue their securities indirectly through the 
intermediaries. In that case, entrepreneurs can signal their types by accepting different 
contracts offered by intermediaries without introducing the costly effort of investors. 
 
In recent years, several papers also show us some new findings on this topic. Yang and 
Zeng (2014) suggest that if investors can acquire quality information about the project 
and screen it through the financing process, the real production of entrepreneurs could 
depend on investors’ information acquisition. Besides, based on the strength of this 
dependence, either debt or convertible debt could be optimal. Further, Yang (2015) 
suggests that the optimality of debt may stand out when investors are allowed to 
acquire information from different aspects of the fundamental. Because investors 
could benefit from their information at the cost of entrepreneurs through adverse 
selection. With rational anticipation, entrepreneurs may prefer to issue securities 
which minimise investors’ incentive to get information. The main difference between 
Yang and Zeng (2014), Yang (2015) and ours is that in their papers, bargain power, 
and information advantage are separated into two parties: entrepreneurs and investors. 
In other words, entrepreneurs have the whole ownership of their asset while investors 
could have a better understanding about the quality of it. Therefore, the ignorant 
entrepreneurs have no incentive to signal the quality of their asset and investors’ 
information acquisition always becomes harmful to entrepreneurs. Conversely, in our 
paper, information advantage is endowed by entrepreneurs, so how to transfer 
information convincingly becomes the main conflict of our model. Under this 
environment, investors’ information acquisition could be valuable to entrepreneurs in 
certain cases. Also, their paper mainly focuses on a case where aggregate cash flow is 
fixed, whereas our paper devotes more attention to a case where it is variable. As a 
result, the impact of information acquisition and optimal securities on social welfare 
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will also be included in our paper.   
 
Other related papers include Boot and Thakor (1993), Allen and Gale (1988, 1994), 
Madan and Soubra (1991), Zender (1991) and Kalay and Zender (1997). In Boot and 
Thakor (1993), they illustrate that the optimal strategy for a securities seller is to split 
the claim on the cash flow into an information-sensitive security and a second claim 
that is less information-sensitive. Nevertheless, in their model, the seller offers the 
entirety of their asset for sale, and as a result, the cost of dilution is eliminated. Allen 
and Gale (1988, 1994), and Madan and Soubra (1991) discuss the optimal securities 
design problem in risk-sharing while in our model both entrepreneurs and investors 
are assumed to be risk neutral. Also, we do not consider the securities design based on 
corporate control as did Zender (1991) and Kalay and Zender (1997). 
 
3. The Model 
 
We consider a three-date (0, 1, 2) model where all agents are risk neutral. There are 
three different types of agents: entrepreneurs, investors and intermediaries. 
 
Entrepreneurs 
 
At Date 0, an entrepreneur owns a single (long-term) asset with type τ ∈ {L,H} and 
he/she privately knows the type of the asset. This asset will deliver τ units of the 
consumption good at Date 2 with probability one and L is assumed to be less than H. 
The prior probability that τ = H is λ ∈ (0,1). The final payoff of the asset is verifiable, 
and courts can only enforce any contract contingent upon this final payoff at Date 2. 
Entrepreneurs also have access to a short-term linear technology which allows them 
to convert each dollar invested in it at Date 1 into β dollar (β > 1) at Date 2. However, 
in contrast to the payoff of the long-term asset, the payoff of the short-term technology 
is not verifiable and so no contract can be written based on the payoff of this 
technology. The entrepreneurs have no wealth, and so the funds invested in the short-
term technology at Date 1 have to be raised by securitizing the long-term asset.  
 
Investors 
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Investors are competitive and endow with Y>H units of funds which allow them to 
purchase the entire asset from an entrepreneur. More importantly, investors can receive 
a signal regarding τ by exerting effort which costs c. The signal is denoted by Π ∈
{ΠH, ΠL} and the probability that the signal is correct by σ ≡ Pr (Π = Πτ). To make 
the model interesting, we assume that the signals received by investors are informative, 
that is σ > 1/2.  
 
Financial Intermediaries (Investment Banks) 
 
Intermediaries are also competitive and can purchase the asset by the entrepreneurs 
and resell it to investors. More specifically, intermediaries can offer menus of contracts 
to entrepreneurs. In our model, a contract specifies the price paid by the intermediary 
to the entrepreneur and the contingent repayment to the intermediary and is denoted 
by Ci (Bi
j
, Pi). Ci stands for a contract offered to an entrepreneur who has announced 
to be of type “i”. Bi
j
 stands for the contingent payment to the intermediary when the 
asset (entrepreneur) is ex-post proved to be of type “j” while the entrepreneur has 
announced to be of type “i”. Pi  stands for the price intermediaries pays to an 
entrepreneur who has announced to be of type “i” in exchange for the asset. After the 
entrepreneurs choose their contract, the intermediaries purchase all the securities 
issued by the entrepreneurs and resell them to investors (possibly after securitizing 
them).   
 
Game structure  
 
In the first stage of the game, the entrepreneurs decide whether they will issue their 
securities directly to final investors or through intermediaries.  
 
The Game with Direct Issue of Securities 
 
If an entrepreneur decides to issue her securities directly to investors, the game is: 
 
Stage 2: The entrepreneur decides both the form and the price of her securities. 
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Stage 3: Given the form of the securities, competitive investors will update their 
beliefs about the quality of the asset and decide whether they should take the effort to 
obtain the informative signal about the asset quality.  
 
Stage 4: Investors decide whether they will purchase the securities issued by any of 
the entrepreneurs. 
 
Stage 5: If some securities are not sold, the entrepreneurs adjust their price and relist 
them for sale. 
 
Stage 6: Finally, the asset delivers the consumption good, and the payoff to investors 
is determined by the portfolio of securities they have chosen. 
 
The Game with Intermediated Issue of Securities 
 
If an entrepreneur decides to issue her securities through intermediaries, the game is: 
 
Stage 2: Competitive intermediaries offer menus of contracts to entrepreneurs.   
 
Stage 3: Each entrepreneur chooses one of the contracts offered. 
 
Stage 4: The intermediary securitizes the assets they purchased from entrepreneurs 
and offer the securities to final investors. 
 
Stage 5: After observing the contracts signed between the entrepreneurs and the 
intermediaries and the securities issued by intermediaries, investors will update their 
beliefs about the asset quality and decide whether to exert effort to obtain the 
informative signal. Given their information set and the resulting beliefs, investors 
decide whether to purchase the securities issued by intermediaries. 
 
Stage 6: Finally, the asset delivers the consumption good, and the payoff to investors 
is determined by the portfolio of securities they have chosen. 
 
Two points should be made here: First, we allow for cross-subsidization across 
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contracts within the menu offered by each intermediary. That is, competition among 
intermediaries will lead to zero profits for the whole menu but not necessarily for each 
contract. Losses on some contracts are compensated by profits on the other contracts. 
Second, the intermediaries cannot acquire the informative signal about the asset 
quality (and do not have any prior information about it). If an intermediary offers a 
pooling contract (degenerate menu), it does not obtain any information about the asset 
quality. As a result, if the investors (speculators) acquire the informative signal at the 
reselling stage, the intermediary will be at an informational disadvantage and may 
make losses. This suggests that, in order to avoid this informational disadvantage, 
intermediaries will seek to obtain information about asset quality by offering 
separating menus. 
 
4. Equilibrium without intermediaries 
 
As we have mentioned above, if intermediaries are not introduced, the entrepreneurs 
will sell their securities directly to the investors. Based on the securities issued by 
entrepreneurs, investors update their belief and decide whether they should make an 
effort to acquire the signal. Incorporating all the information they own, the investors 
finally make their purchasing decision. To clarify the preference of different types, we 
firstly analysis potential separating equilibrium in the direct issuing:  
 
Lemma 1: In the direct issuing market, both a separating equilibrium and a 
pooling equilibrium can be sustained if the High type entrepreneurs issue riskless 
debt. 
 
Proof: 
 
We start our proof on the separating equilibrium. Suppose that the high type 
entrepreneurs offer a contract CH (BH
H, BH
L , PH) while the low type entrepreneurs offer 
a contract  CL (BL
H, BL
L, PL): 
 
Correspondingly, the utility functions of high type and low type are 
 
UH = βPH + H − BH
H 
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UL = βPL + L − BL
L 
 
Besides, since the type can be inferred by the separating contracts, the price of the 
securities will be equal to its true value. Therefore, we have the following break-even 
conditions from the investors: 
 
PH ≤ BH
H 
PL ≤ BL
L 
 
Moreover, with the separating contract, neither type should have the incentive to 
mimic the other type. Hence the following incentive constraints should be satisfied: 
 
βPH + H− BH
H ≥ βPL + H − BL
H 
βPL + L − BL
L ≥ 𝛽PH + L − 𝐵𝐻
𝐿   
 
Finally, due to limit liability, the entrepreneurs cannot commit a higher payment than 
their output. Therefore: 
 
BH
H , BL
H ≤ 𝐻 
𝐵𝐻
𝐿 , BL
L ≤ 𝐿 
 
To prevent the Low type entrepreneurs from mimicking, the High type entrepreneurs 
may increase 𝐵𝐻
𝐿  to its maximum. Because the High type entrepreneurs know that their 
output will never be L, while it may happen to Low type for sure. Hence issuing 
securities with high payment in low output state can effectively signal their type 
without incurring any extra cost. 
 
By substituting the 𝐵𝐻
𝐿 = 𝐿 into the incentive constraint of Low type, we can have: 
 
βPL + L − BL
L ≥ 𝛽PH + L − 𝐿 ⇒ βPL + L − BL
L ≥ 𝛽PH 
 
Since the output of the Low type entrepreneurs is lower than that of the High types 
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(L<H), it can be inferred that the Low type entrepreneurs may have a higher incentive 
to mimic the High types. Therefore, the incentive constraint should be binding: 
 
βPL + L − BL
L = 𝛽PH 
 
Besides, it can also be proved that the Low type entrepreneurs will fully securitize 
their asset to maximize their utility.  
 
Suppose that there exists a separating menu where BL
L = 𝐿 − ∆< 𝐿. Base on the break-
even condition, it can be inferred that PL ≤ BL
L ⟹ PL ≤ 𝐿 − ∆. As a result, the utility 
of the Low type entrepreneurs is UL = βPL + L − BL
L ≤ (β − 1)(𝐿 − ∆) + L. In that 
case, if one of the Low type entrepreneurs suggests a new deviating contract where 
BL
H = BL
L = PL = 𝐿, it can be inferred that the utility of the Low type in the deviating 
contract becomes U′L = (β − 1)L + L > UL. Doubtlessly, the Low type entrepreneurs 
have an incentive to deviate to the new contract. Moreover, this deviating contract is 
going to be accepted by the investors regardless whether the High type entrepreneurs 
mimic or not. Therefore, we can conclude that in any separating equilibrium with 
direct issuing, it must be: 
 
BL
L = PL = 𝐿 
 
 
By substituting BL
L = PL = 𝐿  back to the incentive constraint of Low type 
entrepreneurs:  
 
βPL + L − BL
L = 𝛽PH ⟹ PH = PL = 𝐿 
 
Finally, by substituting PH = 𝐿 back to the utility function of High type entrepreneurs, 
we can infer that the High type entrepreneurs will choose  𝐵𝐻
𝐻 = 𝐿 as well. Because 
the price of their securities is fixed by the incentive constraint of Low type, any 
increase on their contingent payment  𝐵𝐻
𝐻 cannot generate a higher income. As a result, 
in the separating equilibrium, the High type entrepreneurs have no incentive to commit 
𝐵𝐻
𝐻 > 𝐿.  In conclusion, with the direct issuing process, the separating equilibrium can 
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arise only if the High type entrepreneurs issue riskless debt   𝐵𝐻
𝐻 = 𝐵𝐻
𝐿 = 𝐿, while the 
Low type entrepreneurs can issue risky or riskless securities 𝐵𝐿
𝐿 = 𝐿 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵𝐿
𝐻𝜖[𝐿, 𝐻].  
 
From the proof above, we can infer that a pooling allocation where both types issue 
riskless debt can also be sustained as an equilibrium. This allocation is sustained when 
investors hold a belief that the one who issue risky securities (𝐵𝑖
𝐻 > 𝐿) must be the 
Low type. This belief can satisfy the intuitive criterion, when the return of the 
investment 𝛽 is sufficiently low. In that case, the loss of mispricing may overcome the 
benefit of a higher investment. Therefore, the High type entrepreneurs have no 
incentive to increase 𝐵𝐻
𝐻. Neither do the Low type entrepreneurs have the incentive. 
Because under the belief of the investors, increasing 𝐵𝐿
𝐻 cannot generate a higher 
income to them. Besides, since the pay-out of the riskless debt is fixed to be L, the 
investors may find it worthless to exert any effort. In conclusion, none of the 
participants can become better-off by deviating to other strategies, and the pooling 
allocation can be sustained as a Bayesian equilibrium.  
 
However, when the return of short-term investment β becomes sufficiently high, the 
High type entrepreneurs may have the incentive to issue riskier securities and 
motivates the investors to “identify” the types by exerting effort. To be more specific, 
when High type entrepreneurs choose to issue risky securities for a higher selling price, 
the incentive constraints will be violated. In another word, if the High type 
entrepreneurs issue any risky securities, the Low type entrepreneurs will always mimic. 
 
Reviewing the simplified incentive constraints of the Low type in the proof of Lemma 
1: 
 
β𝐿 + L − L ≥ 𝛽BH
H + L − 𝐵𝐻
𝐿  
 
β𝐿 ≥ 𝛽BH
H + L − 𝐵𝐻
𝐿 ⇒ β(𝐿 − BH
H) ≥ L − 𝐵𝐻
𝐿  
 
Given the assumption of limit liability, entrepreneurs cannot commit a payment higher 
than their full income (𝐵𝐻
𝐿 ≤ 𝐿). Therefore, if the High type entrepreneurs commit a 
BH
H > 𝐿, the incentive constraint of Low type will be violated. In another word, the 
  95 
 
Low type entrepreneurs will always have the incentive to mimic the High type if  BH
H >
𝐿. As a result, no prior information could be acquired by observing the contract chosen 
by the entrepreneurs and all the securities are sold at an initial pooling price (𝑃𝑝).  
 
From the structure of the sequential game above, we can infer that the equilibrium can 
be solved by implementing backward induction.  As the starting point of our discussion, 
we firstly focus on the small sub-game where the investors make their effort-taking 
and purchasing decision. At the beginning of this sub-game, the pooling contract 
(𝐵𝑝
𝐻, 𝐵𝑝
𝐿 , 𝑃𝑝) are given by the entrepreneurs’ previous move.  
 
If the investors choose not to acquire any signal, the expected revenue of the securities 
are: 
𝑃 = 𝜆𝐵𝑝
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐵𝑝
𝐿 
 
Therefore, we can infer that the reservation price of the investors will be 𝑃𝑝 = 𝑃 
without any signal.  
 
 The game could become more complicated when the investors exert effort to acquire 
the signal. In our model, we assume that the signal of investors is informative but not 
perfect. Since the probability for the signal to match the type is σ ∈ (
1
2
, 1), securities 
with positive signal ( ΠH) are more likely to be the high type.  Otherwise, if a negative 
signal ( ΠL) is acquired, investors may decrease their expectation to the securities. 
However, the signal acquired by investors is imperfect. Hence, with a certain 
probability (1-σ), the signal may fail to reflect the true type of the securities. High type 
securities could be marked as “low” type by the investors and rejected in the first sales. 
In that case, the High type entrepreneur may have to decrease their securities price in 
the second sales. This risk of misidentification may restrict the incentive for High type 
entrepreneurs to issue their securities directly to the market, especially when the 
information is relatively inaccurate (σ).  
 
To start a more detail discussion, we summarize all four matching situations about 
the type and signal with the following table: 
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Type Signal Ex-post Probability Ex-anti Probability 
H 𝜋𝐻 σ λσ 
H 𝜋𝐿 1 − σ λ(1 − σ) 
L 𝜋𝐻 1 − σ (1 − λ)(1 − σ) 
L 𝜋𝐿 σ (1 − λ)σ 
 
As we can conclude from the table above, for the securities associated with good signal 
(𝜋𝐻), the expected value is: 
 
𝑃𝑔 =
𝜆𝜎
𝜆𝜎 + (1 − 𝜆)(1 − 𝜎)
𝐵𝑝
𝐻 +
(1 − 𝜆)(1 − 𝜎)
𝜆𝜎 + (1 − 𝜆)(1 − 𝜎)
𝐵𝑝
𝐿 
 
While for the securities associated with bad signal (𝜋𝐿), the expected value will be: 
 
𝑃𝑏 =
𝜆(1 − 𝜎)
𝜆(1 − 𝜎) + (1 − 𝜆)𝜎
𝐵𝑝
𝐻 +
(1 − 𝜆)𝜎
𝜆(1 − 𝜎) + (1 − 𝜆)𝜎
𝐵𝑝
𝐿 
         
Based on our assumptions that the signal is informative (𝜎 > 1/2) and the pay-out of 
the securities is positive correlated with the output (𝐵𝑝
𝐻 ≥ 𝐵𝑝
𝐿), it can be inferred that 
𝑃𝑔 ≥ 𝑃𝑏. 
 
Given the ex-post expectation of the securities value, we turn to the discussion about 
the investors’ optimal strategy.  As we have mentioned in previous paragraphs, the ex-
ante proportion of high type entrepreneurs is publicly known as λ. As a result, if the 
investors purchase all the securities regardless of the signal, the expected value of their 
asset pool is: 
 
E(V) = 𝜆𝐵𝑝
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐵𝑝
𝐿 
 
As we can see, this value can be rationally predicted before the signal acquisition. 
Therefore, we can infer the following lemma: 
 
Lemma 2:   With rational expectation, it can never be an equilibrium for the 
investors to exert effort and choose to purchase all the securities or reject all the 
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securities afterward.  
 
Proof: Assume that the entrepreneurs set their initial price equal to 𝑃𝑝 in the first sales. 
If the investors purchase all the securities without taking any effort, their pay-off is: 
 
𝜆𝐵𝑝
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐵𝑝
𝐿 − 𝑃𝑝 
 
However, if the investors remain to purchase all the securities after exerting effort, 
their pay-off becomes: 
 
𝜆𝐵𝑝
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐵𝑝
𝐿 − 𝑃𝑝 − 𝐶 
 
Given a strictly positive cost of effort 𝐶, investors who have chosen the later strategy 
will become better-off by deviating to the previous one. Therefore, the later strategy 
cannot be an equilibrium. With similar argument, it can also be found that the investors 
would choose to be passive when they intend to reject all the offers.   
 
In these two special cases, the payoff to the investors can be expected before the effort-
taking decision and is irrelevant to the signal acquired. In another word, the investors 
cannot benefit from the signal they acquire if they decide to purchase all or reject all. 
Nevertheless, to obtain this signal, the investors have to pay C as the cost of their effort. 
Therefore, if the investor expects to purchase all of the securities or leave the market, 
she will never choose to exert effort.  
 
The only way in which the investors can benefit from their signal is through securities 
selection. Since the signal acquired by the investors is informative, the investors may 
generate positive profit by purchasing the securities with good signal and reject those 
with bad signal. Based on our previous discussion, if the investors exert effort, a 
fraction equal to 𝜆𝜎 + (1 − 𝜆)(1 − 𝜎) of the securities is going to be identified as 
“good”. Hence, by purchasing these securities with good signal, the investors can 
acquire: 
 
[𝜆𝜎 + (1 − 𝜆)(1 − 𝜎)] ∗ (𝑃𝑔 − 𝑃𝑝) 
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In ex-ante, if the investors choose to take effort and make the securities selection, their 
payoff is:  
 
𝐸𝐸𝑆 = [𝜆𝜎 + (1 − 𝜆)(1 − 𝜎)] ∗ (𝑃𝑔 − 𝑃𝑝) − C 
 
Otherwise, if the investors do exert any effort, there will be no signal which they can 
use to make their selection. Therefore, they either purchase all the securities or reject 
to purchase any. By purchasing all the securities, the investors’ payoff is: 
 
𝐸𝐼𝑃 = 𝜆𝐵𝑝
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐵𝑝
𝐿 − 𝑃𝑝 
 
Otherwise, if the investors reject all the offers from the entrepreneurs, their payoff is: 
 
 𝐸𝐼0 = 0 
          
In summary, after excluding some dominated or impossible strategy combination, 
three strategies are remaining to be compared by the investors: 1, investors exert effort 
and select their securities with the signal – (effort, selection). 2, investors do not exert 
any effort and purchase all the securities – (ignorance, purchase). 3, investors do not 
exert any effort and leave the market – (ignorance, reject). In the following discussion, 
we are going to compare all these strategies two by two under different pricing area. 
Given the price set up by the entrepreneurs, a strategy is going to be chosen by the 
investors if and only if it can generate higher payoff than the other two.   
 
Define ?̃?  as the reservation price at which the investors feel indifferent between 
choosing (effort, selection) and (ignorance, reject). From the definition of ?̃?  and 
investors’ pay-off function, it can be inferred that: 
 
[𝜆𝜎 + (1 − 𝜆)(1 − 𝜎)] ∗ (𝑃𝑔 − ?̃?) − C = 0 
 
⇒ ?̃? =
𝜆𝜎𝐵𝑝
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜆)(1 − 𝜎)𝐵𝑝
𝐿
𝜆𝜎 + (1 − 𝜆)(1 − 𝜎)
−
𝐶
𝜆𝜎 + (1 − 𝜆)(1 − 𝜎)
 
  99 
 
 
Due to the linearity of the pricing function, if the entrepreneurs choose a price above 
?̃?, the investors would prefer (ignorance, reject) to (effort, selection). Otherwise, if the 
price is below ?̃? , obtaining the signal and doing securities selection, may generates 
higher profit to the investors.  
 
Similarly, define ?̅? as the reservation price at which the investors feel indifferent 
between choosing (ignorance, purchase) and (ignorance, reject). We can have: 
  
𝜆𝐵𝑝
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐵𝑝
𝐿 − ?̅? = 0 
 
⇒ ?̅? = 𝜆𝐵𝑝
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐵𝑝
𝐿 
 
In the case without any signal, if the entrepreneurs set a price 𝑃𝑝 > ?̅?, the investors 
may trend to reject entrepreneurs’ offer. Because the initial price of the securities has 
exceeded their ex-ante expectation. Therefore, purchasing all the securities is a loss-
making decision to the investors. In the opposite, if the entrepreneurs set a price 𝑃𝑝 ≤
?̅?, the investors may purchase all the securities without any signal and still generate 
positive profit.  
 
Finally, define ?̇?  as the reservation price at which the investors feel indifferent 
between choosing (effort, selection) and (ignorance, purchase). Similarly, by 
definition we have: 
 
[𝜆𝜎 + (1 − 𝜆)(1 − 𝜎)] ∗ (𝑃𝑔 − ?̇? )– C = 𝜆𝐵𝑝
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐵𝑝
𝐿 − ?̇? 
 
⇒ ?̇? = 𝑃𝑏 +
𝐶
(1 − 𝜆)𝜎 + 𝜆(1 − 𝜎)
 
 
Intuitively, if the price of securities is extremely low, the benefit of excluding the low 
type securities may decrease. As a result, when the benefit of doing so cannot cover 
the cost of effort (𝑃𝑝 ≤ ?̇?), the investors may choose to purchase all the securities 
blindly instead of taking any effort. Otherwise, when the potential loss of purchasing 
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low quality securities becomes sufficiently high (𝑃𝑝 > ?̇?) , the investors may have 
incentive to acquire information and select their securities more causally.  
 
To clarify the optimal strategy of investors, we compare the reservation prices under 
different parameter conditions and end up with the following conclusion: 
 
Proposition 1:  
 
When ?̃? ≤ ?̅?, there exist a pooling equilibrium where the entrepreneurs set their 
initial price 𝑷𝒑 = ?̅? and the investors purchase all the securities without taking 
any effort.  
 
When ?̃? > ?̅? and 𝝈?̃? + (𝟏 − 𝝈)𝑷𝒃 > ?̅?, there exist a pooling equilibrium where 
the entrepreneurs set their initial price 𝑷𝒑 = ?̃?, second sales price 𝑷𝒑𝒔 = 𝑷𝒃 and 
the investors exert effort to do the securities selection.  
 
When ?̃?  >  ?̅?  and 𝝈?̃? + (𝟏 − 𝝈)𝑷𝒃 ≤ ?̅? , there exist a separating equilibrium 
where the entrepreneurs issue their securities through intermediaries.  
 
Proof: 
The whole proof can be departed into two cases depending on the relationship between 
?̃? and ?̅?: 
 
Case 1: When ?̃? ≤ ?̅?. 
 
?̃? ≤ ?̅? ⇒
𝜆𝜎𝐵𝑝
𝐻+(1−𝜆)(1−𝜎)𝐵𝑝
𝐿
𝜆𝜎+(1−𝜆)(1−𝜎)
−
𝐶
𝜆𝜎+(1−𝜆)(1−𝜎)
≤ 𝜆𝐵𝑝
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐵𝑝
𝐿 
 
⟹ C ≥ λ(1 − λ)(2σ − 1)(𝐵𝑝
𝐻 − 𝐵𝑝
𝐿) 
 
With the same parameter condition, it can be easily proved that  ?̇? ≥ ?̅? in this case.  
 
To simplify our analysis, we conclude the relative relationship between ?̃?,  ?̅? and ?̇? 
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with the following graph: 
 
 
As we can see from the graph above, the whole pricing area can be divided into two. 
When the entrepreneurs set an initial price above ?̅?, investors’ optimal strategy will be 
(ignorance, reject). As we have defined in the previous section, when the price of 
securities is above  ?̅? , (ignorance, reject) can bring higher pay-off to the investors 
than (ignorance, purchase). Similarly, when the price is higher than  ?̃?, the investors prefer 
(ignorance, reject) to (effort, selection).  As we can see in this case, any price level 
above ?̅? will also be above ?̃?, which means that, when the entrepreneurs set their price 
above ?̅?,  (ignorance, reject) becomes a better strategy than both (ignorance, purchase) 
and (effort, selection). However, if the entrepreneurs cut the price below ?̅?, (Ignorance, 
Purchase) will become the dominant strategy amount the three. As we have defined, 
when the price is below ?̇? , the investor would become better-off by choosing 
(ignorance, purchase) instead of  (effort, selection). Since any price below ?̅? is also 
below ?̇?, it can be inferred that when the price is lower than  ?̅?, (ignorance, purchase) 
becomes a better strategy than both (ignorance, reject) and (effort, selection). 
 
(Ignorance, Reject) 
(Ignorance, Purchase) 
?̇? 
𝑃 
?̃? 
𝑃𝑝 
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Intuitively, the above case arises when the cost of speculation is sufficiently high. In 
that case, the investors may not be able to generate sufficient profit from acquiring a 
signal to cover the corresponding cost. Therefore, when all the securities are sold at a 
pooling price, the investors may either purchase all or reject all after comparing the 
market price to their ex-ante expectation about the securities value. Similarly, when 
the cost of effort is sufficiently high, the intermediaries can also purchase all the 
securities at ?̅? and resell them all to the investors at the same price. Given that the 
investors have no incentive to exert effort, the intermediaries are not going to suffer 
from the adverse selection cost. Therefore, this equilibrium can be sustained with or 
without intermediaries. However, our paper mainly focus on the case where the 
investors exert effort, so in the following discussion we simply assume that C < λ(1 −
λ)(2σ − 1)(𝐵𝑝
𝐻 − 𝐵𝑝
𝐿). 
 
 
Case 2: When ?̃? > ?̅?. 
 
?̃? > ?̅? ⇒
𝜆𝜎𝐵𝑝
𝐻+(1−𝜆)(1−𝜎)𝐵𝑝
𝐿
𝜆𝜎+(1−𝜆)(1−𝜎)
−
𝐶
𝜆𝜎+(1−𝜆)(1−𝜎)
> 𝜆𝐵𝑝
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐵𝑝
𝐿 
 
⟹ C < λ(1 − λ)(2σ − 1)(𝐵𝑝
𝐻 − 𝐵𝑝
𝐿) 
 
Similar to the last case, it can also be proved that  ?̇? < ?̅? under the same parameter 
condition. As a result, the investors’ optimal strategy can be concluded by the 
following graph: 
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As we can see from the graph above, when the price of securities 𝑃𝑝 > ?̃?, rejecting 
entrepreneurs’ offers becomes the optimal strategy to the investors. Since any price 
above ?̃?  is also above ?̅? , the investors can hardly generate a positive profit by 
purchasing any of the securities.  However, when the price of securities decreases to 
the area between ?̃? and ?̅?, the strategy combination (effort, selection) start to become 
dominating. Because when the securities price is below ?̃?, the investors can generate 
a positive expected profit by exerting effort and do the securities selection. However, 
if the investors attempt to purchase all the securities blindly, they may make a loss 
because the initial price is above ?̅?.To move one step further, from the location of ?̇?, 
we can infer that the  (effort, selection) strategy can still make a higher profit than 
(ignorance, purchase) even when the price is between  ?̅? and ?̇?. Finally, in the extreme 
case where entrepreneurs set a price below ?̇? , the (ignorance, purchase) strategy 
becomes the optimal one to the investors. As we have discussed in previous sections, 
when the securities price is extremely low, the benefit of excluding low type securities 
may not be able to cover the cost of effort.  
 
?̇? 
𝑃 
?̃? 
𝑃𝑝 
(Ignorance, Reject) 
(Ignorance, Purchase) 
(Effort, Selection) 
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To summarise our findings in case 2, we find that the investors’ incentive for taking 
effort is undermined when the price of securities is extremely high or extremely low, 
because the high price of the securities may prevent the investors from purchasing the 
securities fundamentally. If there is no hope for the investors to break even under any 
possible trading strategy, they may simply leave the market without even bothering 
the signal channel. In the opposite, when the securities price is extremely low, the 
investors may find it unnecessary to exclude the low-quality securities by exerting 
effort. Excepting the two extreme cases above, investors are motivated to exert effort 
when the price of securities locates between ?̇? and ?̃?. In that case, the benefit from 
securities selection covers the corresponding cost, thus the (effort, selection) becomes 
the optimal strategy to the investors. However, in the following discussion, we are 
going to show that it is not always on the high type entrepreneurs’ behalf to motivate 
the investors. Because the signal acquired by the investors is imperfect, the high type 
entrepreneurs can be misidentified as “low” type ones. Once it is the case, the high 
type entrepreneurs may be rejected by the investors in the first sales and suffers a price 
cut in their reselling process. 
 
With the optimal strategy of the investors, we can discuss the pricing strategy of the 
entrepreneurs by moving one step backward. Our discussion starts with the case 1 
where C ≥ λ(1 − λ)(2σ − 1)(𝐵𝑝
𝐻 − 𝐵𝑝
𝐿). Based on our result in last section, any price 
above  ?̅? will be rejected by the investors while any price below ?̅? will not satisfy 
entrepreneurs’ incentive of utility maximization. Therefore, the High type 
entrepreneurs will choose their initial price equal to ?̅?  in the equilibrium. 
Correspondingly, the investors will purchase all the securities without taking any effort.  
 
Then we come to the discussion about case 2. Firstly, with similar argument as the 
previous case, the high type entrepreneurs have no incentive to suggest a price higher 
than ?̃? , because it is above the investors’ reservation price under any strategy 
combination. If the high type entrepreneurs set their initial price between ?̃? and ?̅?, it 
can be inferred that the investors may exert effort and do securities selection base on 
their signal. Since the Low type entrepreneurs always have the incentive to mimic the 
High type, we may focus on the optimal pricing strategy of the High type.  As we have 
discussed in previous section, the signal acquired by the investors is informative but 
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imperfect. Hence, only with probability σ, the investors may truly identify the High 
type entrepreneurs and purchase their securities at the initial price 𝑃𝑝. Otherwise, with 
probability 1 − σ, they are misidentified as “Low type” and rejected by the investors 
in the first sales. As we have discussed at the beginning of this section, for the 
securities associated with bad signal, their expected value is: 
 
𝑃𝑏 =
𝜆(1 − 𝜎)
𝜆(1 − 𝜎) + (1 − 𝜆)𝜎
𝐵𝑝
𝐻 +
(1 − 𝜆)𝜎
𝜆(1 − 𝜎) + (1 − 𝜆)𝜎
𝐵𝑝
𝐿 
 
Therefore, in the second sales, the investors are not going to accept any price above 
𝑃𝑏. To maximize their efficient investment, the entrepreneurs are going to set their 
second sale price at 𝑃𝑏 and the investors will purchase all the remaining securities at 
that price. As a result, if the high type entrepreneurs set their initial price between ?̃? 
and ?̅?, their expected selling price becomes: 
 
EP(𝑃𝑝) = 𝜎𝑃𝑝 + (1 − 𝜎)𝑃𝑏 
 
Given that the investors are going to exert effort, it is optimal for the high type 
entrepreneurs is to set their initial price at ?̃?  in the first sales. Summarizing our 
conclusions in the first and second sale, the expected selling price of high type 
securities becomes: 
 
EP(?̃?) = 𝜎?̃? + (1 − 𝜎)𝑃𝑏 
 
Finally, it is also possible for the entrepreneurs to deactivate the investors by setting 
an initial price below ?̇?. The potential motivation of doing so could be avoiding the 
risk of misidentification. However, in our model, setting an extremely low price equal 
or below ?̇? is never the optimal strategy to the high type entrepreneurs. Because the 
investors are also allowed to sell their securities through intermediaries in our settings. 
As we can see from the graph above, ?̇? < ?̅? when C < λ(1 − λ)(2σ − 1)(𝐵𝑝
𝐻 − 𝐵𝑝
𝐿). 
Following our discussion in the separating equilibrium through intermediaries, the 
high type entrepreneurs can sell their securities at a price no less than ?̅?  when 
intermediary is introduced. In other word, setting a price below ?̇? in the direct issuing 
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process is strictly dominated by the strategy of introducing the intermediaries which 
is going to be shown in the later section. Therefore, in the following discussion about 
direct issuing process we may only focus on the case where the entrepreneurs set their 
initial price 𝑃𝑝 = ?̃?.  
 
When 𝑃𝑝 = ?̃?, the expected price of high type entrepreneurs’ securities will be : 
 
EP(?̃?) = 𝜎?̃? + (1 − 𝜎)𝑃𝑏 
 
Alternatively, if the high entrepreneur do not sell their securities directly to the 
investors and turn to the intermediaries, regardless of the form of securities, the price 
is going to be ?̅?. Therefore, the direct issuing process is preferred when EP(?̃?) > ?̅?. 
Otherwise when EP(?̃?) ≤ ?̅? , the high type entrepreneurs may turn to the 
intermediaries. To further analysis the necessary condition for introducing the 
intermediaries, we drive: 
 
𝜎?̃? + (1 − 𝜎)𝑃𝑏 < ?̅? 
 
⇒ C > ?̇? =
𝜆𝜎 + (1 − 𝜆)(1 − 𝜎)
𝜎
{
𝜆𝜎2𝐻 + (1 − 𝜆)(1 − 𝜎)𝜎𝐿
𝜆𝜎 + (1 − 𝜆)(1 − 𝜎)
+
𝜆(1 − 𝜎)2𝐻 + (1 − 𝜆)𝜎(1 − 𝜎)𝐿
𝜆(1 − 𝜎) + (1 − 𝜆)𝜎
− [𝜆𝐻 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐿]} 
 
 
Finally, with backward induction, we substitute the expect price in direct issuing  
EP(?̃?) into the utility function of high type entrepreneur to drive the optimal securities : 
 
𝐸𝑈𝐻 = 𝛽(𝜎?̃? + (1 − 𝜎)𝑃𝑏) + 𝐻 − 𝐵𝑝
𝐻 
 
𝐸𝑈𝐻 = 𝛽 (
𝜆𝜎2𝐵𝑝
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜆)(1 − 𝜎)𝜎𝐵𝑝
𝐿
𝜆𝜎 + (1 − 𝜆)(1 − 𝜎)
−
𝜎𝐶
𝜆𝜎 + (1 − 𝜆)(1 − 𝜎)
+
𝜆(1 − 𝜎)2𝐵𝑝
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜆)𝜎(1 − 𝜎)𝐵𝑝
𝐿
𝜆(1 − 𝜎) + (1 − 𝜆)𝜎
) + 𝐻 − 𝐵𝑝
𝐻 
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To solve the optimal securities: 
 
∂𝐸𝑈𝐻
∂𝐵𝑝𝐿
= 𝛽 (
(1 − 𝜆)(1 − 𝜎)𝜎
𝜆𝜎 + (1 − 𝜆)(1 − 𝜎)
+
(1 − 𝜆)𝜎(1 − 𝜎)
𝜆(1 − 𝜎) + (1 − 𝜆)𝜎
) > 0 
 
⟹𝐵𝑝
𝐿 = 𝐿 
 
∂𝐸𝑈𝐻
∂𝐵𝑝𝐻
= 𝛽 (
𝜆𝜎2
𝜆𝜎 + (1 − 𝜆)(1 − 𝜎)
+
𝜆(1 − 𝜎)2
𝜆(1 − 𝜎) + (1 − 𝜆)𝜎
) − 1 
 
If (
𝜆𝜎2
𝜆𝜎+(1−𝜆)(1−𝜎)
+
𝜆(1−𝜎)2
𝜆(1−𝜎)+(1−𝜆)𝜎
) < 1 ⟹ 𝐵𝑝
𝐻 = L and 𝐵𝑝
𝐿 = 𝐿 . However, this sub-
case cannot be sustained as an equilibrium. Because the result we obtained above 
contradicts to the precondition for case 2 to arise (C < λ(1 − λ)(2σ − 1)(𝐵𝑝
𝐻 −
𝐵𝑝
𝐿) ⇒ 𝐶 < 0). When the high type entrepreneurs issue riskless securities (𝐵𝑝
𝐻 = 𝐵𝑝
𝐿 =
𝐿), it can be inferred that 𝑃𝐺 = 𝑃𝐵 = ?̅? = L, which drives our discussion back to case 
1. 
 
Therefore the remaining case is  𝛽 (
𝜆𝜎2
𝜆𝜎+(1−𝜆)(1−𝜎)
+
𝜆(1−𝜎)2
𝜆(1−𝜎)+(1−𝜆)𝜎
) ≥ 1 ⇒ 𝐵𝑝
𝐻 = 𝐻 
and we end up with a pooling equilibrium where both types of entrepreneurs issue 
risky securities  (𝐵𝑝
𝐻 = 𝐻 and 𝐵𝑝
𝐿 = 𝐿).  
 
 
5. Separating Equilibrium when Intermediaries are Introduced 
 
Following our discussion in the last section, we show that the intermediaries are more 
likely to be introduced when the cost of the signal is relatively high or the accuracy of 
the signal is relatively low. To clarify the role played by the intermediaries in securities 
issuing process, we turn to analysis the equilibrium when the intermediaries are 
introduced. Distinguishing from the direct issuing process, the intermediaries can offer 
a menu of contracts to the investors, which allows them to introduce “cross-subsidies.” 
As we mentioned in the game setting part, competition among intermediaries will lead 
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to zero profits for the whole menu but not necessarily for each contract. Losses on 
some contracts can be compensated by profits on the other contracts. This loss and 
profit are defined as cross-subsidies in our model, which is defined as Si. 
 
Therefore, for any separating menu offered by the intermediaries, we should have the 
following equations: 
 
PH = BH
H − SH and PL = BL
L − SL 
 
In another word, the price of securities only depends on their true value   and the 
corresponding “cross-subsidy.” Intuitively, in a separating menu, the authenticity of 
the announcement is guaranteed by the incentive constraint. Hence the price of 
securities is not affected by entrepreneurs’ commitment in which the type is different 
from their announcement (BH
L  and BL
H). However, this commitment can still play an 
important role in signalling. As we can see, High type entrepreneur can increase their 
commitment in Low state BH
L  to prevent Low type entrepreneurs from mimicking 
without incurring any extra cost to themselves.  
 
Moreover, when intermediaries are introduced into the issuing process, “cross-subsidy” 
is another important way to separate the Low type entrepreneurs from the High type 
ones. However, the intermediary cannot become loss-making after the “subsidy.” 
Therefore, the following break event condition must be satisfied:  
 
λSH + (1 − λ)SL = 0 ⇒ SL = −
λ
1 − λ
SH 
 
In the special case where cross-subsidies are not introduced into the menu, we simply 
have SL = SH = 0. In another word, each separating contract in the menu will satisfy 
their break-even condition.  
 
By substituting the price equations back into the utility functions, we can have:  
 
UH = βPH +H − BH
H = β(BH
H − SH) + H − BH
H 
= (𝛽 − 1)𝐵𝐻
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑆𝐻 + 𝐻 
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UL = βPL + L − BL
L = β(BL
L − SL) + L − BL
L 
= (𝛽 − 1)𝐵𝐿
𝐿 − 𝛽𝑆𝐿 + 𝐿 
 
With the utility functions above, we can now derive some general results which can 
be useful for establishing and characterising the separating equilibrium for our model. 
 
Lemma 3: In any separating equilibrium with or without cross-subsidy, 
intermediaries will sell the securities at a fair price to investors. 
 
Proof: As we explained above, for separating purpose, the intermediaries introduce 
“cross-subsidies” when they purchase securities from the entrepreneurs. By decreasing 
the price of High type securities and increasing those of the Low type, they strengthen 
the incentive for the Low type entrepreneurs to report their type truly. However, in the 
reselling process, it becomes not only unnecessary but also unbeneficial for the 
intermediaries to introduce “cross-subsidies” in the sales contract. Since contracts are 
observable in our model, the investors can infer the true type of the securities by 
observing the contract between entrepreneurs and intermediaries. Suppose that an 
intermediary resells his/her securities with “cross-subsidies.” After inferring the true 
value of each security, the investors will only purchase the underpriced securities and 
leave the overpriced ones unsold, which makes the intermediaries loss-making. Hence, 
when types are revealed in the purchasing process, the intermediaries are going to set 
their resell price equal to the securities’ true value.  
 
Lemma 4: In any separating equilibrium, Low type entrepreneurs will seek to 
sell the whole claim of their risky asset by choosing a contract with 𝐁𝐋
𝐋 = 𝐋. 
 
Proof: 
Similar to our discussion in the previous section, in any separating equilibrium, 
intermediaries can infer entrepreneurs’ type by observing the contract chosen by the 
entrepreneurs. Therefore, the utility function of Low type entrepreneurs will be:  
  
𝑈𝐿 = (𝛽 − 1)𝐵𝐿
𝐿 − 𝛽𝑆𝐿 + 𝐿 
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To solve the optimal contract chosen by the Low type entrepreneur, we calculate the 
first order derivative of the utility function on 𝐵𝐿
𝐿 and obtain: 
 
∂𝑈𝐿
∂𝐵𝐿
𝐿 = 𝛽 − 1 > 0 
 
When the type is revealed in the separating menu, the Low type entrepreneurs always 
have the incentive to fully securitize their risky asset. Because the short-term 
investment has a strictly positive return, increasing the scale of investment can 
generate a higher utility to the Low type. However, due to limit liability, a Low type 
entrepreneur cannot commit more L. Therefore, the Low type entrepreneurs will set 
BL
L = L. 
 
Besides, with a separating menu, neither type of the entrepreneurs should become 
better off by mimicking the other. In other words, the incentive constraints must be 
satisfied: 
 
β(BH
H − SH) + H − BH
H ≥ β(BL
L − SL) + H − BL
H 
β(BL
L − SL) + L − BL
L ≥ 𝛽(BH
H − SH) + L − 𝐵𝐻
𝐿  
 
The first one is the incentive constraint for the High type while the second one is the 
incentive constraint for the Low type. Take the first inequity as an example: the left-
hand side represents the utility level if the High type entrepreneur truly reveals his/her 
type, while the right-hand side of the inequity represents the utility level if the High 
type entrepreneur pretends to be a Low type one. Similar to the discussion without 
intermediaries, the Low type entrepreneurs may have a higher incentive to mimic the 
High type ones. Therefore, by decreasing the price paid to the High type entrepreneurs 
and increasing that to the Low types, the intermediaries can weaken the motivation for 
the Low type entrepreneurs to mimic the other.  
 
Lemma 5: In any separating equilibrium involving cross-subsidies, High type 
subsidises the Low type. 
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Proof: Suppose that there exists a separating equilibrium where the Low type 
entrepreneurs offer a subsidy to the High type. In other words, intermediaries are 
making a profit in the Low type contract and are making a loss in the High type 
contract (SH < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 SL > 0). Consider that a new entrant offers a contract, which 
makes the Low type better-off and implies a strictly positive profit, for example CL
∗  
(BL
∗H = H, BL
∗L = L and PL
∗ = L − Δ where Δ < SL). Obviously, the price paid to the 
Low type entreprenerus in the new contract is higher than in original one (PL = L −
SL), and the Low type entrepreneurs will deviate to the new contract. In that case, since 
the incumbent menu intends to generate profit from the Low types and subsidize the 
High types, it will become loss-making. Therefore, the incumbent menu cannot be 
sustained as an equilibrium.   
 
Lemma 6: Among all the feasible zero-profit menus, only the one which 
maximises the utility of the High type can be sustained as equilibrium. 
 
Proof: Suppose that a menu of contracts CH and CL becomes the equilibrium in the 
market. As the result of full competition, this menu must satisfy the zero-profit 
condition, λSH + (1 − λ)SL = 0. Otherwise, the rival can simply attract both types of 
entrepreneurs by offering a more competitive menu. Consider that a new entrant 
attempts to offer a profit-making menu containing CH
+ andCL
+ , which satisfies the 
incentive constraint ( UL(CL
+) > UL(CH
+))  and makes the High type better-off 
(UH(CH
+) > UH(CH)). As a result, the High type will deviate to the new menu. If the 
original menu involves cross-subsidy, as proved in Lemma 2 and 3, the incumbent 
menu will become loss-making when it is taken only by the Low type. Otherwise, if 
the original menu does not involve cross-subsidies, the new entrant may only attract 
the High types and still makes a positive profit. Due to the existence of profitable 
deviation, the original menu CH and CL could not be an equilibrium. 
 
 
Given the lemmas we have listed previously, the separating equilibrium with 
intermediaries can be simplified as the solution to the following maximisation problem: 
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max
{BH
H,SH}
UH = βPH + H − BH
H = β(BH
H − SH) + H − BH
H 
 
Subject to: 
 
The Incentive Comparability Constraints: 
 
 
β(BH
H − SH) + H − BH
H ≥ β(BL
L − SL) + H − BL
H 
β(BL
L − SL) + L − BL
L ≥ 𝛽(BH
H − SH) + L − 𝐵𝐻
𝐿  
 
Limited liability constraints: 
 
BL
L, BH
L ≤ L and BH
H, BL
H ≤ H 
 
Cross-subsidy must be from high type to low type: 
 
SH ≥ 0 
 
Break event condition of cross-subsidy: 
 
λSH + (1 − λ)SL = 0 ⇒ SL = −
λ
1 − λ
SH 
 
By solving the maximisation problem above, we obtain the following conclusion: 
 
Lemma 7: 
When intermediaries are introduced into the issuing process: 
If 𝛃𝛌 − 𝟏 ≥ 𝟎 ⇒ 𝛌 ≥
𝟏
𝛃
 𝐨𝐫 𝛃 ≥
𝟏
𝛌
, there exists a separating equilibrium with cross-
subsidy where 𝐁𝐇
𝐇 = 𝐇 and 𝑺𝑯 = (𝟏 − 𝛌)(𝑯 − 𝑳). 
 
If 𝛃𝛌 − 𝟏 < 𝟎 ⇒ 𝛌 <
𝟏
𝛃
 𝐨𝐫 𝛃 <
𝟏
𝛌
 , there exists a separating equilibrium without 
cross-subsidy where 𝐁𝐇
𝐇 = 𝐁𝐇
𝐋 = 𝐁𝐋
𝐋 = 𝐋 and 𝐁𝐋
𝐇 ≠ 𝐋. 
 
In the first sub-case, when the proportion of High type entrepreneurs is sufficiently 
large or the return of short-term investment is sufficiently high, High type 
entrepreneurs will have the incentive to introduce cross-subsidy for signalling. Since 
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the cost of cross-subsidy is equally shared by all the High type entrepreneurs, a higher 
proportion can end up with a lower cost for each High type entrepreneur:(λSH +
(1 − λ)SL = 0). On the other hand, a high return on investment can compensate High 
type entrepreneurs for their loss of cross-subsidy. As a result, when either of them is 
sufficiently high, high type entrepreneurs will choose the separating menu with cross-
subsidy. Otherwise, if the proportion of High type is small or the return of short-term 
investment is low, the High type entrepreneurs may not be well compensated for 
offering cross-subsidies. In that case, High type entrepreneurs may become better-off 
by issuing riskless debt and restrict their investment. Similar to the separating 
equilibrium without intermediaries, High types entrepreneurs will issue riskless debt 
and the equilibrium price will be PH = PL = L. 
 
Another noticeable point in the separating equilibrium with intermediaries is that 
regardless of the parameter conditions, it is always the case: 
 
PH = PL = ?̅? = 𝜆𝐵𝐻
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐵𝐿
𝐿 
 
This conclusion can be easily inferred in case II, because PH = PL = 𝐵𝐻
𝐻 = 𝐵𝐿
𝐿 = 𝐿. 
As for the case I, by substituting BH
H = H , BL
L = 𝐿 and 𝑆𝐻 = (1 − λ)(𝐻 − 𝐿) back 
into the pricing function, we can have: 
 
PH = BH
H − SH = 𝐻 − (1 − λ)(𝐻 − 𝐿) = 𝜆𝐻 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐿 
 
PL = BL
L − SL = 𝐿 +
λ
1 − λ
SH = 𝜆𝐻 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐿 
 
This result proves our previous suggestion that the selling price of the securities can 
never be below ?̅?  when intermediaries are introduced into the issuing process. 
Therefore, the intermediaries are more likely to be introduced when  𝜎?̃? +
(1 − 𝜎)𝑃𝑏 ≤ ?̅?. 
 
However, by substituting PH = PL = ?̅?,  BH
H = H and BL
L = 𝐿 back into the incentive 
constraints in case I, we can see that both incentives constraints become binding at the 
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same time. Hence, to check the sustainability of the separating equilibrium, we need 
to show that the intermediaries cannot become better-off by offering a pooling contract. 
Firstly, to attract the entrepreneurs without violating the break-even condition, the 
intermediaries can only offer a pooling contract 𝐶𝑝:  Pp = ?̅?,  Bp
H = H and Bp
L = 𝐿. If 
we only focus on the take-over process from the entrepreneurs to the intermediaries, 
this pooling contract end up with the same pay-off as our separating menu. However, 
if we also take the following reselling game into consideration, this pooling contract 
can end up with a loss to the intermediaries. Because if the intermediaries purchase all 
the securities at a pooling price, they may not be able to identify the type of the 
entrepreneurs. Therefore, in the reselling process they can only choose to sell all the 
securities at a pooling price.  Given our assumption that C < λ(1 − λ)(2σ − 1)(𝐵𝑝
𝐻 −
𝐵𝑝
𝐿) , the investor may have incentive to speculate on their signal in the reselling 
process – by purchasing the securities with good signal and leave the securities with 
bad signal unsold. Taking this potential cost of adverse selection into consideration, 
the intermediaries can never break-even by purchasing and reselling at the same price. 
However, the intermediaries cannot pass this cost back to the entrepreneurs by cutting 
down their purchasing price below ?̅? ,  because it will become dominated by the 
separating menu. Moreover, it is also impossible for the intermediaries to fully pass 
their cost back to the investors by increasing their reselling price when 𝜎?̃? +
(1 − 𝜎)𝑃𝑏 ≤ ?̅?, since the cost of effort may partly be internalized into the price, which 
has been discussed in direct issuing process. With the optimal pricing strategy, the 
expected income of the intermediary will be: λH + (1 − λ)L − C < ?̅? , which is 
insufficient to cover the purchasing cost. In conclusion, the deviation to the pooling 
contract may decrease the pay-off to the intermediaries, so only the separating menu 
can be sustained as an equilibrium. Intuitively, the separating menu protect 
intermediary from speculation by equalizing the information between intermediary 
and investors. More importantly it can achieve a higher social efficiency by saving 
investors’ cost of effort. Therefore, our model shows that the introduction of 
intermediaries can separate different types of entrepreneurs more efficiently.  
 
  
6. The Introduction of Intermediaries and Market Equilibrium  
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To summarise our findings in the previous two sections, we reach the following 
propositions. 
 
Proposition 2 
When 𝛌 ≥
𝟏
𝛃
 and 𝛌(𝟏 − 𝛌)(𝟐𝛔 − 𝟏)(𝑩𝒑
𝑯 − 𝑩𝒑
𝑳) > 𝑪 > ?̇?, there exists a separating 
equilibrium with intermediaries, where 𝐁𝐇
𝐇 = 𝐇 and 𝐒𝐇 = (𝟏 − 𝛌)(𝐇 − 𝐋) > 𝟎. 
 
As we have mentioned above, the separating equilibrium with cross-subsidy is more 
likely to arise when the proportion of High type is sufficiently large. With cross-
subsidisation, we can observe that the price of High type securities will be under-
priced while Low type securities will be overpriced in the take-over process. Moreover, 
as we have discussed in Lemma 3, all securities will be sold from intermediaries to 
investors at a fair price. Therefore, we should observe that the price of high (low) 
quality securities increases (decreases) in the reselling process.  
 
To check the sustainability of the equilibrium, we firstly check whether an 
intermediary can benefit by offering a deviating menu or deviating contract. From the 
maximization problem we solved in the previous section, it can be inferred that, given 
the separating menu we offered, there is no other break-even menu which can make 
the high type entrepreneurs better-off. Besides, in our separating menu, the incumbent 
intermediary is making a profit from the high type entrepreneurs and making a loss 
from the low type ones. Therefore, other separating menus which only attracts the low 
types will be loss-making. In summary, the intermediary cannot benefit from deviating 
to another menu. Then we check whether a new intermediary can benefit by offering 
a single deviating contract.  Firstly, since the separating menu is making a loss on the 
low types, it can be inferred that a single contract that only attracts the low types is 
loss-making. Secondly, as we can see in the separating menu, the incentive constraints 
of Low type is binding. In this case, if the intermediaries intend to attract the High 
type entrepreneurs with a more beneficial contract, the new contract will also attract 
the Low type. Because in our model, entrepreneurs are assumed to be risk neutral. 
Hence, a higher purchasing price or a lower real payment may bring equal marginal 
benefit to both types. In another word, it is unbeneficial to offer a contract that only 
attracts the High type entrepreneur. Finally, we need to check whether the new entry 
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can benefit by offering a pooling contract which attracts both types of entrepreneurs. 
As we have discussed in the previous sections, when C < λ(1 − λ)(2σ − 1)(𝐵𝑝
𝐻 −
𝐵𝑝
𝐿), Intermediary who offer pooling contract may suffer a loss due to the speculation 
of the investors. In a word, the new intermediary cannot offer a beneficial pooling 
contact which attracts both types of entrepreneurs. Therefore, the intermediary has no 
incentive to deviate in this equilibrium. 
 
Guaranteed by the incentive constraint, neither type of the entrepreneurs may have the 
incentive to mimic the other inside the menu. Therefore, the deviation remains to be 
checked is the issuing process. Suppose that there exists an entrepreneur who deviates 
to the direct issuing process and offer a more beneficial contract. As we have discussed 
in the section about incentive constraint, any deviating contract that is beneficial to 
High types will also be beneficial to the Low types. If the new contract is beneficial 
only to the Low type, then the investors may rationally infer that the deviation is made 
by the Low type and will not accept any price above L. In that case, the Low type 
entrepreneurs may worse-off after deviation.  On the other hand, if the new contract 
can benefit both types, the investors may infer that the deviation could be made both 
types of entrepreneurs. When 𝐶 < λ(1 − λ)(2σ − 1)(𝐵𝑝
𝐻 − 𝐵𝑝
𝐿) , they may seek to 
acquire signal by exerting effort. In that case, the maximization price obtained by the 
entrepreneurs will be 𝜎?̃? + (1 − 𝜎)𝑃𝑏. Under the parameter condition that 𝐶 > ?̇?, we 
can have 𝜎?̃? + (1 − 𝜎)𝑃𝑏 < ?̅?. In conclusion, the new deviation does not make the 
entrepreneurs better-off and the original separating menu through intermediary can be 
sustained as an equilibrium. 
 
Intuitively, Proposition 2 also shows that the entrepreneurs are more likely to introduce 
intermediaries when the cost of speculation is relatively high, and the accuracy of the 
signal is relatively low. Based on our previous discussion, the cost of effort is 
internalized into the initial price in the first sales. Therefore, a high cost of effort may 
drive down the expected price in direct issuing process. On the other hand, the 
introduction of cross-subsidies allows the high type entrepreneurs to sell their 
securities at a guaranteed price without cutting down their investment level. Hence the 
benefit of issuing securities through intermediaries becomes more significant when 
the return of short-term investment β  is sufficiently high. More importantly, the 
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introduction of intermediaries improves the social welfare by saving investors’ cost of 
effort which in return benefit the High type entrepreneurs. By endogenizing the 
existence of intermediary, our mechanism guarantees the separation in the takeover 
process which fills the information gap between intermediaries and investors.  As a 
result, the intermediaries can sell the securities of both types at their fair price without 
being manipulated by the investors.    
 
Proposition 3 
When 𝑪 < ?̇?  and 𝛃 (
𝛌𝛔𝟐
𝛌𝛔+(𝟏−𝛌)(𝟏−𝛔)
+
𝛌(𝟏−𝛔)𝟐
𝛌(𝟏−𝛔)+(𝟏−𝛌)𝛔
) ≥ 𝟏 , there exist a pooling 
equilibrium where entrepreneurs sell their risky securities (𝑩𝒑
𝑯 = 𝑯 and 𝑩𝒑
𝑳 = 𝑳) 
directly to the investors. And the investors exert effort to select their securities. 
 
Proposition 3 summarizes our findings in the discussion about direct issuing process. 
On one hand, a relatively high return in short term investment motivate the high type 
entrepreneurs to issue risky securities. On the other hand, a low cost of effort makes 
the high type entrepreneurs tend to issue their securities through direct market. In our 
model, the cost of effort is internalized into the initial price. Hence a decrease in cost 
of effort can also mean a lower cost for high type entrepreneurs to motivate the 
investors. As we have assumed at the beginning of the model, the signal acquired by 
investors is informative which means that high type entrepreneurs are more likely to 
sell their securities at their initial price than the low types. As a result, when the signal 
is sufficiently accurate, the high type entrepreneur may end up with a higher expected 
price of their securities than that from intermediaries.  
 
Since we use backward induction to solve the sequential game in direct issuing process, 
it can be inferred that the equilibrium in Proposition 3 is sub-game perfect. The only 
step remains to be checked is whether the entrepreneurs the have the incentive to 
deviate their issuing channel. Suppose that a high type entrepreneur intends to deviate 
from the direct issuing market to the intermediary market.  Similar to the discussion 
in the previous section, if the intermediaries offer a new contract that can make the 
High type entrepreneurs better-off, it will inevitably attract the Low type as well. 
Therefore, if the intermediary holds a belief that the deviating entrepreneurs are the 
High types and offers a price equal to H. The new contract will attract the Low types 
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as well. Hence, the intermediaries will become loss-making. Besides, if the 
intermediaries hold a belief that the deviating entrepreneurs can be both High types 
and Low types, they will never offer a price higher than ?̅?. When 𝐶 < ?̇?, we can have 
𝜎?̃? + (1 − 𝜎)𝑃𝑏 < ?̅?. In that case, the new deviating contract can never attract the 
High type but the Low type. Hence, the remaining belief is that the deviating 
entrepreneurs must be Low type. Hence, the intermediary will only offer a price equal 
to L for the deviating entrepreneurs and neither types can benefit from the deviation.  
In conclusion, no deviation in issuing channel can generate higher pay-off to either the 
high type or the low type, the original equilibrium can be sustained. 
 
 
Proposition 4 
When 𝛌 <
𝟏
𝛃
, there exists a separating equilibrium where 𝐁𝐇
𝐇 = 𝐁𝐇
𝐋 = 𝐁𝐋
𝐋 = 𝐋, 
and 𝐁𝐋
𝐇 ≠ 𝐋, and this separating equilibrium can be sustained with or without 
the intermediary. 
 
Proposition 5 
When 𝛌 <
𝟏
𝛃
, there exists a pooling equilibrium where both types of entrepreneurs 
issue riskless debt 𝐁𝐩
𝐇 = 𝐁𝐩
𝐋 = 𝐋, and this pooling equilibrium can be sustained 
with or without the intermediary. 
 
The above two propositions illustrate the special case discussed in Leland and Pyle 
(1977). When the proportion of High type entrepreneurs and the return from the short-
term investment is relatively low, High type entrepreneurs may find it costly to issue 
risky securities. In that case, High type entrepreneurs may choose securities which 
minimise mispricing in the market.  
 
As we have mentioned in the proposition, this equilibrium can be sustained with or 
without intermediaries. Because in both cases, the market price of securities will be L 
for both types, which is equal to their true value. In that case, investors will never 
make any effort to identify the asset quality because the pay-out of the securities is 
independent of the type. Therefore, given that there is no risk of mispricing in the 
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market, the choice of whether to introduce the intermediaries becomes irrelevant to 
the price of the asset. 
 
7. Conclusion and Empirical Implications 
 
In this paper, we discuss the optimal mechanism design under ex-ante asymmetric 
information. We show that the introduction of intermediaries can improve the 
efficiency and liquidity provision by allowing cross-subsidy. Additionally, we 
illustrate that the usage of cross-subsidy is more likely to be observed when the 
proportion of High type entrepreneurs is relatively large. Furthermore, our model 
shows that the existence of speculative investors may offer the intermediaries higher 
incentive to implement the separating menu. Since the separating menu provides a 
simple way to transparentize the quality of the asset, it guarantees the efficiency in the 
resell market and saves investors’ cost of effort. In contrast to conventional models of 
intermediaries, we prove that the efficiency gain of intermediaries relies on the change 
of mechanism design and contract menu instead of on superior monitoring technology. 
We also show that intermediaries are more likely to be introduced into the securities 
issuing process when the cost of speculation is relatively high. Otherwise, 
entrepreneurs will decide to sell the securities directly to investors at pool price. 
 
More interestingly, we derive the following empirical implications from the model 
which can be tested in future empirical research: Firstly, our model predicts that risky 
securities are more likely to be issued when the economic environment is good (a 
larger proportion of High type entrepreneurs and high return on short-term investment). 
When the economy is in the boom, we may even observe that the price of High (Low) 
type securities will increase (decrease) in the reselling process. Conversely, we may 
observe that only riskless securities will be issued in the market when the economic 
environment is less favorable, and there will be a lack of liquidity in the market. 
Secondly, entrepreneurs have a higher incentive to sell risky securities through 
intermediaries in an inefficient market, while in a mature market with a low cost of 
information, the introduction of intermediaries may become less beneficial to 
entrepreneurs. 
 
Dynamically, our model also predicts that the recovery speed of intermediaries after 
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depression will be faster for a less efficient market. This is because in a depressed 
market, both types of entrepreneurs may issue riskless securities in equilibrium and 
the introduction of intermediaries then becomes irrelevant. As a result, we may not 
observe any diversification in the behaviour of High type entrepreneurs in different 
markets. However, when the economy starts to recover, the existence of better 
investment opportunity will encourage entrepreneurs to issue riskier securities. At that 
time, the behaviour of entrepreneurs with high-quality assets begins to diversify. For 
High type entrepreneurs in an inefficient market, they will prefer to issue their risky 
securities through intermediaries. In the case of an efficient market, the High type 
entrepreneurs may feel more beneficial to issue directly to the investors. As a result, a 
higher growth rate of intermediary usage can be observed in a developing market than 
in a developed market.  
 
Finally, some of the assumptions in our model can be modified to be included in a 
more general discussion. For example, in our model, we discuss only a market with 
multiple entrepreneurs and risky assets. However, to discuss the market of merger and 
acquisition, this assumption should be replaced by an assumption of unique 
entrepreneurs and risky assets with a certain probability to be the High type. Further, 
we also assume that the contracts between entrepreneurs and intermediaries are 
observable. In certain markets, this assumption may not be realistic. It may be 
appropriate to assume that the contract setting is observable while the choices of 
entrepreneurs are not. All these modifications can be looked on as an important future 
extension of our research. 
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Appendix: 
 
A 1: Separating equilibrium with investment bank and cross-subsidies  
 
In this case, the utility function of high type entrepreneurs is: 
 
UH = βPH + H − BH
H, 
 
 And that of low type is: 
 
 UL = βPL + L − BL
L.  
 
The first term on the left-hand side is the return of the short term investment. The 
second term represents the output of entrepreneurs’ risky asset.  
 
By substituting the price function, the utility functions can be rewritten as: 
 
UH = βPH +H − BH
H = β(BH
H − SH) + H − BH
H 
= (𝛽 − 1)𝐵𝐻
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑆𝐻 + 𝐻 
 
 
UL = βPL + L − BL
L = β(BL
L − SL) + L − BL
L 
= (𝛽 − 1)𝐵𝐿
𝐿 − 𝛽𝑆𝐿 + 𝐿 
 
Thereby the incentive comparability conditions can be inferred: 
 
β(BH
H − SH) + H − BH
H ≥ β(BL
L − SL) + H − BL
H 
β(BL
L − SL) + L − BL
L ≥ 𝛽(BH
H − SH) + L − 𝐵𝐻
𝐿  
 
By definition the payout cannot exceed the income of asset, which is defined as limited 
liability constraints: 
: 
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BL
L, BH
L ≤ L and BH
H, BL
H ≤ H 
 
In any separating menu with cross-subsidies, the high types subsidize the low types. 
This lemma can be represented by a non-negative constraint of SH: 
 
SH ≥ 0 
 
To further simplify the Incentive comparability constraint, we take the utility of the 
low type and drive the first order derivative on 𝐵𝐿
𝐿:  
 
𝑈𝐿 = (𝛽 − 1)𝐵𝐿
𝐿 − 𝛽𝑆𝐿 + 𝐿 
⇒
∂𝑈𝐿
∂𝐵𝐿
𝐿 = 𝛽 − 1 > 0 
 
To maximize her utility, low type entrepreneurs would like to increase 𝐵𝐿
𝐿 as much as 
possible. The amount of payout is restricted by limit liability 𝐵𝐿
𝐿 ≤ 𝐿 
 
Therefore, we have  
𝐵𝐿
𝐿 = 𝐿 
and 
𝑈𝐿 = (𝛽 − 1)𝐿 − 𝛽𝑆𝐿 + 𝐿. 
 
By substitution, the incentive comparability constraint can be simplified as: 
  
βL − β𝑆𝐿 ≥ 𝛽(BH
H − SH) + L − 𝐵𝐻
𝐿  
 
Intuitively, to increase the cost for low types to mimic, entrepreneurs of high type 
would like to increase 𝐵𝐻
𝐿  to its upper bound. Base on the quality of her own asset, 
high entrepreneur knows that her output will never be L. So higher payout 
commitment on Low state generates no real cost to the high type. Similarly, due to 
limit liability, high type can only set 𝐵𝐻
𝐿 = 𝐿. 
 
Hence the incentive comparability condition becomes: 
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βL − β𝑆𝐿 ≥ 𝛽(BH
H − SH) 
βL − β𝑆𝐿 ≥ β𝐵𝐻
𝐻 − 𝛽SH 
 
Substituting SL = −
λ
1−λ
SH into the inequity, we have  
 
βL + β
λ
1 − λ
SH ≥ β𝐵𝐻
𝐻 − 𝛽SH 
 
β
1
1 − λ
SH ≥ 𝛽(𝐵𝐻
𝐻 − 𝐿) 
 
β𝑆𝐻 ≥ 𝛽(1 − λ)(𝐵𝐻
𝐻 − 𝐿) 
 
𝑆𝐻 ≥ (1 − λ)(𝐵𝐻
𝐻 − 𝐿) 
 
As we have discussed in the main text, high type entrepreneurs offer cross-subsidies 
to prevent low types from mimic them. However, as the cost of doing so, the price of 
theirs securities becomes lower. Therefore, high type entrepreneurs are reluctant to 
offer any extra cross-subsidy that is unnecessary for signalling. In another word, the 
incentive comparability constraint should be binding:  
 
𝑆𝐻 = (1 − λ)(𝐵𝐻
𝐻 − 𝐿) 
 
By substituting the equation above, we further simplify the utility function of high 
types: 
 
𝑈𝐻 = (𝛽 − 1)𝐵𝐻
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑆𝐻 +𝐻 
 
𝑈𝐻 = (β − 1)𝐵𝐻
𝐻 − 𝛽(1 − 𝜆)(𝐵𝐻
𝐻 − 𝐿) + 𝐻 
 
To solve for the optimal securities of high types, we drive the first order derivative of 
the utility function:  
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∂𝑈𝐻
∂𝐵𝐻
𝐻 = (𝛽 − 1) − 𝛽(1 − 𝜆) = 𝛽 − 1 − 𝛽 + 𝛽𝜆 = 𝛽𝜆 − 1 
 
From the equation above, we can see that: 
 
If βλ − 1 < 0 ⇒ λ <
1
β
 or β <
1
λ
  the Separating equilibrium without cross subsidy 
will dominate 
 
If βλ − 1 ≥ 0 ⇒ λ ≥
1
β
 or β ≥
1
λ
 the Separating equilibrium with cross subsidy will 
exist where BH
H = H  
 
In that case  
 
 
𝑈𝐻 = (β − 1)𝐻 − 𝛽(1 − 𝜆)(𝐻 − 𝐿) + 𝐻 
 
𝑈𝐻 = β[λH + (1 − λ)L] 
 
In this case, both incentive constraints are binding and we end up with a separating 
equilibrium. 
 
A 2: Separating equilibrium when investment bank is included while the cross-
subsidy does not 
 
As we mentioned above the utility function of both entrepreneurs are: 
 
UH = βPH + H − BH
H 
 
UL = βPL + L − BL
L 
 
 
When 𝑆𝐻, 𝑆𝐿 = 0 , the price of securities of both types are  PH = BH
H  and PL = BL
L 
respectively, and the utility function of High and Low type entrepreneurs become: 
 
 
UH = (𝛽 − 1)𝐵𝐻
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑆𝐻 + 𝐻 
 
UL = (𝛽 − 1)𝐵𝐿
𝐿 − 𝛽𝑆𝐿 + 𝐿 
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The incentive comparability constraints of High type and Low type are: 
 
(β − 1)𝐵𝐻
𝐻 + 𝐻 ≥ 𝛽𝐵𝐿
𝐿 + 𝐻 − 𝐵𝐿
𝐻 
 
(β − 1)𝐵𝐿
𝐿 + 𝐿 ≥ 𝛽𝐵𝐻
𝐻 + 𝐿 − 𝐵𝐻
𝐿  
 
The limited liability constraints are: 
 
BL
L, BH
L ≤ L and BH
H, BL
H ≤ H 
 
By similar argument above, in separating equilibrium Low type will issue BL
L = 𝐿. 
High type entrepreneurs may prefer to set 𝐵𝐻
𝐿 = 𝐿 in order to minimize Low types’ 
incentive to mimic.  
 
Hence the incentive comparability constraint of Low type entrepreneurs can be 
simplified as: 
 
(β − 1)𝐿 + 𝐿 ≥ 𝛽𝐵𝐻
𝐻 + 𝐿 − 𝐿 
βL ≥ β𝐵𝐻
𝐻 
βL ≥ β𝐵𝐻
𝐻 
 
In separating equilibrium, this constraint is binding, so we have 
 
βL = β𝐵𝐻
𝐻 ⇒ 𝐵𝐻
𝐻 = 𝐿 
 
Then the utility of H type will be: 
 
𝑈𝐻𝑊 = (𝛽 − 1)𝐿 + 𝐻 
 
In this equilibrium, the High type entrepreneur issues the riskless debt with face 
value L. As a result, the incentive comparability constraint of H type becomes: 
 
(β − 1)L + H ≥ βL + H − 𝐵𝐿
𝐻 
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Obviously, by choosing a face value 𝐵𝐿
𝐻 > 𝐿, the above condition can be strictly 
satisfied. So the separating equilibrium can be sustained. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  130 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter IV: 
 
Clearinghouse and Liquidity Provision 
under Aggregate Uncertainty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  131 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
   One interesting topic in financial academic after crisis is whether we should 
substitute the current OTC trading mechanism with a central clearinghouse in order to 
better cope with multiple uncertainties? More importantly, by reviewing last financial 
crisis, we find that the lack of counterparty’s information, unexpected large exposure 
to systemic risk and sequentially default together drive the disaster in financial markets. 
Acharya and Basin (2014) have shown that the introduction of central clearinghouse 
can improve the transparence of the market which in return decreases the counterparty 
risk. While Duffie and Zhu (2011) point out that the introduction of a central 
counterparty may reduce the efficiency of netting and increase the inefficient social 
collateral.  This paper attempts to show the importance of central clearinghouse in a 
different way. When contracts are allowed to be designed without any exogenous 
restriction, the introduction of central counterparty becomes a necessary condition to 
implement the optimal contract under aggregate uncertainty. The reason is that market 
participants may have the incentive to increase the scale of their contract which can 
lead to inefficient risk sharing.  
 
      We consider a general model where agents with different production technology 
insure each other by entering a future contract. In our model, agents of different types 
may face a state contingent shock in the middle of their investment procedure. At that 
time, they may demand extract liquidity to continue their investment. To hedge this 
risk and guarantee their investment to go through, agents may have the incentive to 
participate in a future contract with a counterparty who can provide liquidity in the 
state when they need it. By entering a future contract, agents can reduce their 
inefficient saving for self-insurance and increase the scale of their investment. 
However, we are going to show that three incentive conflicts may prevent the 
implementation of the first-best allocation. Firstly, agents can default at the cost of all 
their future income. Given that the scale of investment is private information of agents, 
they may consume all their endowment and default sequentially. Secondly, the number 
of contracts entered by a certain agent is unobservable to the others, which means 
agents may enter too many contracts that exceed their solvency and default 
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strategically. Thirdly, the introduction of aggregate uncertainty is into our model may 
further distort the efficient allocation. This key difference distinguishes our work from 
Leitner’s (2012). With aggregate uncertainty, we show that agents may have the 
motivation to squeeze out other agents with identical technology so as to have better 
insurance. Given the assumption that agents are allowed to design the contracts they 
use without any exogenous restrictions, this motivation will prevent the social optimal 
contract to be chosen. As a result, to implement the optimal contract we need the 
central clearinghouse to work as the unique counterparty in every trade and 
“standardize” the contract to be optimal. 
 
    To move one step further from previous researches such as Leitner (2012) and 
Acharya and Basin (2014) our paper shows that the interaction between aggregate 
uncertainty and incentive of defaulting will restrict the usage of the optimal contract. 
In their paper, they either assume no aggregate uncertainty (Leitner (2012)) or take the 
optimal contract as exogenously given (Acharya and Basin (2014)). As a result, they 
only focus on central clearinghouse’s information revelation function, but neither of 
them successfully point out the necessity of counterparty substitution and contract 
standardization. In fact, if the market is completely transparent, there is no difference 
between central trading and separate trading in their model. However, in the following, 
we will show that both of their papers are just special cases in our generalized model. 
By relaxing the two conditions above we prove that central trading becomes crucial in 
the implementation of the social optimal contract and information transparency is no 
longer a sufficient condition to ensure market efficiency.  
 
     Besides, our model attempts to throw light on the relationship between systemic 
risk and social optimal contract. Our paper shows that a higher margin requirement is 
necessary to limit the risk exposure of a certain type of agents when aggregate 
uncertainty is high. Moreover, our model also shows that in the extreme case, the 
central clearinghouse may even have the incentive to provide liquidity to their 
counterparty in order to guarantee the trading volume of the market.   
 
     In practice, our model implies that a central clearinghouse is more likely to be set 
up in a market with high aggregate uncertainty (for example market of agriculture 
product). This implication is consistent with the history of Chicago Board of Trading, 
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which start to use standardized future contracts to substitute forward contract in 
agriculture product market. In addition, our model also implies that fixing the margin 
requirement to unique and nonnegative to all types of agents may lead to an inefficient 
resource allocation and low level of social investment. Therefore, the settings of 
margin system should be more flexible to match the volatile market situation.   
  
 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we will briefly review the 
previous literature about the central counterparty. Section 3 discusses the basic setting 
and assumptions in our model. And as a comparison, the first best allocation will be 
illustrated in Section 4.  Then, in Section 5, we will analysis the second best allocation 
when default is allowed. Moreover, we compare our mechanism with OTC bilateral 
trading mechanism in Section 6. Finally, we will come to the conclusion and empirical 
implications in Section 7. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
In 1989, Bernanke empirically analyzed the role played by clearinghouses in the 
exchange of future market. He concluded that by substituting itself as a seller to every 
buyer and a buyer to every seller, clearinghouse becomes an official “party to every 
trade.” By interposing itself in this way, the clearinghouse legally assumes the 
obligation of guaranteeing the execution of each trade to other clearing members. The 
main purpose is to enable investors to trade without concern about the creditworthiness 
of the individuals with whom they are dealing.  
 
      More importantly, in this paper, he also discusses the optimal method for 
clearinghouses to deal with different sources of risk. For idiosyncratic risk of agents, 
clearinghouse should standardize the future contract to efficiently promote the trading 
between agents and diversify this part of risk. However, for the systematic risk, it 
becomes impossible to cope with it completely. In that case, it might seem desirable 
to limit the exposure of the clearinghouse to large, systematic shock explicitly. 
Nevertheless, our model shows that the standardization of contracts is also of great 
help in dealing with systematic risk. By limiting the scale of contract, central 
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clearinghouses effectively control the exposure of systematic risk of different agents 
and achieve a higher social investment. 
  
Although the important characteristics have been showed by Bernanke empirically, 
the real role played by the central counterparty is still unclear in theoretical discussion. 
Some papers strongly suspect the introduction of central counterparty (Duffie and Zhu 
(2009) and Stephens and Thompson (2011)), while others highlight the potential 
efficiency improvement from CCP (Acharya and Basin (2012) and Carapella and Mill 
(2012)). Kroszner (1999) illustrates that three functions are essential for the 
clearinghouse to improve the efficiency of exchange: (1) the standardization of 
contracts, (2) construction of margin system and (3) introduction of a central 
counterparty. Although the importance of margin requirement has been long discussed 
by previous papers, seldom of them accurately point out the driving factors of it. This 
paper contributes to the literature on market microstructure design by incorporating 
the three functions above and highlights the role of margin system in dealing with 
aggregate uncertainty. In our setting, the asset/project returns are nonverifiable and 
contracts are unobservable (and nonexclusive). As a result, the agents’ history of 
transactions is private information, and this encourages agents to sign contracts with 
multiple counterparties and subsequently default. To solve this problem, we need to 
introduce a mechanism to extract this information from agents. The key feature of our 
mechanism is that there is an intermediary who is the unique trading counterparty for 
all agents (traders). Since the intermediary is the unique counterparty which agents 
can trade with, it can extract information about agents’ trading histories.  Moreover, 
by setting contract specific margin requirement optimally, the clearinghouse can help 
to share the systemic risk more efficiently and increase the social investment.  More 
interestingly, our model shows that in the extreme case, when the aggregate 
uncertainty is sufficiently high, the clearinghouse may have the incentive to set up a 
negative margin requirement to a certain type of asset owner. To be more precise, 
during the crisis, the central intermediary can encourage the social investment by 
collecting the margin from the majority and transferring it to the minority. Thus, our 
mechanism relaxes the incentive constraints of repayment and increases the 
investment to its efficient (second-best) level. 
 
In fact, under the discussion about optimal clearing system, previous papers mainly 
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focus on the information sharing role of the platform. (For example Leitner (2012), 
Bennardo, Pagano and Piccolo (2013) and Goldstein and Leitner (2013)). Amount 
them, the most closely-related paper to ours is Leitner (2012). In his framework, 
intermediaries can provide an easy way to monitor agents’ positions by collecting 
agents’ voluntary report. And he shows that by setting position limits and revealing 
the name of agents who hit the limits, intermediaries can effectively overcome the 
problem of multiple counterparties and subsequent default. However, Leitner’s paper 
does not cover the situation where aggregate uncertainty is also introduced into the 
economy. In fact, when there is aggregate uncertainty, Leinter’s unique optimal margin 
requirement may no longer fit different types of agents. Our model shows that margin 
requirement should be contract specific to cope with the systemic risk. And the 
contract relations between agents are not necessarily to be direct and one-to-one. In 
our model, we show that indirect and one-to-multiple contract relations can be helpful 
in dealing with different exposure of systemic risk. Because Leitner’s model 
exogenously assumes that bargain power of different agents should be equal given 
identical proportions of different types. Bilateral trading and central clearing system 
can end up with the same result in Leitner’s model. However, our model concludes 
that when the proportions of types become different, the choice of different trading 
mechanism can become essential. We prove that if agents are allowed to set up any 
one to one contract without restrictions, agents may tend to increase the “scale” of the 
contract and drive out partly of other agents from the market. All these incentives may 
boost up the inefficient social saving and lead to a lower aggregate investment. As 
shown in the following, in that case, a central clearinghouse in required to work as the 
unique counterparty to build up indirect contract relation between agents and limit the 
exposure of a certain type of agents by contract standardization. 
 
Another related paper is Acharya and Basin (2014). In this paper, they focus on a 
market where agents are risk aversion and intend to share their risk as much as possible. 
Similar to Leitner’s and our settings, agents have the incentive to default with their 
trading position unobservable. They show that a lack of position transparency can lead 
to counterparty risk externalities. This means that the market may end up with too 
many short positions that collect premium upfront but default ex-post, which in return 
causes inefficient level of risk-sharing, deadweight cost of bankruptcy, and productive 
inefficiency. To cope with this inefficiency problem, Acharya and Basin (2014) 
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suggest a centralized clearing mechanism that provides transparency of trade positions 
or a centralized counterparty that observes all trades and set price competitively. 
However, in their model, asset and contracts are exogenously designed, and the central 
clearinghouse is just characterized by its information incorporation function. In 
another word, any other mechanisms with information transparency can achieve the 
same result in their settings. (for example Leitner’s volunteer reporting mechanism). 
Hence, their model still did not show the key differences between central “trading” 
and central “information revealing”. In fact, their model does not point out the 
necessity of contract standardization and counterparty substitution. Distinguishes from 
their paper, contract design is endogenouslized as a part of the game in our model. And 
we are going to show that contract standardization and counterparty substitution can 
play essential roles in restricting the risk exposure of a single agent and allowing all 
the agents to share their risk more efficiently. Therefore, we are going to show that 
information transparency is not sufficient to guarantee efficiency and central 
clearinghouse can do more by working as market participants instead of only an 
information recorders.  Besides, in their model agents’ future income is given by 
exogenous endowment which can become observable to the central clearinghouse, 
while in our model, agent’s future income depends on his current unobservable 
investment level. This assumption allows us to explore the relationship between the 
aggregate uncertainty and social investment. More importantly, it allows us to compare 
the advantages and disadvantages between the OTC market and central clearing 
market. As a result, we find that the central counterparty may have the incentive to 
provide liquidity to the minority when systemic risk is severe. In fact, by collecting 
margin from a certain type of agents and lend this fund to their counterparties, clearing 
house can improve the insurance capacity of the whole system and encourage efficient 
investment. 
  
As for the discussion about optimal clearing system under aggregate risk, Biais, Heider 
and Hoerova (2012 and 2015) also give their comparison between central clearing and 
OTC market. In the paper published in 2012, they suggest that CCP can improve the 
efficiency when dealing with idiosyncratic risk. By the advantage of risk mutualization, 
CCP can offer complete insurance to protection buyers and end up with a first best 
allocation. However, CCP is no longer optimal, when aggregate risk is introduced and 
the effort of counterparty searching becomes unobservable. Because the full insurance 
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offered by CCP can undermine the incentive for protection buyer to search for a better 
counterparty, which in return increases the defaulting rate and affects the insurance 
against systemic risk. Therefore, OTC could dominate CCP by retaining the searching 
incentive of protection buyer when the systemic risk becomes significant. This result 
is consistent with Arnold (2014), which suggests that the insurance offered by the CCP 
may undermine the incentive for banks to screen their counterparty. To make it even 
worse, the standardized contract traded in CCP may make it impossible to signal the 
loan quality by imposing different contracts. However, in the recent working paper of 
Biais, Heider and Hoerova (2015), they construct another model where the protection 
seller can control their risk exposure after they obtain a signal about their 
counterparty’s future income. They show that when the bad signal arrives, the 
protection seller may have a higher incentive to increase their risk exposure since the 
contract is looked on as a liability to the sellers. Thus, they may intend to shift their 
risk to the buyers. In that case, they prove that margin call from CCP after bad signal 
can improve sellers’ incentive and enhance the ability to share risk. Besides, the 
introduction of CCP also decreases the margin requirement through risk mutualization. 
The key difference between our paper and theirs is that we put more attention to the 
interaction between systemic risk and default. In their models, risk exposure and 
defaulting are separating to protection buyers and protection sellers correspondingly, 
while all the trading agents are facing the risk and can choose to default at the same 
time in our model. In another word, we are applying a hedging setting instead of a 
convention insurance one as Biais, Heider and Hoerova (2012 and 2015). Moreover, 
in their model, protection sellers are excluded from the aggregate risk and their 
probability of defaulting depends only on their type. While in our setting, aggregate 
risk can impact all the trading agents and it could be impossible for any agents to 
insure the others fully. With this assumption, we are going to show that by applying 
the optimal contract, CCP can share the risk more widely and efficiently than the OTC 
market. 
 
       Besides, Duffie and Zhu (2009) suggests that adding an independent central 
clearing platform (CCP) to each derivative market may reduce the netting efficiency, 
which in return increase agents’ average exposure to counterparty risk. The intuition 
is that when agent trade with CCP, they will not be able to benefit from bilateral netting 
between a pair of counterparties across different underlying assets. As a result, CCP 
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will require extra margin for each kind of derivative products, which may affect the 
efficiency of resource allocation and increase the probability of defaulting. Basing on 
this idea, Duffie and Zhu point out that netting across a large number of products is 
necessary for a central counterparty to reduce counterparty risk in a non-transparent 
market setting. Different from their framework, in our model, we consider an economy 
with only one source of risk the and one financial asset. And since we endogenize 
agents' incentive of defaulting in this environment, our model concludes that the 
introduction of central clearing counterparty can effectively reduce the margin 
requirement for each contract and improve social welfare.  
 
     Our paper also contributes to the recent discussion about mechanism efficiency 
under aggregate uncertainty. Menkveld (2016) construct a model which endogenize 
the existence of “arbitrageurs,” who benefits from the leverage embed in the margin 
system, and “standby investors,” who benefits from the extremely bad state when the 
CCP need to unwind the position it inherits from the arbitrageurs in default. He 
concludes that by offering fire sale premium and building up a default fund, the CCP 
can balance the proportion of two types of traders and achieve social efficiency. In 
addition, Acharya, Iyer and Sundaram (2015) point out that the introduction of hedging 
contract decreases agents’ necessary saving for self-insurance, which helps agents to 
cope with the idiosyncratic risk at lower cost. However, it also decreases their 
resistance to the systemic risk when the correlated failure takes place. Hence they 
prove that by imposing a margin requirement and ex-post transfer, the CCP can 
improve social efficiency and increase aggregate investment. Nevertheless, in their 
papers, the probability of default is exogenous and depends only on the risk of projects 
and their correlation. In comparison, our model incorporates the incentive of strategic 
default and focus on the role played by CCP in coping with systemic risk and avoiding 
market failure.  
 
Finally, as an extension, our centralized trading mechanism is also helpful to cope with 
other trading frictions: For example, the matching cost. (Duffie, Garleanu and 
Pedersen, 2005). Since the intermediary is the unique counterparty agents can trade 
with, all the potential seller and buyer can contact the intermediary directly instead of 
matching in the market. In another aspect, it could also be helpful to accelerate the 
payout from clearinghouses to creditors when trading firm fail in the financial crisis 
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(Squire (2012)).  Through netting, clearinghouse provides a quicker intermediate 
payout to creditors which increase the liquidity provision and decreases uncertainty. 
However, our model does not incorporate this kind of effect, since we do not consider 
about the discount factor and agents are assumed to be risk neutral. 
 
 
3. Game Structure and Basic Assumption 
 
The model describes a market where a continuum of agents enter bilateral hedging 
contracts for mutual insurance purposes. More specifically, there are two types of 
agents (Type-1 and Type-2) who may have different income base on the realization of 
state in date 1. Different from Leitner’s model where the contract is a Type-1 agent 
and a Type-2 agent, in our model we have a central intermediary who works as the 
unique counterparty to trade with both types of agents. In fact, we find that this 
mechanism can achieve higher social efficiency than Leitner’s mechanism under the 
condition of aggregate uncertainty. And we will prove this finding in the following 
section. Agents and the intermediary enter the contract at Date 0, in which they specify 
payment at Date 1 contingent on the realization of the state. An agent can default 
strategically, but the cost of doing so will be all her future income. In Leither’s model, 
they assume that contracts are non-exclusive and agents cannot observe the historical 
and future contracts of their counterparties. In that case, agents may have the incentive 
to enter multiple contracts and default strategically. To cope with this problem, Leither 
introduces a central institution which can extract all relevant information about 
contracts that agents enter by inducing them to report one another. However, in our 
setting, the intermediary is the only counterparty that agents can trade with, so the it 
can solve this problem by simply collecting the identity information from the agents.  
 
    Besides the trading mechanism, we also generalize Leitner’s model by allowing the 
existence of aggregate uncertainty. That is, instead of assuming equal proportions of 
both agents, we assume that the proportion of one type of agent is larger than that of 
the other type. In that case, it is impossible for both types of agents to be completely 
insured. Without losing the generality, we assume that the proportion of type 1 “p” is 
larger than the proportion of type 2 “1 − p”, or p ≥
1
2
 . Then the remaining settings 
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will be similar to Leitner’s model: There are three dates, t=0, 1, 2, and one divisible 
good -- cash. Uncertainty sources from the random realization of future states, State 1 
and State 2, one of which will realize at Date 1. Agents are risk neutral and obtain an 
expect utility of E(c0 + c1 + c2) from consuming c0, c1, and c2 dollars at Dates 0, 1, 
and 2, respectively. Agents are protected by limited liability, so ct ≥ 0 at each date. 
 
    At Date 0, agents are endowed with one unit of cash and an investment opportunity. 
Moreover, this investment opportunity requires the human capital of the agent. In 
another word, taking over the project from the agents will destroy all the future value 
of the project. Each project lasts for two periods, and the corresponding cash flow can 
be summarized in the following figure.  
 
 
 
    Take the project of type 1 as an example: At Date 0, type 1 agent chooses the scale 
of her investment I1 ∈ [0,1] which is unobservable to the intermediaries and other 
agents. When it comes to Date 1, if state 1 realizes, the project will yield εI1 (ε > 0) 
and continue to Date 2 automatically. Otherwise, if state 2 realize, the project requires 
an additional investment εI1 to continue. If the additional investment is not paid in full, 
the project will be forced to liquidate, and the liquidation value of the project is 
assumed to be 0. If the project continues to maturity, it yields RI1 dollars at Date 2. 
With similar structure, the project of a Type 2 agent yields  εI2  in State2 but 
requires εI2 in State 1. If the project continues to maturity, it yields RI2 dollars at Date 
2. 
 
We normalize the risk-free rate to be 0% and assume that R > 1 > 𝜀.  From the game 
structure mentioned above, we can see that R > 𝜀 guarantees the efficiency of making 
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additional investment in Date 1. While R > 1 implies that each type of the projects 
has a strictly positive NPV in a world without friction. And finally, ε < 1 ensures the 
satisfaction of rational constrain. 
 
Following Leitner’s structure, we also have the following assumptions: 
 
Assumption 1. An agent cannot commit to paying out of the project’s final cash flows 
(RIi). 
 
Assumption 2. An agent cannot commit to paying out of the project’s interim cash 
flows (εIi) 
  
Assumption 1 excludes the possibility that agents self-finance for her project by selling 
part of her future income in Date 2. Without this assumption, agents can satisfy their 
liquidity demand by simply securitize their future claims. In that case, there is little 
incentive to entry the insurance contract. Assumption 2 allows agents to default in 
Date 1 even when she has the fund to continue. If an agent defaults, her project will 
be terminated, which means that the agent will lose all her future income. Moreover, 
since the project requires agents’ human capital, intermediary or other agents will not 
accept the projects’ asset as collateral, instead only cash is acceptable as collateral. 
Specifically, agents and intermediary can open an escrow account through a third party 
so that money placed in escrow account can be observed by both the agents and 
intermediary. 
 
Assumption 3. The amount that an agent invests in his project (𝐼𝑖) and the amount that 
an agent consumes are private information. 
 
      Assumption 3 introduces the risk of strategic default: agents who intend to default 
can consume all her cash and invest 0 to the project. Without this assumption, agents 
can simply avoid the counterparty risk by setting up a minimum investment level. Due 
to the post efficiency constraint R > 𝜀, increasing initial investment can strengthen the 
motivation for agents to follow their commitment. However, under Assumption 3, cash 
collateral become necessary to control the potential counterparty risk even when 
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contracts are exclusive.  
 
Assumption 4. An agent cannot observe contracts that other pairs of agents enter 
(either in the past or the future) 
 
          Since all the past and future contracts are not observable to the current 
counterparty, agents may have the incentive to enter multiple contracts and default 
strategically. Specifically, agents can consume all their endowment in Date 0 (𝐼𝑖 = 0), 
and enter multiple contracts. As a result, when the “bad” state (state –i) realizes they 
get payment from their counterparty or the intermediary. While the good (state i) 
realizes, they default and pay nothing. In other word, they benefit from the “bad” state 
by entering multiple contracts and substituting their investment with consumption. To 
prevent the implementation of this strategy, we need a supervision mechanism which 
effectively reveals the trading history information. As mentioned at the beginning of 
this section, in Leitner’s mechanism, he allows agents to trade directly to each other 
and sets up a central intermediary who collects and reveals the voluntary trading 
reports from agents. Due to the potential threats of default form their counterparties, 
agents have sufficient incentive to report truthfully. In a word, he constructs a “peel 
monitoring” system to cope with this problem. Different from his mechanism, we 
introduce a central intermediary to solve the problem above. As we mentioned above, 
central intermediary works as the only counterparty which agents can trade with. 
Hence, she has an access to the trading history of all the agents and can simply detect 
agents who attempts to enter overmuch contracts. In the case without aggregate 
uncertainty, both mechanisms can solve the problem properly. However, we will show 
in the following that our mechanism will become superior if aggregate uncertainty is 
introduced. 
 
Utility Function of Agents 
 
  In order to compare the social efficiency between two mechanisms, we firstly assume 
that there is a social planner who designs the optimal contract to maximize the social 
welfare. In fact, maximizing the social efficiency is equivalent to maximizing the ex-
ante expect utility of the agents. Therefore, the most efficiency mechanism can still be 
endogenized even in the case without a social planner. For a contract 𝜓, it illustrates 
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(𝑘1, 𝑘2, 𝑥1, 𝑥2) where 𝑘𝑖 denotes the margin of agent i and 𝑥𝑖 denotes the payout for 
agent i when state i realizes. Besides, the intermediary is allowed to set different 
position limits to different types of agents depending on their potential solvency. Think 
of the case when the intermediary allows the type-1 agents to take” 𝛼” contracts and 
allows the type-2 agents to take “𝛽” contracts. If the incentive constrains are satisfied, 
no default will actually take place and the utility function of two types of agents will 
be: 
 
𝑈1(𝜓) = 1 − 𝐼1 − 𝛼𝑘1 +
1
2
(𝛼𝑘1 + 𝜀𝐼1 − 𝛼𝑥1) +
1
2
(𝛼𝑘1 + 𝛼𝑥2 − 𝜀𝐼1) + 𝑅𝐼1
= 1 + (𝑅 − 1)𝐼1 +
1
2
𝛼(𝑥2 − 𝑥1) 
𝑈2(𝜓) = 1 − 𝐼2 − 𝛽𝑘2 +
1
2
(𝛽𝑘2 + 𝜀𝐼2 − 𝛽𝑥2) +
1
2
(𝛽𝑘2 + 𝛽𝑥1 − 𝜀𝐼2) + 𝑅𝐼2
= 1 + (𝑅 − 1)𝐼2 +
1
2
𝛽(𝑥1 − 𝑥2) 
 
Take type 1 agents as an example, 1 − 𝐼1 − 𝛼𝑘1 denotes the consumption in Date 0 
after the investment and margin requirement. Term 𝛼𝑘1 + 𝜀𝐼1 − 𝛼𝑥1 illustrates the 
consumption of type 1 agent if state 1 realizes and agent 1 fulfills her commitment. In 
that case, she firstly received fund from her investment 𝜀𝐼1. But base on the contract, 
she will pay 𝑥1  for each contract she holds which multiplied by the number of 
contracts 𝛼. After the payment, the margin at Date 0, 𝛼𝑘1 will be returned to agent 1. 
While the term 𝛼𝑘1 + 𝛼𝑥2 − 𝜀𝐼1 stands for the consumption of agent 1 in state 2. 
When state 2 realize, agent 1 is required to make additional investment 𝜀𝐼1 to continue 
the project. Depending on the contract, she will receive the fund 𝛼𝑥2  from the 
intermediary. And the margin 𝛼𝑘1 will also be returned to the agent, since it will be 
irrational to default when she can benefit from the contract. Finally, 𝑅𝐼1 represents the 
final payoff from the investment if the project is successfully maintained to Date 2. 
Similarly, agent 2 consumes 1 − 𝐼2 − 𝛽𝑘2 in Date 0, 𝛽𝑘2 + 𝜀𝐼2 − 𝛽𝑥2 in Date 1 if 
state 2 realizes and 𝛽𝑘2 + 𝛽𝑥1 − 𝜀𝐼2 if state 1 realizes. 
 
Since all agents are protected by limited liability, regardless of date and states, their 
consumption must be non-negative: 
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{
1 − 𝐼1 − 𝛼𝑘1 ≥ 0
𝛼𝑘1 + 𝜀𝐼1 − 𝛼𝑥1 ≥ 0
𝛼𝑘1 + 𝛼𝑥2 − 𝜀𝐼1 ≥ 0
  and  {
1 − 𝐼2 − 𝛽𝑘2 ≥ 0
𝛽𝑘2 + 𝜀𝐼2 − 𝛽𝑥2 ≥ 0
𝛽𝑘2 + 𝛽𝑥1 − 𝜀𝐼2 ≥ 0
 
 
To make sure that agents will have the incentive to enter the insurance contract offered 
by the intermediary, we need to analysis agents’ outside option as well. Alternatively, 
agents who do not enter the contract can maximize their utility by self-insurance. To 
be more specifically, agents can save partly of their endowment in Date 0 and use the 
money to satisfy their liquidity demand in Date 1 (autarky). In that case, we denote 
the saving of the agents by “s”, and the optimal allocation will be: 
 
𝑠 = 1 − 𝐼
𝑠 = 𝜀𝐼
⇒ 𝐼 =
1
𝜀 + 1
⇒ 𝑈𝐴 = 𝑠 + 𝑅𝐼 =
𝑅 + 𝜀
1 + 𝜀
 
 
       Therefore, in order to attract agents to enter the insurance contract, the social 
planner must make sure that the rational constraint will be satisfied. In another word, 
by entering the contract, agents must become better-off than autarky: 
 
𝑈𝑖(𝜓) ≥ 𝑈𝐴 =
𝑅 + 𝜀
1 + 𝜀
 
 
Finally, as we have mentioned above, in our model we allow for aggregate uncertainty 
by put different proportion to different types of agents. In that case, it is impossible to 
offer complete insurance to all the majority agents (type-1 agents in our model). Given 
the continuity and monotony of the utility function, the optimal allocation can be either 
offering incomplete insurance to all the type-1 agents or offering complete insurance 
to part of the type-1 agents (complete insurance with quota) and letting the remaining 
type-1 agents end up with autarky (ration). We will compare the equilibrium allocation 
under these two different cases in the following, to see which of them can achieve 
higher social efficiency. 
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4. First Best Allocation without Potential Default 
      
Before we start our discussion, to set up a benchmark of efficiency, we firstly solve 
the case where both the investment level and the number of contracts agents enter are 
observable (First Best). In that case, there is no potential default risk, and we have the 
following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1. When the investment level and the number of contracts agents enter 
are observable, offering incomplete insurance to the entire majority or offering 
complete insurance to part of the majority can both achieve efficiency. 
 
The proof will be in the following. We will start from the all-participating case and 
then come to the complete insurance with quota case. 
 
All-Participating Contract 
 
In the case where the intermediary chooses to offer incomplete insurance to all the 
majority agents, the intermediary must make sure that she will have enough funds to 
fulfill her commitment. In state 1, the intermediary will collect 𝛼𝑥1 from each type 1 
agent and pay 𝛽𝑥1 to each type 2 agent. Whereas in state 2, the intermediary will get 
𝛽𝑥2 from each type 2 agent and pay 𝛼𝑥2 to each type 1 agent. To ensure that the cash 
inflow and outflow are able to break even, intermediary will adjust the position 
limit"𝛼" and "𝛽" depending on the proportion of agents "p" and "1 − p": 
 
p𝛼𝑥1 − (1 − 𝑝)𝛽𝑥1 = 0
(1 − p)𝛽𝑥2 − 𝑝𝛼𝑥2 = 0
⇒ 𝑝𝛼 = (1 − 𝑝)𝛽 ⇒ 𝛽 =
𝑝
1 − 𝑝
𝛼 
 
Moreover, as we mentioned above we assume that there are more type 1 agents than 
type 2 agents: 
p > 1/2 ⇒ 𝛽 > 𝛼 
 
And to simplify our result, without losing generality, we normalize 𝛼 = 1, so: 
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𝛽 =
𝑝
1 − 𝑝
 
 
Base on the assumptions above, we can acquire the first best allocation of the model 
by solving the following: 
 
max: 𝑝𝑈1(𝜓) + (1 − 𝑝)𝑈2(𝜓) 
 
Subject to: 
 
{
 
 
 
 
1 − 𝐼1 − 𝑘1 ≥ 0      …… . (1)
𝑘1 + 𝜀𝐼1 − 𝑥1 ≥ 0    …… (2)
𝑘1 + 𝑥2 − 𝜀𝐼1 ≥ 0    …… (3)
1 − 𝐼2 − 𝛽𝑘2 ≥ 0     …… (4)
𝛽𝑘2 + 𝜀𝐼2 − 𝛽𝑥2 ≥ 0……(5)
𝛽𝑘2 + 𝛽𝑥1 − 𝜀𝐼2 ≥ 0……(6)
 
 
In another word, the social planner’s objective is to maximize the social welfare 
subject to the limited liability constraints. By substituting the utility function into the 
object function above, we have: 
 
          𝑝𝑈1(𝜓) + (1 − 𝑝)𝑈2(𝜓) 
= 𝑝 + 𝑝(𝑅 − 1)𝐼1 +
1
2
𝑝(𝑥2 − 𝑥1) + (1 − 𝑝)(𝑅 − 1)𝐼2 +
1
2
𝛽(1 − 𝑝)(𝑥1 − 𝑥2) 
      = 1 + (𝑅 − 1)[𝑝𝐼1 + (1 − 𝑝)𝐼2] 
 
From the equation above, we can easily see that the social welfare 𝑝𝑈1(𝜓) + (1 −
𝑝)𝑈2(𝜓) is strongly related to the social investment 𝑝𝐼1 + (1 − 𝑝)𝐼2. Since 𝑅 > 1, to 
maximize the social welfare is equivalent to maximize the social investment. With the 
same reason, the constraint (1) and (4) should be binding. Thus: 
 
𝐼1 = 1 − 𝑘1 and 𝐼2 = 1 −
𝑝
1−𝑝
𝑘2 
 
 If we substitute them back into the objective function, we will get: 
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1 + (𝑅 − 1)[𝑝𝐼1 + (1 − 𝑝)𝐼2] 
= 1 + (𝑅 − 1)[𝑝 − 𝑝𝑘1 + (1 − 𝑝) − 𝑝𝑘2] 
= 1 + (𝑅 − 1)[1 − 𝑝(𝑘1 + 𝑘2)] 
 
As we can see from the equation above, the most efficient mechanism must the one 
which minimize the aggregate collateral (margin requirement) of the society. Since the 
NPV of the project is positive, it will be more efficient for us to substitute one unit of 
margin with one unit of investment.  
 
As I mentioned above, under aggregate uncertainty it is impossible to offer complete 
insurance to both types of agents especially the majority (type-1 agent). However, in 
order to maximize the social investment, complete insurance should be offered to the 
minority (type-2 agent). In that case, we should imply that (5), (6) and (3) should be 
binding while (2) is not. As a result, the optimal contract will be:(see Appendix A1) 
 
{
 
 
 
 𝑥𝐹𝐼1 = 𝑥𝐹𝐼2 =
𝜀
𝛽
𝑘𝐹𝐼2 = 0
𝑘𝐹𝐼1 = 1 −
1
(1 + 𝜀)
−
(1 − 𝑝)𝜀
𝑝(1 + 𝜀)
 
 
 
With this optimal contract, the investment of type 1and type 2 will be: 
 
𝐼𝐹𝐼1 =
1
1 + 𝜀
+
(1 − 𝑝)𝜀𝐼2
𝑝(1 + 𝜀)
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐼𝐹𝐼2 = 1 
        
The utility of type 1and type 2 will be: 
 
𝑈𝐹𝐼1(𝜓) = 1 + (𝑅 − 1)𝐼𝐹𝐼1 = 1 +
𝑅 − 1
𝜀 + 1
+
(1 − 𝑝)(𝑅 − 1)𝜀
𝑃(1 + 𝜀)
 
𝑈𝐹𝐼2(𝜓) = 1 + (𝑅 − 1)×1 = 𝑅 
 
And the social welfare: 
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𝑝𝑈𝐹𝐼1(𝜓) + (1 − 𝑝)𝑈𝐹𝐼2(𝜓) = 𝑝 +
(𝑅 − 1)𝑝
𝜀 + 1
+
(1 − 𝑝)(𝑅 − 1)𝜀
𝑝(1 + 𝜀)
+ (1 − 𝑝)𝑅 
 
  From the result above, we can see that the margin requirement of the minority (type-
2) is 0 and she can make a full investment 𝐼𝐹𝐼2 = 1, under the protection of complete 
insurance. It may be meaningful to find that the margin of type-1 agent is not 0. 
However, the margin of agent 1 here does not play any role in preventing agent from 
default. Since both the investment and the number of contracts agents enter are 
observable, there is no incentive for type-1 agent to do that. In fact, the margin 
𝑘𝐹𝐼1here just works as “saving” which is similar to the autarky case.  Because, when 
state 2 realizes, it is impossible to satisfy the liquidity demand of agent-1 only with 
the money from agent-2, the remaining must be complemented by the saving of agent-
1 themselves. In order word, intermediary requires agents 1 to save partly of her 
endowment so as to cope with the aggregate uncertainty. And due to this saving 
requirement, the investment of type-1 agents is less than optimal level 1. Moreover, 
we can see that if there is no aggregate uncertainty (1 − 𝑝 = 𝑝 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽 = 1), Leitner’s 
most efficient case where both types of agents can make full investment is achievable.  
 
One-to-One Complete Insurance with Quota Case 
 
In this case, to offer complete contract, the intermediary will set up an indirect one-to-
one insurance relationship between agents of different kinds. However, because there 
are more type-1 agents than type-2 agents, the remaining type-1 agents who are not 
offered the contract will have to end up with autarky. In detail, 1 − 𝑝 of the type-1 
agent will be offered with the complete insurance contract while the remaining 2p −
1 type-1 agent will have to satisfy their own liquidity demand by self-insurance.  
 
       For agents who are offered with quota, the optimal contract will be: 
 
𝛼 = 𝛽 = 1
𝑘𝐹𝐶1 = 𝑘𝐹𝐶2 = 0
𝐼𝐹𝐶1 = 𝐼𝐹𝐶2 = 1
𝑥𝐹𝐶1 = 𝑥𝐹𝐶2 = 𝜀
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 Intuitively, since these agents are offered with a complete insurance contract, their 
future liquidity demand will be satisfied fully by the payment from the intermediary. 
Therefore, both types of agents will make a full investment to maximize their utility. 
Besides, the margin of both types of agents will be 0 because there is no incentive for 
agents to default under this setting.  
 
As a result, the utility of agents with complete insurance contract will be: 
 
𝑈𝐹𝐶1(𝜓′) = 𝑈𝐹𝐶2(𝜓′) = 1 + (𝑅 − 1)×1 = 𝑅 
 
So the social welfare will be: 
 
(1 − 𝑝)𝑈1(𝜓
′) + (1 − 𝑝)𝑈2(𝜓
′) + (2𝑝 − 1)𝑈𝐴 
 
= 𝑝 +
(𝑅 − 1)𝑝
𝜀 + 1
+
(1 − 𝑝)(𝑅 − 1)𝜀
𝑝(1 + 𝜀)
+ (1 − 𝑝)𝑅 
 
Comparing this result with the previous case, we can easily find that the social welfares 
of two different contracts are identical. Hence, Proposition 1 is proved.  
 
Finally, it is important to point out the relationship between this complete insurance 
with quota case and Leinter’s mechanism. In this specific case, the optimal contract is 
identical to Leinter’s. Different from our mechanism, Leintner allows agents to trade 
directly with each other while intermediary is only delegated to collect and monitor 
the voluntary report from them. As a result, under his mechanism, for a contract to be 
supported as equilibrium, it must be collusion-proof. And Leinter also proves that the 
complete insurance contract is the unique optimal collusion-proof contract. Therefore, 
the optimal partial insurance contract which we get in the first case is not 
implementable in Leinter’s mechanism. To see this, we can compare the utility of 
counterparties who enter the different contracts: 
 
𝑈𝐹𝐼1(𝜓) = 1 +
𝑅 − 1
𝜀 + 1
+
(1 − 𝑝)(𝑅 − 1)𝜀
𝑃(1 + 𝜀)
< 𝑈𝐹𝐶1(𝜓′) = 𝑅 
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𝑈𝐹𝐼2(𝜓) = 𝑈𝐹𝐶2(𝜓′) = 𝑅 
 
In this case, it means each type-1 agent may have the incentive to form a one-to-one 
collusion by offering a more attractive contract to agent 2 and kicking out other type-
1 agents. In another word, the incomplete insurance contract is not collusion prevented. 
Hence, this contract is implementable only in our mechanism where the intermediary 
works as the unique counterparty.  
 
More importantly, since Leinter’s mechanism requires the contract to be collusion-
proof, the complete insurance contract will still be their optimal even with under 
aggregate uncertainty. However, the efficiency of this bilateral-complete-insurance 
contract is guaranteed by the assumption of equal proportion and equal bargaining 
power between counterparty, which is not realistic when there are more type-1 agents 
than type-2 agents. Obviously, if the propositions of two types of agents are not equal, 
the minority should have higher bargaining power than the majority due to their 
scarcity. In the following section, we are going to show that the effect of this imbalance 
of scarcity could be magnified when incentive constraints are introduced into the 
model. And the trading mechanism with central intermediary will show her superiority 
under this environment. 
 
5. Second Best Allocation Allowing Potential Default 
 
In this section, we start our discussion for the second best allocation by introducing 
the participation constraints (𝐼𝑅𝑖) and the incentive constraints (𝐼𝐶𝑖). Since we have 
solved the outside option for the agents, the participation constraints can simply be 
written as: 
 
𝑈𝑖(𝜓) ≥ 𝑈𝐴 =
𝑅 + 𝜀
1 + 𝜀
 
 
As we have mentioned in the game settings, the level of investment 𝐼𝑖 is private 
information of the agent. Therefore, an agent can substitute her investment with 
consumption and subsequently default at Date 1 as she has no cash flows to pay from. 
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Hence, the incentive constraints can be described as: 
 
𝑈𝑖(𝐼𝑖|𝜓) ≥ 𝑈𝑖(𝐼
′
𝑖|𝜓), 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝑘𝑖] 
 
Simply, this inequity means that the agents will choose an investment level which 
maximizes her utility. Thus, an optimal contract should be set up so that any deviation 
from the equilibrium strategy cannot be beneficial. Proved by Leinter, this constraint 
can be replaced with 𝑈𝑖(𝐼𝑖|𝜓) ≥ 𝑈𝑖(0|𝜓). In other words, it is enough to focus on the 
case of full investment substitution due to the linearity of the utility function. 
Intuitively, an agent who plans to default is better off consuming all her initial 
endowment rather than investing it and losing it upon default. 
 
Hence, the incentive constraints reduce to: 
 
1
2
(x1 − k1) ≤ (R − 1)I1 +
1
2
(x2 − x1) 
 
β
2
(x2 − k2) ≤ (R − 1)I2 +
𝛽
2
(x1 − x2) 
 
With this incentive constraint, we firstly get the following lemma: 
 
Lemma 1: For an agent who is offered an insurance contract and does not plan to 
default, she can fully substitute her private saving with her collateral.  
 
Comparing the functions of margin and saving in our model, we can see that both 
methods can transfer fund from period 0 to period 1. The only difference is that margin 
will be returned to agents if and only if agents fulfill their commitments. From the 
incentive constraints above, we can see that higher margin requirement (k1 and k2 )  
can strengthen the incentive for agents to follow the contract. As a result, a higher 
margin requirement can support a contract with higher insurance coverage which in 
return increases the investment of agents. Therefore, for agents who intend to fulfill 
their contracts, they will prefer to “save” fund using the margin account instead of the 
private saving one. Besides, given this incentive, by intuitive criterion, agents with 
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private saving can be expected to be the ones who are going to default in Date 1 
because they are the only ones who can benefit from this deviation. Doubtlessly, agents 
of this kind will not be offered an insurance contract by the central counterparty. 
 
With the Lemma 1 above, we will discuss the social welfare under different contract 
settings: all-participating contracts and complete insurance with quota. And we will 
find the following result: 
 
Proposition 2. When R ≥ 1 +
1
2
ε, the incentive constraints will not be binding. Both 
all-participating contracts and complete insurance contract with quota can achieve the 
first social welfare.  
 
Proposition 3.  When R < 1 +
1
2
ε, incentive constraints of Type 2 agents will become 
binding. The all-participating contracts will become more efficient than complete 
insurance contract with quota. 
 
Proposition 2 is relatively straight forward. When the final return of the project is 
sufficiently high, the opportunity cost of defaulting will become high enough to 
prevent agents from doing so. Since agents who default in Date 1 will lose all her 
future income in Date 2, they will find it more beneficial to follow their commitment. 
As a result, the incentive constraints play no role in the maximization problem. And 
the result will be identical to what we get in Proposition 1.  
 
In comparison, Proposition 3 is more interesting and complicated. It describes a case 
where the final return itself become no longer sufficient to guarantee the contract 
fulfillment. As a result, a margin requirement will be imposed to agents to control the 
risk of defaulting. And we will have to discuss it case by case: 
 
 All-Participating Case 
 
In the case where the intermediary offers all-participating contract, the maximization 
problem will become: 
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max: 𝑝𝑈1(𝜓) + (1 − 𝑝)𝑈2(𝜓) 
Subject to: 
 
 {
1 − 𝐼1 − 𝑘1 ≥ 0……①
𝑘1 + 𝜀𝐼1 − 𝛼𝑥1 ≥ 0……②
𝑘1 + 𝛼𝑥2 − 𝜀𝐼1 ≥ 0……③
  and {
1 − 𝐼2 − 𝛽𝑘2 ≥ 0……④
𝛽𝑘2 + 𝜀𝐼2 − 𝛽𝑥2 ≥ 0……⑤
𝛽𝑘2 + 𝛽𝑥1 − 𝜀𝐼2 ≥ 0……⑥
 
 
𝑈1(𝜓) ≥ 𝑈𝐴 =
𝑅 + 𝜀
1 + 𝜀
……⑦ 
𝑈2(𝜓) ≥ 𝑈𝐴 =
𝑅 + 𝜀
1 + 𝜀
……⑧ 
 
 
1
2
(x1 − k1) ≤ (R − 1)I1 +
1
2
(𝑥2 − 𝑥1)……⑨ 
β
2
(x2 − k2) ≤ (R − 1)I2 +
𝛽
2
(𝑥1 − 𝑥2)……⑩ 
 
By solving the maximization problem above given  R < 1 +
1
2
ε , we find that two 
different sub-cases can arise.  
 
Proposition 4. When R < 1 +
1
2
ε and β >
8(1+𝜀)𝜀
(2𝑅−𝜀)(2𝑅−2+𝜀)
−
2𝑅+3𝜀
2𝑅−𝜀
 , the optimal all-
participating contract will exhaust the liquidity provided by Type 2 agents and only 
the incentive constraint of Type 2 agents will become binding.  
 
Proposition 5.  When R < 1 +
1
2
ε  and β ≤
8(1+𝜀)𝜀
(2𝑅−𝜀)(2𝑅−2+𝜀)
−
2𝑅+3𝜀
2𝑅−𝜀
 , both incentive 
constraints will become binding in the optimal all-participating contract, and there will 
be liquidity surplus for Type 2 agents in state 2. 
 
       Case I 
         
As illustrated in Proposition 4, the first case arises when constraint ⑤ is binding while 
constraint ⑨ is not. It means that when state 2 arises, the liquidity provided by type 2 
agents will be exhausted in state 2. In that case, the optimal contract will be: 
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𝑥1 =
2 + 3𝜀 − 2𝑅
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
 
 
𝑥2 =
2𝑅 − 2 + 𝜀
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
 
 
𝐼1 =
2𝑅 + 2𝛽𝑅 + 𝜀 − 𝛽𝜀 − 2
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
 
 
𝐼2 =
2
2𝑅 − 𝜀
 
 
𝑘1 = 1 −
2𝑅 + 2𝛽𝑅 + 𝜀 − 𝛽𝜀 − 2
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
 
 
𝑘2 =
2𝑅 − 𝜀 − 2
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
 
 
Case II 
          The second case arises when constraint ⑨ is binding and constraint ⑤ is not. It 
means that the maximization of social investment is restricted by type 1 agents’ 
incentive constraints of defaulting. In that case, the optimal contract will become: 
 
𝑥1 =
(2𝛽 + 1)𝜀2 + (4𝛽𝑅 + 4𝑅 − 2𝛽 − 4)𝜀 + (4𝑅𝛽 − 8𝑅 + 4𝑅2 + 4 − 4𝛽)
𝛽(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
 
 
𝑥2 =
(𝛽 + 2)𝜀2 + (4𝑅 + 4𝑅𝛽 − 4𝛽 − 2)𝜀 + (4𝑅 + 4𝛽 − 4 − 8𝛽𝑅 + 4𝛽𝑅2)
𝛽(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
 
 
𝐼1 =
(4𝛽 + 2)𝜀 + 4𝑅 − 4 + 4𝛽
𝛽(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
 
 
𝐼2 =
(2𝛽 + 4)𝜀 + 4 − 4𝛽 + 4𝛽𝑅
(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
 
 
𝑘1 =
3𝛽𝜀2 + (8𝛽 − 4𝛽𝑅 − 2)𝜀 + (8𝛽𝑅 − 4𝛽𝑅2 − 4𝑅 + 4 − 4𝛽)
𝛽(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
 
 
𝑘2 =
3𝜀2 + (8 − 4𝑅 − 2𝛽)𝜀 + (8𝑅 − 4𝑅2 − 4 + 4𝛽 − 4𝛽𝑅)
𝛽(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
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 Comparing these results with the first best allocation, we can easily see that both types 
of agents will have to put higher margin in order to satisfy the incentive constraints. 
In that case, the level of efficient investment will decrease. And it is also not surprising 
to find that type 2 agent will have a higher investment level than a type 1 agent since 
they are better insured.  
       
 
6. Discussion about Social Welfare and Aggregate Investment 
 
     Basing on the optimal all-participating contract we have above, we find that the 
social investment can be maximized by including all the agents into the market. In 
another word, the all-participating contract (Clearinghouse contract) can achieve a 
higher social efficiency than the one-to-one contract (Bilateral contract). The 
underlying intuition is that by introducing more Type 1 agents into the contract, it 
saves partly of the inefficient saving and lowers down the cost of fulfilling the 
contracts for the majority type (Type 1). In that case, the all-participating contract 
lowers down the necessary social collateral for contract fulfillment which in turn 
leaving more fund available for investment.  
 
  In the first case the social investment will be: 
 
𝑝𝐼𝑆𝐼1 + (1 − 𝑝)𝐼𝑆𝐼2 =
2𝑅 + 3𝜀 − 4𝑝𝜀
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
 
And in the second case the social investment will be: 
𝑝𝐼𝑆𝐼1 + (1 − 𝑝)𝐼𝑆𝐼2 =
2
𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4
 
 
While with bilateral contract, the social investment will be: 
𝑝𝐼𝐹𝐶1 + (1 − 𝑝)𝐼𝐹𝐶2 =
4(1 − 𝑝)
𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4
+
2𝑝 − 1
𝜀 + 1
 
 
We have proved that, under two different cases, the optimal all-participating contracts 
can always end up with higher aggregate investment than the one-to-one contracts. 
(See Appendix A2) In another word, a central counterparty trading mechanism is more 
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efficient than the bilateral OTC market. However, in the following section, we also 
show that this efficient contract setting is not always sustainable if agents are allowed 
to set up their contract and decide the size of collusion freely. That is to say, in order 
to achieve the social efficiency, the contract traded in the market must be standardized 
and the level of insurance offered by a single contract must be limited so as to cover 
all the market participants.  
 
 Collusion-Proof of the Equilibrium 
 
Now suppose that we start with the all-participating equilibrium with incomplete 
insurance contracts. As we can see, to get better insurances from type 2 agents, type 1 
agents may have the incentive to exclude other agents of the same type. To analysis 
this deviation incentive, we assume that partly of the type 1 agents offer a derivative 
contract to attract the type 2 agents to form a smaller trading group in order to get 
better insurance. We define that the proportion of the type 1 agents in new collusion is 
P’ and that of type 2 agents is 1-P’. Since partly of the type 1 agents are excluded from 
the original market, we know that P′ < 𝑃 and 1 − P′ > 1 − 𝑃 . Moreover we also 
define that β′ =
P′
1−P′
. For this deviation to be preferred, it must be the case that with 
certain resource reallocation, both types of agents inside the collusion become better-
off. Under the risk neutral assumption, one necessary condition is that inside the 
collusion the welfare level should be no less than what they had from the original 
equilibrium. Since we have shown that our equilibrium is the second best, for any 
given P′ in a new collusion, the highest welfare level of the new collusion should be:  
 
         In Case I: 
 
P′USI1(𝑃
′) + (1 − P′)USI2(𝑃
′) = 1 + (𝑅 − 1)
2𝑅 + 3𝜀 − 4𝑃′𝜀
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
 
 
        In Case II: 
 
P′USI1(𝑃
′) + (1 − P′)USI2(𝑃
′) = 1 + (𝑅 − 1)
2
𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4
 
 
While the social welfare level of the same collusion with original all-participating 
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contract will be: 
 
In Case I: 
 
P′USI1(𝑃) + (1 − P
′)USI2(𝑃) 
 
= 1 + (
𝑃′
𝑃
− 𝑃′) (𝑅 − 1)
(2𝑅 + 2𝛽𝑅 + 𝜀 − 𝛽𝜀 − 2)
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
+ (
𝑃′
𝑃
− 𝑃′)
2𝑅 − 2 − 𝜀
2𝑅 − 𝜀
+ (𝑅 − 1)
2(1 − 𝑃′)
2𝑅 − 𝜀
+
(1 − 𝑃′)(2 − 2𝑅 + 𝜀)
2𝑅 − 𝜀
 
 
 
In Case II: 
 
P′USI1(𝑃) + (1 − P
′)USI2(𝑃) 
 
= 1 + (𝑅 − 1) (
𝑃′
𝑃
− 1)
(4𝛽 + 2)𝜀 + 4𝑅 − 4 + 4𝛽
(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
+ (𝑅 − 1)
2(1 − 𝑃′)
(1 − 𝑃)(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)
+ (
𝑃′
𝑃
− 1)
(𝛽 − 1)(𝜀2 + 2𝜀 + 12𝑅 − 4𝑅2 − 8)
2(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
 
 
Under our assumption if the deviation is beneficial to both types of agents, we should 
have: 
P′U′SI1 + (1 − P
′)U′SI2 > P
′USI1 + (1 − P
′)USI2 
 
        As we have proved, this condition is satisfied by any parameter value of Case II. 
While in Case I, it can also be satisfied when the return of investment R is sufficiently 
high. In that case, Type 1 agents will always find it beneficial to form a smaller trading 
group until the proportion of both types becomes equal. Since all the Type 1 agents in 
the new collusion do not consider about the externality they brought to others, they 
will make the deviation if the benefit of doing so cover the corresponding cost. As we 
have suggested above, Type 1 agents can benefit from a higher coverage and a higher 
investment level in a smaller trading group. Therefore when the return of investment 
R becomes high, the incentive of forming a smaller trading group will be stronger. On 
the other hand, the cost of excluding other Type 1 source from a higher “cross-subsidy.” 
As we have mentioned above, Type 2 agents are liquidity provider in the bad state and 
their producing technology is relatively scarce in the market. Therefore, Type 1 agents 
have to subsidize Type 2 agents for this scarcity by offering better terms in the 
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contracts, for example, lower contingent payment  𝑥2  and lower margin 
requirement 𝑘2. So, excluding some of the Type 1 agents means that the remaining 
Type 1s have to share higher cross subsidy per person. That is why the all-participating 
contract can be collusive proof when β is sufficiently high (Case I) and the return of 
investment R is sufficiently low. In summary:(See Appendix A3) 
 
 
Proposition 6. The all-participating equilibrium will be collusive proof iff β >
8(1+𝜀)𝜀
(2𝑅−𝜀)(2𝑅−2+𝜀)
−
2𝑅+3𝜀
2𝑅−𝜀
 and R <
(2−3𝜀)+√17𝜀2+20𝜀+4
4
 
 
 
        In conclusion, our model suggests that contracts need to be standardized 
exogenously in order to maximize social investment when the market is facing 
aggregate uncertainty. As we have proved above, if agents are allowed to decide the 
contract freely, the majorities will tend to exclude other agents of the same type and 
form a smaller trading group which in return increases the amount of inefficient social 
saving and restricts aggregate investment. As a result, a central counterparty is 
required to be set up to decide the optimal contract and this contract should be the 
unique one traded in the market. In another word, our model shows that the existence 
of OTC contract may lead to social inefficiency in a market with aggregate uncertainty. 
 
        Besides, our model also predicts that central clearinghouses are more likely to be 
set up in a market with high aggregate uncertainty and low return. Because the all-
participating contract will become collusive proof, in that case, the equilibrium is more 
likely to be sustained.  
 
Discussion about the Margin Requirement  
 
In this section, we focus on the margin requirement of different types of agents. From 
the equilibrium in Case I, we have: 
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𝑘1 = 1 −
2𝑅 + 2𝛽𝑅 + 𝜀 − 𝛽𝜀 − 2
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
 
 
𝑘2 =
2𝑅 − 𝜀 − 2
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
 
        
And from that of Case II, we have: 
 
𝑘1 =
3𝛽𝜀2 + (8𝛽 − 4𝛽𝑅 − 2)𝜀 + (8𝛽𝑅 − 4𝛽𝑅2 − 4𝑅 + 4 − 4𝛽)
𝛽(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
 
 
𝑘2 =
3𝜀2 + (8 − 4𝑅 − 2𝛽)𝜀 + (8𝑅 − 4𝑅2 − 4 + 4𝛽 − 4𝛽𝑅)
𝛽(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
 
 
From the equations above, we can simply find that k2 < k1, which means that the 
margin requirement for the minority (Type 2) is lower than that of the majority (Type 
1). Because Type 2 agents own a relatively scarce production technology, it is no 
surprise that they get a contract with better terms. With identical reason, one can see 
that Type 2 agents end up with a higher level of investment ISI2 > ISI1 and lower 
contingent payment xSI2 < xSI1. Both of these conditions decrease the incentive for 
Type 2 agents to default. More importantly, this difference of incentive is strongly 
related to the proportion of two types. In extreme cases, when the proportion of type 
2 agents is sufficiently small, the margin requirement for Type 2 agents can even 
become negative. Because when the shock from aggregate uncertainty becomes huge, 
to offer higher insurance to Type 1 agents, the central intermediary may have 
motivations to lend fund to Type 2. This method can improve the social efficiency, 
especially in the case when the liquidity provided by Type 2 is exhausted in bad state 
(Case I): 
 
𝑘2 =
2𝑅 − 𝜀 − 2
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
 
 
Since R < 1 +
1
2
𝜀, we have  
 
2𝑅 − 𝜀 − 2 < 0 ⇒ 𝑘2 < 0 
 
Correspondingly we have  
𝐼2 =
2
2𝑅 − 𝜀
> 1 
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Proposition. 7 Whenβ >
8(1+𝜀)𝜀
(2𝑅−𝜀)(2𝑅−2+𝜀)
−
2𝑅+3𝜀
2𝑅−𝜀
  the margin requirement of Type 2 
agents will become negative and the investment of Type 2 𝐼2 will be higher than 1. 
 
In our setting, the capacity for agents to fulfill their commission depends heavily on 
their scale of investment. Take type 2 agents as an example, when state 2 realizes, they 
will receive εI  from their investment and this contingent revenue are linearly 
increasing with investment. However, when the proportion of Types 2 agents is 
sufficiently small, their aggregate payment capacity and scale of investment will be 
limited by their endowment. As a result, to maximize the social welfare, the central 
intermediary can collect the margin from Type 1 agents and lend the fund to Type 2 
agents in order to increase their aggregate investment. Therefore, in this case, the 
incentive for Type 2 agents to fulfill their commission will purely rely on their high 
level of investment.  
 
In general, when aggregate uncertainty is large in the market, the central clearinghouse 
should limit the holding of the high market-correlated asset by increasing the margin 
requirement. On the other hand, central clearinghouse should also provide liquidity to 
agents who work as the real counterparty to the market majority.  
 
7. Conclusion and Empirical Implication 
 
     In this paper, we discuss a bilateral insurance trading model with unobservable 
investment and non-exclusive contract. Different from Leinter’s setting, we consider 
a trading mechanism where intermediary works as the unique counterparty. Under 
aggregate uncertainty, we discuss two different contract setting: all-participating 
contract and one-to-one contract. We find that the previous one is more efficient when 
the incentive of strategic default is incorporated into the model. However, our model 
also shows that to achieve the optiamal allocation, the trading contract must be 
standardized and restricted exogenously. Otherwise, agents may have the incentive to 
form a smaller trading group and increase the scale of their contracts. In another word, 
if agents are allowed to decide their contracts, the bilateral OTC market is more likely 
to be formed although it leads to inefficient risk sharing and social investment.    
Different from previous studies where margin requirement is unique to all the market 
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participant, our model shows that the optimal margin level should be contract specific 
and adjusted basing on the exposure of aggregate uncertainty. More importantly, our 
model shows that, when the proportion of a certain type of agents becomes sufficiently 
high, the central clearinghouse may be motivated to provide liquidity to the 
counterparties of the majority so as to increase the capacity of insurance and efficient 
social investment.  
 
     In practice, our model predicts that this kind of centralized trading mechanism is 
more likely to be observed in markets with high aggregate uncertainty. While in the 
market with low aggregate uncertainty, both the central clearinghouse and one-to-one 
direct trading market may exist. Take Chicago Board of Trading (CBOT) as an 
example. CBOT is the most representative agriculture trading board in the world. In 
1865, CBOT use standardized future contract to substitute forward contract and 
successful implement margin system where it works as the counterparty of each agent. 
Since agriculture is an industry that strongly affected by climate, this trading 
mechanism increases their capability to cope with this systematic risk. While in recent 
years, it also extends its business to oil, metal and financial assets. For a  market with 
lower aggregate uncertainty, for example financial asset, our model explains the co-
existence of standardized central trading contract and specific one-to-one forward 
contract. 
 
       Moreover, our model also predicts that when the aggregate economy is in the 
boom (state 1), there exists an excess supply of liquidity. While the economy is in 
depression (state 2), the liquidity provision will be exhausted when the ratio between 
different types is sufficiently high. And as proved above, when the proportions of 
different types are relatively close, the incentive constraints will become binding. This 
means that the potential risk of defaulting will limit the investment of agents which in 
return decrease the probability of liquidity crisis in the extreme cases. 
 
        Additionally, our model also implies that central clearinghouse should be allowed 
to provide liquidity to certain types of agents when the market is exposed to a high 
level of aggregate uncertainty. In another word, fixing the margin requirement to 
unique and nonnegative to all types of agents may lead to an inefficient resource 
allocation and low level of social investment. Therefore, the settings of margin system 
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should be more flexible to match the volatile market demand.   
 
As an extension, we also think this centralized trading mechanism may be a 
constructive attempt to cope with some other problems in OTC market, for example, 
the cost of matching and moral hazard in monitoring. By including these trading 
frictions, we expect to make our model more general, and this should be taken as the 
next step of our research. Additionally, our model leads to several empirical 
implications which  remain to be examined in the future. 
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Appendix 
 
A1: 
 
Case I 
1 − 𝐼1 − 𝑘1 = 0……(1) 
 
𝑘1 + 𝜀𝐼1 − 𝑥1 > 0……(2) 
 
𝑘1 + 𝑥2 − 𝜀𝐼1 = 0……(3) 
 
1 − 𝐼2 − 𝛽𝑘2 = 0…… (4) 
 
β𝑘2 + 𝜀𝐼2 − β𝑥2 = 0……(5) 
 
β𝑘2 + 𝛽𝑥1 − 𝜀𝐼2 = 0……(6) 
 
𝑈1(𝜓) ≥ 𝑈𝐴 =
𝑅 + 𝜀
1 + 𝜀
……(7) 
 
𝑈2(𝜓) ≥ 𝑈𝐴 =
𝑅 + 𝜀
1 + 𝜀
……(8) 
 
1
2
(𝑥1 − 𝑘1) < (𝑅 − 1)𝐼1 +
1
2
(𝑥2 − 𝑥1)……(9) 
 
𝛽
2
(𝑥2 − 𝑘2) = (R − 1)𝐼2 +
𝛽
2
(𝑥1 − 𝑥2)……(10) 
 
Take (5),(6) and (10) 
 
From (5)+(6) 
2β𝑘2 + 𝛽(𝑥1 − 𝑥2) = 0 
 
From (10) 
β(𝑥2 − 𝑘2) − 2(𝑅 − 1)𝐼2 = 𝛽(𝑥1 − 𝑥2) 
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2β𝑘2 + 𝛽(𝑥2 − 𝑘2) − 2(𝑅 − 1)𝐼2 = 0 
 
β(𝑥2 + 𝑘2) = 2(𝑅 − 1)𝐼2 
 
𝑥2 =
2
𝛽
(𝑅 − 1)𝐼2 − 𝑘2 
From (4) 
𝑘2 =
1
𝛽
(1 − 𝐼2) 
 
𝑥2 =
2
𝛽
(𝑅 − 1)𝐼2 −
1
𝛽
(1 − 𝐼2) 
 
𝛽𝑥2 = 2(𝑅 − 1)𝐼2 − (1 − 𝐼2) 
 
𝛽𝑥2 = 2𝑅𝐼2 − 𝐼2 − 1 
 
𝐼2 =
𝛽𝑥2 + 1
2𝑅 − 1
 
 
From (1) and (3) 
1 − 𝐼1 − 𝑘1 = 0 ⇒ 𝑘1 = 1 − 𝐼1 
 
𝑘1 + 𝑥2 − 𝜀𝐼1 = 0 
 
1 − 𝐼1 + 𝑥2 − 𝜀𝐼1 = 0 
 
1 + 𝑥2 = 𝐼1 + 𝜀𝐼1 
 
𝐼1 =
1 + 𝑥2
1 + 𝜀
 
 
From (4) and (5) 
1 − 𝐼2 + 𝜀𝐼2 − 𝛽𝑥2 = 0 
 
1 − β𝑥2 = 𝐼2 − 𝜀𝐼2 
𝐼2 =
1 − 𝛽𝑥2
1 − 𝜀
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And together with 
𝐼2 =
𝛽𝑥2 + 1
2𝑅 − 1
 
We have  
1 − 𝛽𝑥2
1 − 𝜀
=
𝛽𝑥2 + 1
2𝑅 − 1
 
 
2R − 2Rβ𝑥2 − 1 + 𝛽𝑥2 = 𝛽𝑥2 + 1 − 𝜀𝛽𝑥2 − 𝜀 
 
2R − 2 + ε = (2Rβ − εβ)𝑥2 
 
𝑥2 =
2𝑅 − 2 + 𝜀
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
 
 
And  
𝐼2 =
1 − 𝛽𝑥2
1 − 𝜀
=
2
2𝑅 − 𝜀
 
 
𝐼1 =
1 + 𝑥2
1 + 𝜀
=
2𝑅 + 2𝛽𝑅 + 𝜀 − 𝛽𝜀 − 2
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
 
 
 
From  
2β𝑘2 + 𝛽(𝑥1 − 𝑥2) = 0 
 
⇒ 2(1 − 𝐼2) + 𝛽(𝑥1 − 𝑥2) = 0 
 
⇒ 𝛽(𝑥1 − 𝑥2) = 2(𝐼2 − 1) 
 
𝑥1 − 𝑥2 =
2
𝛽
(𝐼2 − 1) 
 
𝑥1 =
2
𝛽
(𝐼2 − 1) + 𝑥2 
 
𝛽𝑥1 = 2(𝐼2 − 1) + 𝛽𝑥2 
 
𝛽𝑥1 + 1 = 2(𝐼2 − 1) + 𝛽𝑥2 + 1 
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𝛽𝑥1 + 1
2𝑅 − 1
=
2(𝐼2 − 1)
2𝑅 − 1
+
𝛽𝑥2 + 1
2𝑅 − 1
 
 
𝛽𝑥1 + 1
2𝑅 − 1
=
2(𝐼2 − 1)
2𝑅 − 1
+ 𝐼2 
 
𝛽𝑥1 + 1 = 2(𝐼2 − 1) + (2𝑅 − 1)𝐼2 
 
𝐼2 =
𝛽𝑥1 + 3
2𝑅 + 1
 
 
⇒
2
2𝑅 − 𝜀
=
𝛽𝑥1 + 3
2𝑅 + 1
 
 
2Rβ𝑥1 − 𝜀𝛽𝑥1 + 6𝑅 − 3𝜀 = 4𝑅 + 2 
 
β(2R − ε)𝑥1 = 2 + 3𝜀 − 2𝑅 
 
𝑥1 =
2 + 3𝜀 − 2𝑅
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
 
 
In summary, we have: 
𝑥1 =
2 + 3𝜀 − 2𝑅
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
 
 
𝑥2 =
2𝑅 − 2 + 𝜀
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
 
 
𝐼1 =
2𝑅 + 2𝛽𝑅 + 𝜀 − 𝛽𝜀 − 2
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
 
 
𝐼2 =
2
2𝑅 − 𝜀
 
 
𝑘1 = 1 − 𝐼1 = 1 −
2𝑅 + 2𝛽𝑅 + 𝜀 − 𝛽𝜀 − 2
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
 
 
𝑘2 =
2𝑅 − 𝜀 − 2
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
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Then we need to check whether our solution satisfies (2) 
 
𝑘1 + 𝜀𝐼1 − 𝑥1 > 0……(2) 
 
Given (1) 𝑘1 = 1 − 𝐼1, 
1 − 𝐼1 + 𝜀𝐼1 − 𝑥2 > 0 
 
1 − 𝑥1 > (1 − 𝜀)𝐼1 
 
1 − 𝑥1 > (1 − 𝜀)(1 +
𝑥2 − 𝜀
1 + 𝜀
) 
 
1 − 𝑥1 > 1 +
𝑥2 − 𝜀
1 + 𝜀
− 𝜀 − 𝜀
𝑥2 − 𝜀
1 + 𝜀
 
 
(1 + ε)(ε − 𝑥1) > (𝑥2 − 𝜀)(1 − 𝜀) 
 
ε − 𝑥1 + 𝜀
2 − 𝑥1𝜀 > 𝑥2 − 𝜀𝑥2 − 𝜀 + 𝜀
2 
 
ε(𝑥2 − 𝑥1) > (𝑥1 + 𝑥2) − 2𝜀 
 
ε(𝑥2 − 𝑥1) >
4𝜀
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
− 2𝜀 
 
(𝑥2 − 𝑥1) >
4
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
− 2 
 
4𝑅 − 4 − 2𝜀
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
>
4
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
− 2 
 
4𝑅 − 8 − 2𝜀
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
> −2 
 
4R − 2ε − 8 > −2𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀) 
 
2(2R − ε) + 2β(2R − ε) − 8 > 0 
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(β + 1)(2R − ε) > 4 
 
Since β > 1 and R < 1 +
1
2
𝜀 ⇒ 2𝑅 − 𝜀 < 2 
 
The above inequity will be satisfied iff 
β >
4
2𝑅 − 𝜀
− 1 
 
Then we turn to (9) and check under what condition it will be satisfied: 
 
1
2
(𝑥1 − 𝑘1) < (𝑅 − 1)𝐼1 +
1
2
(𝑥2 − 𝑥1) 
 
𝑥1 − 𝑘1 < 2(𝑅 − 1)𝐼1 + (𝑥2 − 𝑥1) 
 
𝑥1 − 1 +
1 + 𝑥2
1 + 𝜀
< (2𝑅 − 2)
1 + 𝑥2
1 + 𝜀
+ (𝑥2 − 𝑥1) 
 
𝑥1 − 1 + (𝑥1 − 𝑥2) < (2𝑅 − 3)
1 + 𝑥2
1 + 𝜀
 
 
2𝑥1 − 𝑥2 − 1 < (2𝑅 − 3)
1 + 𝑥2
1 + 𝜀
 
 
(1 + 𝜀)(2𝑥1 − 𝑥2 − 1) < (2𝑅 − 3)(1 + 𝑥2) 
 
2𝑥1 − 𝑥2 − 1 + 2𝜀𝑥1 − 𝜀𝑥2 − 𝜀 < 2𝑅 − 3 + 2𝑅𝑥2 − 3𝑥2 
 
2(1 + ε)𝑥1 − (1 + 𝜀)𝑥2 − (1 + 𝜀) < (2𝑅 − 3) + (2𝑅 − 3)𝑥2 
 
2(1 + ε)𝑥1 − (1 + 𝜀 + 2𝑅 − 3)𝑥2 < (2𝑅 − 3 + 1 + 𝜀) 
 
2(1 + ε)𝑥1 − (2𝑅 + 𝜀 − 2)𝑥2 < (2𝑅 + 𝜀 − 2) 
 
2(1 + ε)𝑥1 + 2(1 + 𝜀)𝑥2 − (2𝑅 + 3𝜀)𝑥2 < (2𝑅 − 2 + 𝜀) 
 
2(1 + ε)(𝑥1 + 𝑥2) − (2𝑅 + 3𝜀)𝑥2 < (2𝑅 − 2 + 𝜀) 
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2(1 + ε)
4𝜀
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
− (2𝑅 + 3𝜀)
2𝑅 − 2 + 𝜀
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
< 2𝑅 − 2 + 𝜀 
 
8(1 + ε)ε − (2R + 3ε)(2R − 2 + ε) < 𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(2𝑅 − 2 + 𝜀) 
 
β >
8(1 + 𝜀)𝜀
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(2𝑅 − 2 + 𝜀)
−
2𝑅 + 3𝜀
2𝑅 − 𝜀
 
 
And it can be proved that  
8(1 + 𝜀)𝜀
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(2𝑅 − 2 + 𝜀)
−
2𝑅 + 3𝜀
2𝑅 − 𝜀
>
4
2𝑅 − 𝜀
− 1 
 
As a result, the above case will arise when: 
β >
8(1 + 𝜀)𝜀
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(2𝑅 − 2 + 𝜀)
−
2𝑅 + 3𝜀
2𝑅 − 𝜀
 
 
 
 
Case II 
 
1 − 𝐼1 − 𝑘1 = 0……(1) 
 
𝑘1 + 𝜀𝐼1 − 𝑥1 > 0……(2) 
 
𝑘1 + 𝑥2 − 𝜀𝐼1 = 0……(3) 
 
1 − 𝐼2 − 𝛽𝑘2 = 0…… (4) 
 
β𝑘2 + 𝜀𝐼2 − β𝑥2 > 0……(5) 
 
β𝑘2 + 𝛽𝑥1 − 𝜀𝐼2 = 0……(6) 
 
𝑈1(𝜓) ≥ 𝑈𝐴 =
𝑅 + 𝜀
1 + 𝜀
……(7) 
 
𝑈2(𝜓) ≥ 𝑈𝐴 =
𝑅 + 𝜀
1 + 𝜀
……(8) 
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1
2
(𝑥1 − 𝑘1) = (𝑅 − 1)𝐼1 +
1
2
(𝑥2 − 𝑥1)……(9) 
 
𝛽
2
(𝑥2 − 𝑘2) = (R − 1)𝐼2 +
𝛽
2
(𝑥1 − 𝑥2)……(10) 
 
 From (1) and (3), we have 
1 − 𝐼1 + 𝑥2 − 𝜀𝐼1 = 0 
 
1 − (1 + ε)𝐼1 + 𝑥2 = 0 
 
𝑥2 = (1 + 𝜀)𝐼1 − 1 
 
From (4) and (6), we have  
1 − 𝐼2 + 𝛽𝑥1 − 𝜀𝐼2 = 0 
 
1 − (ε + 1)𝐼2 + 𝛽𝑥1 = 0 
 
β𝑥1 = (1 + 𝜀)𝐼2 − 1 
 
From (9) 
1
2
(𝑥1 − 𝑘1 − 𝑥2 + 𝑥1) = (𝑅 − 1)𝐼1 
 
2𝑥1 − 𝑥2 − 𝑘1 = 2(𝑅 − 1)𝐼1 
 
2β𝑥1 − 𝛽𝑥2 − 𝛽𝑘1 = 2𝛽(𝑅 − 1)𝐼1 
 
2(1 + ε)𝐼2 − 2 − 𝛽(1 + 𝜀)𝐼1 + 𝛽 − 𝛽(1 − 𝐼1) = 2𝛽(𝑅 − 1)𝐼1 
 
2(1 + ε)𝐼2 − 2 = 𝛽(2𝑅 − 2 + 𝜀)𝐼1 
 
From (10) 
β(𝑥2 − 𝑘2) = 2(𝑅 − 1)𝐼2 + 𝛽(𝑥1 − 𝑥2) 
 
β(2𝑥2 − 𝑥1 − 𝑘2) = 2(𝑅 − 1)𝐼2 
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2β𝑥2 − 𝛽𝑥1 − 𝛽𝑘2 = 2(𝑅 − 1)𝐼2 
 
As a result, we have 
2(1 + ε)𝐼2 − 2 = 𝛽(2𝑅 − 2 + 𝜀)𝐼1 
 
2β(1 + ε)𝐼1 − 2𝛽 = (2𝑅 − 2 + 𝜀)𝐼2 
 
 
⇒ 
β(2R − 2 + ε)𝐼1 = 2(1 + 𝜀)𝐼2 − 2 
 
(2R − 2 + ε)𝐼2 = 2(1 + 𝜀)𝛽𝐼1 − 2𝛽 
 
 
𝐼2 =
(2𝑅 − 2 + 𝜀)𝛽𝐼1 + 2
2(1 + 𝜀)
 
 
 
[(2𝑅 − 2 + 𝜀)𝛽𝐼1 + 2](2𝑅 − 2 + 𝜀)
2(1 + 𝜀)
= 2(1 + 𝜀)𝛽𝐼1 − 2𝛽 
 
(2𝑅 − 2 + 𝜀)2𝛽𝐼1 + 2(2𝑅 − 2 + 𝜀) = 4(1 + 𝜀)
2𝛽𝐼1 − 4𝛽(1 + 𝜀) 
 
[(2𝑅 − 2 + 𝜀)2 − 4(1 + 𝜀)2]𝛽𝐼1 = −4𝛽(1 + 𝜀) − 2(2𝑅 − 2 + 𝜀) 
 
 
𝐼1 =
(4𝛽 + 2)𝜀 + 4𝑅 − 4 + 4𝛽
𝛽(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
 
 
With  
β(2R − 2 + ε)𝐼1 = 2(1 + 𝜀)𝐼2 − 2 
 
(2R − 2 + ε)𝐼2 = 2(1 + 𝜀)𝛽𝐼1 − 2𝛽 
 
 
(2R − 2 + ε)(β𝐼1 + 𝐼2) = 2(1 + 𝜀)(β𝐼1 + 𝐼2) − 2 − 2𝛽 
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(2R − 4 − ε)(β𝐼1 + 𝐼2) = −2 − 2𝛽 
 
β𝐼1 + 𝐼2 =
2(1 + 𝛽)
𝜀 + 4 − 2𝑅
 
 
𝐼2 =
(2𝛽 + 4)𝜀 + 4 − 4𝛽 + 4𝛽𝑅
(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
 
 
Then from 
𝑥2 = (1 + 𝜀)𝐼1 − 1 
 
β𝑥1 = (1 + 𝜀)𝐼2 − 1 
 
𝑘1 = 1 − 𝐼1 
 
β𝑘2 = 1 − 𝐼2 
 
We can have  
𝑥2 =
(𝛽 + 2)𝜀2 + (4𝑅 + 4𝑅𝛽 − 4𝛽 − 2)𝜀 + (4𝑅 + 4𝛽 − 4 − 8𝛽𝑅 + 4𝛽𝑅2)
𝛽(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
 
 
 
𝑥1 =
(2𝛽 + 1)𝜀2 + (4𝛽𝑅 + 4𝑅 − 2𝛽 − 4)𝜀 + (4𝑅𝛽 − 8𝑅 + 4𝑅2 + 4 − 4𝛽)
𝛽(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
 
 
 
𝑘1 =
3𝛽𝜀2 + (8𝛽 − 4𝛽𝑅 − 2)𝜀 + (8𝛽𝑅 − 4𝛽𝑅2 − 4𝑅 + 4 − 4𝛽)
𝛽(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
 
 
 
𝑘2 =
3𝜀2 + (8 − 4𝑅 − 2𝛽)𝜀 + (8𝑅 − 4𝑅2 − 4 + 4𝛽 − 4𝛽𝑅)
𝛽(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
 
 
 
As what we have done in the last section, we need to check under what conditions (5) and (2) 
will be satisfied: 
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From (5) 
β𝑘2 + 𝜀𝐼2 − 𝛽𝑥2 > 0 
 
(𝜀2 − 2𝜀 + 4𝑅 − 4𝑅2)𝛽 > (4𝑅2 − 4𝑅 + 8𝜀𝑅 − 14𝜀 − 5𝜀2) 
 
β <
8(1 + 𝜀)𝜀
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(2𝑅 − 2 + 𝜀)
−
2𝑅 + 3𝜀
2𝑅 − 𝜀
 
 
 
Sinceβ > 1 , it requires 4𝑅2 − 4𝑅 + 8𝜀𝑅 − 14𝜀 − 5𝜀2 < 0  and 4𝑅2 − 4𝑅 + 8𝜀𝑅 − 14𝜀 −
5𝜀2 < 𝜀2 − 2𝜀 + 4𝑅 − 4𝑅2 . And given our original assumptions 0 < 𝜀 < 1 and 1 < 𝑅 <
1 +
𝜀
2
, all the above requirements can be satisfied when both 𝜀 and R are close to 1. As a result, 
it can be inferred that case II can arise when 𝜀 is sufficiently large and R is sufficiently small. 
 
While from (2) 
𝑘1 + 𝜀𝐼1 − 𝑥1 > 0 
 
(5𝜀2 + 14𝜀 − 8𝜀𝑅 + 4𝑅 − 4𝑅2)𝛽 + (𝜀2 − 2𝜀 + 4𝑅 + 4𝑅2) > 0 
 
Given the discussion in (5) 4𝑅2 − 4𝑅 + 8𝜀𝑅 − 14𝜀 − 5𝜀2 < 0 which means 5𝜀2 + 14𝜀 −
8𝜀𝑅 + 4𝑅 − 4𝑅2 > 0. And because 𝜀 < 1 < 𝑅, it can be proved that 𝜀2 − 2𝜀 + 4𝑅 + 4𝑅2 >
0. Hence we can have: 
 
𝛽 >
−𝜀2 + 2𝜀 − 4𝑅 − 4𝑅2
5𝜀2 + 14𝜀 − 8𝜀𝑅 + 4𝑅 − 4𝑅2
 
    
Since 
−𝜀2+2𝜀−4𝑅−4𝑅2
5𝜀2+14𝜀−8𝜀𝑅+4𝑅−4𝑅2
< 0 and β > 1, the above constrain can always be satisfied. 
 
In conclusion, case II will arise when 𝜀 is sufficiently large and R is sufficiently small. 
 
A2: 
 
Then we come to the comparison of social investment (efficiency) between full-participation 
contracts and one-to-one contracts. 
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Firstly in the one-to-one contract: 
 
I1 = I2 = 1 −
ε − 2(R − 1)
ε − 2(R − 1) + 2
 
 
k1 = k2 =
ε − 2(R − 1)
ε − 2(R − 1) + 2
 
 
x1 = x2 = ε − (1 + ε)
ε − 2(R − 1)
ε − 2(R − 1) + 2
 
 
So the social investment of the one-to-one contract: 
 
2(1 − 𝑝) [1 −
ε − 2(R − 1)
ε − 2(R − 1) + 2
] + (2𝑝 − 1)
1
𝜀 + 1
=
4(1 − 𝑝)
𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4
+
2𝑝 − 1
𝜀 + 1
 
 
 
 While in our all-participation contract, if case I arise: 
 
𝑥1 =
2 + 3𝜀 − 2𝑅
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
 
 
𝑥2 =
2𝑅 − 2 + 𝜀
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
 
 
𝐼1 =
2𝑅 + 2𝛽𝑅 + 𝜀 − 𝛽𝜀 − 2
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
 
 
𝐼2 =
2
2𝑅 − 𝜀
 
 
𝑘1 = 1 − 𝐼1 = 1 −
2𝑅 + 2𝛽𝑅 + 𝜀 − 𝛽𝜀 − 2
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
 
 
𝑘2 =
2𝑅 − 𝜀 − 2
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
 
 
So the social investment: 
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p𝐼1 = 𝑝×
1 − 𝑝
𝑝
×
2𝑅 + 2𝛽𝑅 + 𝜀 − 𝛽𝜀 − 2
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
 
=
(1 − 𝑝)(2𝑅 + 2𝛽𝑅 + 𝜀 − 𝛽𝜀 − 2)
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
 
  
(1 − p)𝐼2 =
2(1 − 𝑝)
2𝑅 − 𝜀
 
 
p𝐼1 + (1 − p)𝐼2 =
1 − 𝑝
2𝑅 − 𝜀
×(
2𝑅 + 2𝛽𝑅 + 𝜀 − 𝛽𝜀 − 2
1 + 𝜀
+ 2) 
 
p𝐼1 + (1 − p)𝐼2 =
(1 − 𝑝)(2𝑅 + 2𝛽𝑅 + 3𝜀 − 𝛽𝜀)
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
 
 
p𝐼1 + (1 − p)𝐼2 =
2(1 − 𝑝)𝑅 + 2𝑝𝑅 + 3(1 − 𝑝)𝜀 − 𝑝𝜀
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
 
 
p𝐼1 + (1 − p)𝐼2 =
2𝑅 + 3𝜀 − 4𝑝𝜀
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
 
 
 
Then we need to show that  
2𝑅 + 3𝜀 − 4𝑝𝜀
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
>
4(1 − 𝑝)
𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4
+
2𝑝 − 1
𝜀 + 1
 
 
2𝑅 + 3𝜀 − 4𝑝𝜀
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
−
2𝑝 − 1
𝜀 + 1
>
4(1 − 𝑝)
𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4
 
 
2𝑅 + 3𝜀 − 4𝑝𝜀 − (2𝑝 − 1)(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
>
4(1 − 𝑝)
𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4
 
 
2𝑅 + 3𝜀 − 4𝑝𝜀 − 4𝑝𝑅 + 2𝑝𝜀 + 2𝑅 − 𝜀
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
>
4(1 − 𝑝)
𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4
 
 
4𝑅 + 2𝜀 − 2𝑝𝜀 − 4𝑝𝑅
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
>
4(1 − 𝑝)
𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4
 
 
2(2𝑅 + 𝜀)(1 − 𝑝)
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
>
4(1 − 𝑝)
𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4
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(2𝑅 + 𝜀)
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
>
2
𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4
 
 
(2R + ε)(ε − 2R + 4) > 2(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀) 
 
2Rε − 4𝑅2 + 8𝑅 + 𝜀2 − 2𝑅𝜀 + 4𝜀 > 2(2𝑅 + 2𝑅𝜀 − 𝜀 − 𝜀2) 
 
𝜀2 + 4𝜀 − 4𝑅2 + 8𝑅 > 4𝑅 + 4𝑅𝜀 − 2𝜀 − 2𝜀2 
 
3𝜀2 + 6𝜀 − 4𝑅𝜀 + 4𝑅 − 4𝑅2 > 0 
 
3𝜀2 + 6𝜀 − 6𝑅𝜀 > 4𝑅(𝑅 − 1 −
1
2
ε) 
 
3ε(ε + 2 − 2R) > 4𝑅(𝑅 − 1 −
𝜀
2
) 
 
In this case R < 1 +
𝜀
2
 , ε + 2 − 2R > 0. 
 
3ε > 4𝑅×(−
1
2
) 
 
3ε > −2𝑅 
 
Given ε > 0, 𝑅 > 0 the above inequity will always be satisfied. 
 
On the other hand, when case II arise 
 
p𝐼1 =
(1 − 𝑝)[(4𝛽 + 2)𝜀 + 4𝑅 − 4 + 4𝛽]
(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
 
 
(1 − p)𝐼2 =
(1 − 𝑝)[(2𝛽 + 4)𝜀 + 4 − 4𝛽 + 4𝛽𝑅]
(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
 
 
p𝐼1 + (1 − p)𝐼2 =
(1 − 𝑝)[(6𝛽 + 6)𝜀 + 4𝑅 + 4𝛽𝑅]
(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
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p𝐼1 + (1 − p)𝐼2 =
(1 − 𝑝)[6(𝛽 + 1)𝜀 + 4𝑅(𝛽 + 1)]
(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
 
 
p𝐼1 + (1 − p)𝐼2 =
(1 − 𝑝)(𝛽 + 1)(6𝜀 + 4𝑅)
(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
 
 
p𝐼1 + (1 − p) =
2
𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4
 
 
Because 𝑝 ≥
1
2
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅 > 1, 
(2𝑝 − 1)(𝜀 + 2𝑅 − 2) ≥ 0 
 
⇒ 4𝑝𝜀 + 4𝑝 − 2𝜀 − 2 ≥ 2𝑝𝜀 − 4𝑅𝑝 + 8𝑝 − 𝜀 + 2𝑅 − 4 
 
⇒ (4𝑝 − 2)(𝜀 + 1) ≥ (2𝑝 − 1)(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4) 
 
⇒
2
𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4
≥
4(1 − 𝑝)
𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4
+
2𝑝 − 1
𝜀 + 1
 
 
 
A3: 
 
Proof of Collusive Proof 
Now suppose that we start with the second-best equilibrium with all agents participate in the 
contracts. As we can see, to get better insurance from type 2 agents, type 1 agents may have 
the incentive to exclude other agents of the same type. To analysis this deviation incentive, 
suppose that partly of the type 1 agents offer a deviate contract to attract the type 2 agents to 
form a smaller trading group in order to get higher protection. We define that the proportion 
of the type 1 agents in new collusion is P’ and that of type 2 agents is 1-P’ correspondingly. 
Since partly of the type 1 agents are excluded from the original market, we know that P′ < 𝑃 
and 1 − P′ > 1 − 𝑃. For this deviation to break down the original equilibrium, it must be the 
case that with certain resource reallocation, both types of agents must become better-off. And 
one necessary condition is that inside the collusion the welfare level should be no less than 
what they get from the original equilibrium. Since we have shown that our equilibrium is the 
second best, for any given P′ in a new collusion, the highest welfare level can be defined as:  
 
P′USI1(𝑃
′) + (1 − P′)USI2(𝑃
′) 
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And the welfare level in the original all participating contract  
 
P′USI1(P) + (1 − P
′)USI2(𝑃) 
 
As a result, the original all participating equilibrium is collusive proof if: 
 
P′USI1(P) + (1 − P
′)USI2(𝑃) ≥ P
′USI1(𝑃
′) + (1 − P′)USI2(𝑃
′) 
 
Otherwise, it may become beneficial for Type 1 agents to form a smaller trading group and 
enjoy higher insurance level from Type 2 agents. 
 
 
 
 
Case I: 
𝑥1 =
2 + 3𝜀 − 2𝑅
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
 
 
𝑥2 =
2𝑅 − 2 + 𝜀
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
 
 
𝐼1 =
2𝑅 + 2𝛽𝑅 + 𝜀 − 𝛽𝜀 − 2
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
 
 
𝐼2 =
2
2𝑅 − 𝜀
 
 
𝑈1 = 1 + (𝑅 − 1)𝐼1 +
1
2
(𝑥2 − 𝑥1) 
 
𝑈2 = 1 + (𝑅 − 1)𝐼2 +
𝛽
2
(𝑥1 − 𝑥2) 
 
𝑥2 − 𝑥1 =
4𝑅 − 4 − 2𝜀
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
 
 
𝑥1 − 𝑥2 =
4 − 4𝑅 + 2𝜀
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
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𝑈1 = 1 + (𝑅 − 1)
2𝑅 + 2𝛽𝑅 + 𝜀 − 𝛽𝜀 − 2
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
+
1
2
[
4𝑅 − 4 − 2𝜀
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
] 
𝑈2 = 1 + (𝑅 − 1)
2
2𝑅 − 𝜀
+
𝛽
2
[
4 − 4𝑅 + 2𝜀
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
] 
 
P𝑈1 = 𝑃 + (𝑅 − 1)
(1 − 𝑃)(2𝑅 + 2𝛽𝑅 + 𝜀 − 𝛽𝜀 − 2)
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
+
(1 − 𝑃)(4𝑅 − 4 − 2𝜀)
2(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
 
⇒ 
P𝑈1 = 𝑃 + (𝑅 − 1)
2𝑅 + 𝜀 − 2𝑃𝜀 − 2 + 2𝑃
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
+
(1 − 𝑃)(2𝑅 − 2 − 𝜀)
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
 
 
(1 − P)𝑈2 = (1 − 𝑃) + (𝑅 − 1)
2(1 − 𝑃)
2𝑅 − 𝜀
+
𝑃(4 − 4𝑅 + 2𝜀)
2𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
 
⇒ 
(1 − P)𝑈2 = (1 − 𝑃) + (𝑅 − 1)
2(1 − 𝑃)
2𝑅 − 𝜀
+
(1 − 𝑃)(2 − 2𝑅 + 𝜀)
2𝑅 − 𝜀
 
 
P𝑈1 + (1 − P)𝑈2 = 1 + (𝑅 − 1)
2𝑅 + 𝜀 − 2𝑃𝜀 − 2 + 2𝑃
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
+ (𝑅 − 1)
2(1 − 𝑃)
2𝑅 − 𝜀
 
 
P𝑈1 + (1 − P)𝑈2 = 1 + (𝑅 − 1)
2𝑅 + 𝜀 − 2𝑃𝜀 − 2 + 2𝑃
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
+ (𝑅 − 1)
2(1 − 𝑃)(1 + 𝜀)
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
 
 
 
P𝑈1 + (1 − P)𝑈2
= 1 + (𝑅 − 1) (2𝑅 + 𝜀 − 2𝑃𝜀 − 2 + 2𝑃 + 2 + 2𝜀 − 2𝑃 − 2𝑃𝜀)/(2𝑅
− 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)  
 
P𝑈1 + (1 − P)𝑈2 = 1 + (𝑅 − 1)
2𝑅 + 3𝜀 − 4𝑃𝜀
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
 
 
P′USI1(𝑃
′) + (1 − P′)USI2(𝑃
′) = 1 + (𝑅 − 1)
2𝑅 + 3𝜀 − 4𝑃′𝜀
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
 
 
P′USI1(𝑃) = 𝑃
′ + (𝑅 − 1)
𝑃′(2𝑅 + 2𝛽𝑅 + 𝜀 − 𝛽𝜀 − 2)
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
+
𝑃′
2
[
4𝑅 − 4 − 2𝜀
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
] 
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 (1 − P′)USI2(𝑃) = (1 − 𝑃
′) + (𝑅 − 1)
2(1 − 𝑃′)
2𝑅 − 𝜀
+
𝛽(1 − 𝑃′)
2
[
4 − 4𝑅 + 2𝜀
𝛽(2𝑅 − 𝜀)
] 
 
P′USI1(𝑃) + (1 − P
′)USI2(𝑃)
= 1 + (
𝑃′
𝑃
− 𝑃′) (𝑅 − 1)
(2𝑅 + 2𝛽𝑅 + 𝜀 − 𝛽𝜀 − 2)
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
+ (
𝑃′
𝑃
− 𝑃′)
2𝑅 − 2 − 𝜀
2𝑅 − 𝜀
+ (𝑅 − 1)
2(1 − 𝑃′)
2𝑅 − 𝜀
+
(1 − 𝑃′)(2 − 2𝑅 + 𝜀)
2𝑅 − 𝜀
 
 
P′USI1(P) + (1 − P
′)USI2(𝑃) > P
′USI1(𝑃
′) + (1 − P′)USI2(𝑃
′) 
 
1 + (R − 1)
2R + 3ε − 4P′ε
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
< 1 + (
𝑃′
𝑃
− 𝑃′) (𝑅 − 1)
(2𝑅 + 2𝛽𝑅 + 𝜀 − 𝛽𝜀 − 2)
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
+ (
𝑃′
𝑃
− 𝑃′)
2𝑅 − 2 − 𝜀
2𝑅 − 𝜀
+ (𝑅 − 1)
2(1 − 𝑃′)
2𝑅 − 𝜀
+
(2 − 2𝑅 + 𝜀)(1 − 𝑃′)
2𝑅 − 𝜀
 
 
1 + (R − 1)
2R + 3ε − 4P′ε
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
< 1 + (
𝑃′
𝑃
− 𝑃′) (𝑅 − 1)
(2𝑅 + 2𝛽𝑅 + 𝜀 − 𝛽𝜀 − 2)
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
+ (
𝑃′
𝑃
− 𝑃′)
2𝑅 − 2 − 𝜀
2𝑅 − 𝜀
+ (𝑅 − 1)
2(1 − 𝑃′)
2𝑅 − 𝜀
+ (𝑃′ − 1)
(2𝑅 − 2 − 𝜀)
2𝑅 − 𝜀
 
 
(R − 1)
2R + 3ε − 4P′ε
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
< (
𝑃′
𝑃
− 𝑃′) (𝑅 − 1)
(2𝑅 + 2𝛽𝑅 + 𝜀 − 𝛽𝜀 − 2)
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
+ (
𝑃′
𝑃
− 1)
2𝑅 − 2 − 𝜀
2𝑅 − 𝜀
+ (𝑅 − 1)
2(1 − 𝑃′)
2𝑅 − 𝜀
 
 
(R − 1)
2R + 3ε − 4P′ε
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
< 𝑃′×
1 − 𝑃
𝑃
×(𝑅 − 1)
(2𝑅 + 2𝛽𝑅 + 𝜀 − 𝛽𝜀 − 2)
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
+ (
𝑃′
𝑃
− 1)
2𝑅 − 2 − 𝜀
2𝑅 − 𝜀
+ (𝑅 − 1)
2(1 − 𝑃′)
2𝑅 − 𝜀
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(R − 1)
2R + 3ε − 4P′ε
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
<
𝑃′
𝑃
(𝑅 − 1)
(2𝑅 + 𝜀 − 2𝑃𝜀 + 2𝑃 − 2)
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
+ (
𝑃′
𝑃
− 1)
2𝑅 − 2 − 𝜀
2𝑅 − 𝜀
+ (𝑅
− 1)
2(1 − 𝑃′)
2𝑅 − 𝜀
 
 
(R − 1)
2𝑅 + 𝜀 − 2𝑃′𝜀 − 2 + 2𝑃′
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
<
𝑃′
𝑃
(𝑅 − 1)
(2𝑅 + 𝜀 − 2𝑃𝜀 + 2𝑃 − 2)
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
+ (
𝑃′
𝑃
− 1)
2𝑅 − 2 − 𝜀
2𝑅 − 𝜀
 
 
(R − 1)
2𝑃𝑅 + 𝑃𝜀 − 2𝑃𝑃′𝜀 − 2𝑃 + 2𝑃𝑃′
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
< (𝑅 − 1)
(2𝑃′𝑅 + 𝑃′𝜀 − 2𝑃′𝑃𝜀 + 2𝑃𝑃′ − 2𝑃′)
(2𝑅 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝜀)
+ (𝑃′ − 𝑃)
2𝑅 − 2 − 𝜀
2𝑅 − 𝜀
 
 
(R − 1)
(𝑃 − 𝑃′)(2𝑅 + 𝜀 − 2)
(1 + 𝜀)
< (𝑃′ − 𝑃)(2𝑅 − 2 − 𝜀) 
 
(R − 1)(2R + ε − 2) < (𝜀 + 2 − 2𝑅)(1 + 𝜀) 
 
2𝑅2 − 𝜀2 + 3𝜀𝑅 − 2𝑅 − 4𝜀 < 0 
 
2𝑅2 + (3𝜀 − 2)𝑅 − 𝜀2 − 4𝜀 < 0 
 
Since 
2−3𝜀
4
< 1 and 𝑅 ∈ (1,1 +
𝜖
2
), we can see that 2𝑅2 + (3𝜀 − 2)𝑅 − 𝜀2 − 4𝜀 is increasing 
in (1,1 +
𝜖
2
), so we can check the extreme case where R=1 and 𝑅 = 1 +
𝜖
2
 to see whether the 
above inequity will be satisfied.  
 
When R=1 
 
2𝑅2 + (3𝜀 − 2)𝑅 − 𝜀2 − 4𝜀 = −𝜀2 − 3𝜀 < 0 
 
While R=1 +
𝜖
2
 
2𝑅2 + (3𝜀 − 2)𝑅 − 𝜀2 − 4𝜀 = 𝜀2 > 0 
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As a result when R<R*, the above inequity will be satisfied which means the all participating 
contract can be collusive proof. While R>R* the above inequity will not be satisfied which 
means that it becomes possible for agents to form a smaller trading group and increase the 
utility level inside the group. 
 
Case 2 
 
𝐼1 =
(4𝛽 + 2)𝜀 + 4𝑅 − 4 + 4𝛽
𝛽(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
 
 
𝐼2 =
(2𝛽 + 4)𝜀 + 4 − 4𝛽 + 4𝛽𝑅
(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
 
 
𝑥1 =
(2𝛽 + 1)𝜀2 + (4𝛽𝑅 + 4𝑅 − 2𝛽 − 4)𝜀 + (4𝑅𝛽 − 8𝑅 + 4𝑅2 + 4 − 4𝛽)
𝛽(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
 
 
𝑥2 =
(𝛽 + 2)𝜀2 + (4𝑅 + 4𝑅𝛽 − 4𝛽 − 2)𝜀 + (4𝑅 + 4𝛽 − 4 − 8𝛽𝑅 + 4𝛽𝑅2)
𝛽(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
 
 
P𝑈1 + (1 − P)𝑈2 = 1 + (𝑅 − 1)
(1 − 𝑃)[(6𝛽 + 6)𝜀 + 4𝑅 + 4𝛽𝑅]
(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
 
 
P𝑈1 + (1 − P)𝑈2 = 1 +
(𝑅 − 1)(1 − 𝑃)(𝛽 + 1)(6𝜀 + 4𝑅)
(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
 
 
P𝑈1 + (1 − P)𝑈2 = 1 + (𝑅 − 1)
2
𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4
 
 
P′USI1(𝑃
′) + (1 − P′)USI2(𝑃
′) = 1 + (𝑅 − 1)
2
𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4
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P′USI1(𝑃) + (1 − P
′)USI2(𝑃)
= 𝑃′ + (𝑅 − 1)
𝑃′[(4𝛽 + 2)𝜀 + 4𝑅 − 4 + 4𝛽]
𝛽(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
+
𝑃′(𝛽 − 1)(4𝑅2 − 12𝑅 + 8 − 2𝜀 − 𝜀2)
2𝛽(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
+ (1 − 𝑃′)
+ (𝑅 − 1)
(1 − 𝑃′)[(2𝛽 + 4)𝜀 + 4 − 4𝛽 + 4𝛽𝑅]
(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
+
(1 − 𝑃′)(𝛽 − 1)(𝜀2 + 2𝜀 + 12𝑅 − 4𝑅2 − 8)
2(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
 
 
P′USI1(𝑃) + (1 − P
′)USI2(𝑃)
= 1 + (𝑅 − 1)(
𝑃′
𝑃
− 1)
(4𝛽 + 2)𝜀 + 4𝑅 − 4 + 4𝛽
(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
+ (𝑅 − 1)
2(1 − 𝑃′)
(1 − 𝑃)(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)
+ (
𝑃′
𝑃
− 1)
(𝛽 − 1)(𝜀2 + 2𝜀 + 12𝑅 − 4𝑅2 − 8)
2(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
 
 
 
P′USI1(P) + (1 − P
′)USI2(𝑃) > P
′USI1(𝑃
′) + (1 − P′)USI2(𝑃
′) 
 
1 + (𝑅 − 1) (
𝑃′
𝑃
− 1)
(4𝛽 + 2)𝜀 + 4𝑅 − 4 + 4𝛽
(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
+ (𝑅 − 1)
2(1 − 𝑃′)
(1 − 𝑃)(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)
+ (
𝑃′
𝑃
− 1)
(𝛽 − 1)(𝜀2 + 2𝜀 + 12𝑅 − 4𝑅2 − 8)
2(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
> 1 + (𝑅 − 1)
2
𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4
 
 
(R − 1)(
𝑃′
𝑃
− 1)
(4𝛽 + 2)𝜀 + 4𝑅 − 4 + 4𝛽
(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
+ (
𝑃′
𝑃
− 1)
(𝛽 − 1)(𝜀2 + 2𝜀 + 12𝑅 − 4𝑅2 − 8)
2(𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
> (𝑅 − 1)[1 −
(1 − 𝑃′)
(1 − 𝑃)
]
2
𝜀 − 2𝑅 + 4
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(R − 1)(1 −
𝑃′
𝑃
)
(4𝛽 + 2)𝜀 + 4𝑅 − 4 + 4𝛽
(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
+ (1 −
𝑃′
𝑃
)
(𝛽 − 1)(𝜀2 + 2𝜀 + 12𝑅 − 4𝑅2 − 8)
2(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
< 2(𝑅 − 1)[
(1 − 𝑃′)
(1 − 𝑃)
− 1] 
 
(R − 1)
𝑃 − 𝑃′
𝑃
×
(4𝛽 + 2)𝜀 + 4𝑅 − 4 + 4𝛽
3𝜀 + 2𝑅
+
𝑃 − 𝑃′
𝑃
×
(𝛽 − 1)(𝜀2 + 2𝜀 + 12𝑅 − 4𝑅2 − 8)
2(3𝜀 + 2𝑅)
< 2(𝑅 − 1)
𝑃 − 𝑃′
1 − 𝑃
 
 
(R − 1)
𝑃 − 𝑃′
𝑃
[(8𝛽 + 4)𝜀 + 8𝑅 − 8 − 8𝛽] +
𝑃 − 𝑃′
𝑃
(𝛽 − 1)(𝜀2 + 2𝜀 + 12𝑅 − 4𝑅2 − 8)
< (𝑅 − 1)
𝑃 − 𝑃′
1 − 𝑃
×4(3𝜀 + 2𝑅) 
 
(R − 1)
𝑃 − 𝑃′
𝑃
{[8𝑃 + 4(1 − 𝑃)]𝜀 + 8(1 − 𝑃)𝑅 − 8(1 − 𝑃) + 8𝑃}
+
𝑃 − 𝑃′
𝑃
(2𝑃 − 1)(𝜀2 + 2𝜀 + 12𝑅 − 4𝑅2 − 8)
< 4(𝑅 − 1)(𝑃 − 𝑃′)(3𝜀 + 2𝑅) 
 
(R − 1){[8𝑃 + 4(1 − 𝑃)]𝜀 + 8(1 − 𝑃)𝑅 − 8(1 − 𝑃) + 8𝑃}
+ (2𝑃 − 1)(𝜀2 + 2𝜀 + 12𝑅 − 4𝑅2 − 8) < 4(𝑅 − 1)(3𝑃𝜀 + 2𝑅𝑃) 
 
(R − 1)(4ε + 4Pε + 8R − 8RP − 8 + 16P − 12Pε − 8PR)
< (2𝑃 − 1)(8 + 4𝑅2 − 12𝑅 − 𝜀2 − 2𝜀) 
 
(R − 1)(4𝜀 − 8𝑃𝜀 + 8𝑅 − 16𝑅𝑃 − 8 + 16𝑃) < (2𝑃 − 1)(8 + 4𝑅2 − 12𝑅 − 𝜀2 − 2𝜀) 
 
(R − 1)(2P − 1)(8 − 8R − 4ε) < (2𝑃 − 1)(8 + 4𝑅2 − 12𝑅 − 𝜀2 − 2𝜀) 
 
(R − 1)(8 − 8R − 4ε) < (8 + 4𝑅2 − 12𝑅 − 𝜀2 − 2𝜀 
 
8R − 8𝑅2 − 4𝜀𝑅 − 8 + 8𝑅 + 4𝜀 < 8 + 4𝑅2 − 12𝑅 − 𝜀2 − 2𝜀 
 
28R − 12𝑅2 − 16 − 4𝜀𝑅 + 6𝜀 + 𝜀2 < 0 
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(R − 1)(4ε − 16 + 8R) > (𝜀 + 2 − 2𝑅)(𝜀 + 2𝑅) 
 
Since R < 1 +
𝜀
2
 and ε < 1, we can infer that R < 1.5. So 4ε − 16 + 8R < 0, ε + 2 − 2R >
0 , R − 1 > 0 and ε + 2R > 0 . As a result, the above inequity will not be satisfied. Which 
means it is possible for agents to form a smaller collusion and increase the utility level inside 
the group. 
 
 
 
 
